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Preface
In this book I examine the link between Russia’s energy and political
power in domestic and foreign policy contexts. The energy of Russia, the
power made possible, mediated and programmed by energy, is scrutin-
ized in a way that takes into account a global normative imperative: the
urgent need to transform fossil energy-dependent societies into low-
carbon ones. I postulate that we can both understand and provide tools
for Russia to build a more resilient and sustainable future for itself and
the global community by focusing on energy via the prisms of power,
spatiality and climate change. I will show how different energy sources –
in a broader social and cultural sense – condition and limit Russia’s
choices, and what the consequences of this are as the surrounding world,
global environment, and global energy and climate politics change.
The foundation for this book is the empirical research that I have
conducted since around 2010. However, the ‘grand narrative’ of the book
is based on my research interests since the beginning of my academic
career in the late 1990s. The main question that has guided me through-
out these years is how natural resources, energy and space are governed
in Russia, and what those different practices within the system of rule
can tell us about the nature of political power. Although my work has
involved very interdisciplinary settings and topics, my ‘home base’ is
geography and that, along with the questions we geographers ask, is
visible in all my research, including this book. Thus, the ultimate
question is the following: how is political power practised with the help
of resources and space, and how do geographical factors condition the
scope of political power?
In the introductory chapter, I outline the objectives of my book and
contextualize the approach I employ through a historical perspective.
Furthermore, I use the introduction to contextualize Russia’s energy by
defining the major actors behind energy policies in Russia and the
resources they deploy, in addition to introducing the vision that also
concludes this book. The contextualizing segment is partly based on
my chapter ‘Energy Governance in Russia: From a Fossil to a Green
Giant?’, in M. Knodt and J. Kemmerzell (eds.), Handbook on the Energy
Governance in Europe (New York: Springer, 2019).
vi
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The second chapter defines the theoretical and methodological
approach that I use: I look at Russia’s energy via a spatial prism where
the flows of energy and materialities with which the flows transect and
intertwine are part of political power practices. This chapter is partially
based on my previous publications: ‘Russian Bioenergy and the EU’s
Renewable Energy Goals: Perspectives of Security’, in S. Oxenstierna
and V.-P. Tynkkynen (eds.), Russian Energy and Security up to 2030
(London: Routledge, 2014) and ‘The Environment of an Energy Giant:
Climate Discourse Framed by “Hydrocarbon Culture”’, in M. Poberezh-
skaya and T. Ashe (eds.), Climate Change Discourse in Russia: Past and
Present (London: Routledge, 2018).
The third chapter looks at energy power in the domestic context, and is
based on my two previously published articles on Gazprom’s national gas
programme Gazifikatsiya Rossii: ‘Energy as Power: Gazprom, Gas Infra-
structure, and Geo-Governmentality in Putin’s Russia’, in Slavic Review,
75(2) (2016), and ‘Sports Fields and Corporate Governmentality:
Gazprom’s All-Russian Gas Program as Energopower’, in N. Koch (ed.),
Critical Geographies of Sport: Space, Power and Sport in Global
Perspective (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).
The fourth chapter examines Russian energy power on the international
scene by focusing on the little-studied case of Russia–Finland energy
trade and diplomacy. This chapter is partly based on my previously
published texts and reports I have contributed to: the above-mentioned
book chapter in Russian Energy and Security up to 2030 (2014), a Policy
Brief ‘Global Energy Transitions and Russia’s Energy Influence in
Finland’ commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office of Finland (2017),
and the article ‘Russia’s Nuclear Power and Finland’s Foreign Policy’
published in Russian Analytical Digest, 193 (2016).
In the fifth chapter, I focus on the environmental issues and energy
futures of one of the most central regions for a hydrocarbon-dependent
Russia – the Arctic. This chapter is partly based on my ‘Introduction:
Contested Russian Arctic’, in V.-P. Tynkkynen, S. Tabata, D. Gritsenko
and M. Goto (eds.), Russia’s Far North: The Contested Energy Frontier
(Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2018), and ‘Russia’s Arctic Natural
Gas and the Definition of Sustainability’, Hot Spots, Cultural Anthro-
pology website, 29 July 2016.
The sixth chapter is based on empirical research and focuses on
climate change discourse, especially the denial of anthropogenic climate
change in Russia. The chapter was written in collaboration with Nina
Tynkkynen and previously published as ‘Climate Denial Revisited:
(Re)contextualising Russian Public Discourse on Climate Change during
Putin 2.0’, in Europe-Asia Studies, 70(7) (2018).
Preface vii
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In the seventh and final chapter of the book, I analyse the ways in
which today’s Russia could escape its problematic fossil energy depend-
ence. Here I look at the first decarbonization efforts inside the
hydrocarbon-dependent regime of Putin, and this chapter is partly based
on my ‘Energy Governance in Russia: From a Fossil to a Green Giant?’
cited above. I conclude the book with a vision for a decarbonized and
green, and thus resilient and sustainable Russia. This vision is based on
the theoretical approach I outline in the second chapter and the empirical
findings that I elaborate on in the following four chapters.
viii The energy of Russia
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1. Introduction: hydrocarbon culture
amidst a changing climate
All but one of the chapters of this book, the concluding one, are devoted
to the problems arising from the entanglement of fossil energy and
political power in Russia. I argue that this is essential, as we cannot come
up with any positive and enlightened foresights for Russia and its
partners without a very detailed knowledge of the problems in the current
energy-political system and its specific hydrocarbon culture mentality.
The hydrocarbon-dependent regime of President Putin is both unable and
unwilling to see the inevitable systemic change that is approaching, and
brought about by global climate change. This Russian deadlock has
encouraged me to seek tools to confront the problem. I define the task in
this chapter by outlining the aims and scope of the book. The latter part
of the chapter contextualizes Russian energy: it is devoted to Russia’s
energy resources, their extraction, domestic use and export, and also
defines the central actors determining the main directions of Russia’s
energy policies, which includes paving the way towards much-needed
climate neutrality.
RESOURCE GEOGRAPHY SETS THE SCENE FOR
POLITICAL CULTURE
This book is an attempt to understand how natural resources and energy
affect the political aims, societal discourses and cultural identity of the
Russian society. Furthermore, it aims to analyse how different energy
sources set conditions for specific political and cultural practices that
frame Russia’s choices, and what the consequences of this are for Russia
and the global community. The focus is more on discourses and practices
promoted by the elite rather than the popular embrace of that agenda. The
fact that high dependence on oil and gas is justified by the economic and
political elite via space and time – oil and gas are depicted as part of
Russian identity and justified with the help of geography and history – is
at the epicentre of the analysis.
1
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On the one hand, the book is linked to debates over the societal and
political implications of energy, and especially that of energy depend-
ence. Thus, readers will find connections to the academic discourse of the
resource curse, for example, a discussion linking the research interests of
economists and political scientists in a quest to understand the economic
and political implications of high resource rents and economic depend-
ence on one or a few (energy) resources. In addition, the concepts of
‘energy superpower’ and ‘energy weapon’ are referred to in the book, but
the links between energy power and energy security are examined with a
twist differing from the traditional accounts that dwell on the topic of
energy as political leverage. Due to the theoretical and methodological
choices I make, which echo my understanding as a political geographer
of what is interesting and relevant, I emphasize that the spatialities and
materialities of energy do play a significant role in explaining Russia’s
choices. The point of departure is that energy materialities possess
agency that frames policies and practices, narratives and discourses by
limiting or enabling different actors to exert power. This means that the
power of various energy sources and the materialities linked to them,
such as oil geology and geography, pipeline infrastructure, a district
heating network or the heat produced by gas, set conditions for certain
political, bureaucratic, commercial and cultural practices in the society.
Due to their spatiality and the materialities – the environment, geology,
infrastructures, flows, links, networks and rents related and connected to
oil and gas – hydrocarbon energy has a conditionalizing effect on societal
development, especially in the Russia context. The fact that geography
and history frame Russia’s choices (Lo 2015) is amplified via the high
dependence on oil and gas, which are once again being depicted as part
of Russian history and geography. Thus, the agency and power of
Russian energy is approached with a viewpoint where Foucauldian
power-analytics and Latourian actor-network theory meet a spatially
thinking scholar.
One presupposition I make in this book is that Russia is a nation and a
country impacted negatively by a high dependence on energy rents and
flows. Russia is not cursed on the same scale as Saudi Arabia, Turkmeni-
stan or Venezuela, but much more than the United States or Norway,
which are also major energy players. Thus, in econometric terms Russia’s
dependence is a hybrid falling somewhere between these two groups of
oil and gas producers. Before the drop in global oil prices that began in
2014, the income from oil and gas exports covered a little more than half
of the government budget (Sabitova and Shavaleyeva 2015). Approxi-
mately two-thirds of this – one-third of total budget income – comes
from oil, because Russia exports 75 per cent of the 550 million tons of
2 The energy of Russia
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the oil that it produces to other countries as crude oil (50 per cent) and
refined oil products (25 per cent). In contrast, nearly three-quarters of the
650 billion cubic metres of gas produced is consumed in Russia, so it
only provides approximately 15–20 per cent of budget income flow.
These flows of energy within Russia and especially out to the global
markets mean that Russia’s energy industry accounts for 25–30 per cent
of GDP. These indicators show that Russia is highly, but not chronically
dependent on fossil energy rents. As these countries grow more depend-
ent on oil and gas, they become more authoritarian, have weaker
(official) institutions, and lag behind others economically (Överland et al.
2010).
My aim is to take this fossil energy dependence as a contextual factor
that makes many political, societal and cultural discourses and practices
understandable. Therefore, the analysis I carry out provides a more
profound explanation of the societal and political effects of energy
dependence: my arguments utilize empirical studies focusing on the
spatialities and materialities of how energy power is practised in Russia.
Naturally, the materialities of energy and the assemblages formed around
fossil energies do not dictate decisions, narratives, deeds or words
vis-à-vis the central energy, environmental, social and foreign policies of
Russia. They frame them to the extent that some powerful actors and
institutions, such as the state-owned gas giant Gazprom, may use these
spatialities and materialities to foster power strategies that benefit these
actors. However, at the same time, these very materialities enable
resistance by helping to construct and maintain counter-discourses and
practices that challenge the (statist) hegemonic discourses and practices.
Here also lies the potential for change: the path dependency that creates
the spatialities and materialities of fossil energy also helps us to
understand what is needed to build a new more sustainable society that
draws its power from different spatialities and materialities. Furthermore,
energy spatialities and materialities also possess agency with a power of
its own that nobody controls. This agency comes close to infrastructural
inertia, but is actually a much wider notion: the agency of energy and its
materialities are the product of material and human, infrastructural and
social, technical and cultural elements. I study this intertwinement using
a power-conscious spatial approach, by asking explicitly how the spati-
alities and materialities of fossil energy are used as part of a political
technology or political power in the Russian context, and how this path
dependence can be broken.
Historically speaking, from Siberian fur in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth century to Siberian, Arctic and Far Eastern oil, gas and uranium in
Introduction: hydrocarbon culture amidst a changing climate 3
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the twenty-first century, Russia has always been socially and economic-
ally dependent on the extraction of natural resources and production of
raw materials. In that respect, one can argue that natural resources, and
even today, energy have always been part of the formula that explains the
framework and scope of politics and policies in Russia. The argument I
make here is that Russia’s high societal dependence on the extraction of
natural resources impacts not only politics and policy but also the polity
(e.g. Ferguson and Mansbach 1996). Polity refers to the whole spectrum
of how the society is governed and ruled, including how it is kept intact
discursively. A polity is made up of ‘identity’, ‘resources’ and ‘hier-
archy’, which are factors that explain and justify each other. Identity is
linked to the (natural) resources that are, again, linked to the way the
society is governed. This is the situation everywhere concerning any
nation or state: the environment and its resources do effect the identities
of that particular culture. However, the fact that Russian society has
always been governed in a hierarchical top-down fashion by tsars,
general secretaries and presidents, who exert their personal power and
that of the elite over the people in a non-democratic way, urges us to
ponder more thoroughly the link between identity, rule and resources. In
this book, I argue that the high dependence on natural resources and – in
the case of Putin’s Russia – energy encourages a more authoritarian rule
than what would have been the case with a different view of resource
geographies and the economic strategies utilizing those geographically
versatile resources. Thus, the geographies of natural resources and
histories related to their extraction play a pivotal role. The fact that the
main stock of natural resources – from furs to timber and coal and from
hydrocarbons to uranium and diamonds – has historically been located in
the periphery and thus spatially detached from the main bulk of popu-
lation and from central settlements and cities in the core areas is the key
to understanding the form of rule that has developed in Russia. The rulers
have never really been dependent on people as resources, but on natural
resources that have been and are detached from communities and the
people. Thus, my argument is that geography has played a significant
role in framing how the country has been governed – and it continues to
do so.
Thinking of the polity formed over centuries in the territory we know
as today’s Russia, another concept – namely Great Power or Empire – is
closely linked to the discussions on polity and of paramount importance.
I argue that in the Russian case, the empire rather than the state is the
territorial manifestation of a polity. The territories of an empire are not
strictly defined and fixed, as with Westphalian states, which leads to a
fluid body politic and, thus, implicitly to unpredictable behaviour.
4 The energy of Russia
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Political scientists who focus on Russia and politicians and diplomats
who know Russia tend to agree only about this: Russia has been and
remains unpredictable. Approaching this discussion with a spatially
schooled mind inspires the following question: is Russia as a nation and
as a polity doomed by its geography? Is it doomed to authoritarian rule
and poor governance, unpredictability and, subsequently, violence
towards its own people and the outside world because of this built-in
unpredictability, and therefore seen as a pariah state among the nations of
the world? The economic and political trends of post-Soviet Russia
unfortunately strengthen this gloomy prediction (for example, Gel’man
2015; Gessen 2017). The role of natural resources – especially fossil
energy, oil and gas – has increased significantly since the last Soviet
decade: in the 1980s the GDP share of the energy sector was about
10 per cent, whereas during the 2010s it is around 25 per cent (Simola
and Solanko 2017). The energy sector did not dominate the Soviet
economy, but it does dominate Russia’s. In addition to arms, energy and
raw materials are the only competitive Russian products in world
markets. The recent increased inputs to the arms industry is the direct
consequence of energy rents, oil and gas money, which are easily
available to the regime and are also used to protect the regime against
enemies – internal and external, real and imagined. I argue that the
violence Russia has carried out is linked to the fact that the Putin regime
feels threatened by internal and external actors – it either really thinks
that it is a surrounded fortress that other groups and states want to
conquer and destroy or it uses this narrative as clout to justify extreme
measures that distract public attention from the real structural problems
facing Russia (Gel’man 2015; Yablokov 2018). At the heart of this fear is
the realization that the regime is in fact extremely weak, and its
legitimacy constantly challenged first and foremost by the Russian
people. A central issue being challenged by the population is the role of
Russia as a mere producer of raw materials, ‘an energy-producing
appendage of the West’ (Rutland 2015), as this is linked to the layman’s
experience of economic injustice prevailing between the elite and the
people. Therefore, the increasingly central economic and political role
played by hydrocarbons has to be justified to the Russians; and this must
be done, as the future of the Putin regime itself is in many ways
dependent on hydrocarbons. This has pushed the regime to build a
legitimizing narrative around hydrocarbons, in addition to turning the
focus from systemic economic and societal problems caused by the fossil
energy dependence to producing conflicts on the international arena in
hopes that the construction of an outside threat will unite the Russian
people under the grand strategy. Thus, the violence Russia has practised
Introduction: hydrocarbon culture amidst a changing climate 5
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and propelled in Ukraine and Syria, and the hostile actions towards its
Western partners – from meddling in elections, mingling with and
funding the far-right, performing ‘covert’ targeted military operations,
hacking and trolling, and even running a state-led doping programme –
are all carried out in order to produce fault lines in Europe and America
and to weaken the West. All this may seem like we are witnessing a
strong Russia. However, what we really see is the fearful leadership of a
‘Potemkin Empire’, which understands that its power and legitimacy are
actually built on very shaky ground.
During the Putin era and since 2000, economic affluence and wealth
has also been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a shrinking group
of people. Today, three-quarters of the wealth in Russia is owned by 1 per
cent of the population, or approximately 1.5 million people. In compari-
son, this figure is less than 40 per cent in the United States and China
(Shorrocks et al. 2016). The ability to accumulate wealth within networks
of power may seem like an outcome of deliberate decisions. However, the
ability to do so is also linked to the specific geographies of energy. Since
the number of people employed in the oil and gas sectors in Russia is
relatively low, despite the fact that companies such as Gazprom are
among Russia’s biggest individual employers, the workforce in the oil
and gas sector has poor bargaining power. The silence of the few people
needed to keep the hydrocarbons flowing from the wells to households,
power plants and export can easily be ‘bought’ and tamed, without the
need for the regime to submit to labour’s political agenda. Timothy
Mitchell (2011) describes this paramount change in labour bargaining
power when the global energy transition pushed us away from depend-
ence on coal, and married us to oil and gas. People employed in the coal
industry were a political body that had a democratizing effect in Western
industrializing countries: the labour unions would not have been strong
without the bargaining power of the coal workers, who were in a position
to halt industrial production dependent on coal via strikes and blockades,
thus providing leverage in relation to how capitalists and political elites
could accumulate wealth and power. This leverage potential existed
during the Soviet economy, as coal and steel industries were economic-
ally pivotal in addition to being major employers. Of course, this leverage
position can easily be contested by arguing that the totalitarian nature of
the Soviet state did not allow this position for the workers. We know that
the labour unions of the Soviet Union were de facto weak (Blom et al.
1996). The labour unions provide some social stability in today’s Russia,
but remain as weak as during the planned economy. Moreover, the most
lucrative and thus important sector of the Russian economy – oil and
gas industries – is a good employer with high salaries, but oil and gas
6 The energy of Russia
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workers have poor political leverage. It accounts for a meagre 1–2 per
cent of the overall workforce, depending on the definition (Simola and
Solanko 2017). The fact that oil and gas are produced in areas with
extremely low population densities, detached from settlements and the
densely populated European Russia, further enables the Putin regime and
its closest entourage to keep the main rents and networks of power in
their hands. The geographies of natural resources and those of fossil
energy thus allow the Russian leadership to carry out policies that serve
their interests and consolidate power via two factors that reinforce each
other. First of all, the sector that produces rents and enables power within
Putin’s entourage is (socio-)politically weak due to the low number of
people employed in that sector, and therefore easily controlled and
tamed. Second, the production and transportation – and to lesser degree
refining – of oil and gas take place in spatially extremely confined points
and corridors in the territory of Russia, detached from the lives of most
Russians, which means that extracting those resources does not expose
the Putin regime to any serious conflicts with the local communities and
Russian society.
In summary, oil and gas both make it possible for and push Putin’s
regime to be violent towards its own people and pay little attention to
international norms – from respecting the sovereignty of other states to
promoting global efforts to mitigate global climate change. I emphasize
that a Russian Empire that is less dependent on hydrocarbons or
similar resources that centralize power could still be an unpredictable and
violent actor. However, I argue that the likelihood of this is significantly
lower in an energy and resource-wise decentralized, economically region-
alized and politically federalized Russia than under the contemporary
hydrocarbon-based rule. Next, I will discuss the premises for moving
away from that diabolical hydrocarbon dependence.
RESOURCES FOR ENERGY TRANSITION?
Russia is an energy giant – and this concerns hydrocarbons, coal and
uranium as well as renewable energy. In addition, Russia has the
technologically relatively developed society needed to foster an energy
transition towards a low-carbon economy. Russia has a large bioenergy
potential via its forests, which are the largest in the world, but its
extensive territory also provides the potential to develop wind, small-
scale hydro, solar and geothermal power in an economically viable way.
Despite this promising premise, a more accurate glance reveals that high
dependence on extraction of natural resources, which defines the Russian
Introduction: hydrocarbon culture amidst a changing climate 7
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economy and politics, is an aspect hindering the transition towards
carbon neutrality and renewable energy. The most crucial factor defining
energy governance in Russia is the fact that its territory is endowed with
large deposits of oil, gas, coal and uranium. Especially, the pivotal role
played by oil and gas industries in the Russian economy and the strong
linkages between political power and the fossil energy sector seem to be
at odds with the energy transition objectives also set in Russian govern-
mental strategies since the early 2000s. The energy sector covers roughly
a quarter of national GDP and the export of oil and gas alone contributes
from one-third to half, depending on the price of oil, to the Russian state
budget revenues (Simola and Solanko 2017). In this situation, determined
by the realities of Russia’s political economy, it is therefore hard to set an
unbiased playing ground for those industries and actors making it
possible to pave the way for energy transition towards a low-carbon
society.
An abundance of energy and resource coupled with historical paths has
created immense industries in all non-renewable energy sectors in Russia.
The colossal size of the industries and companies in the natural resource
sector is the result not only of political history and large resources per se,
but also of particular resource geographies: the globally salient deposits
of hydrocarbons, coal and uranium are not evenly distributed in the
Russian Eurasian space, but concentrated in specific areas that are mostly
far away from the population centres. As a result, the oil, gas, coal and
uranium industries have required major infrastructural investments in
order to develop resources found mainly in the periphery. The fact that
gas industry leader Gazprom controls 40 000 kilometres of gas pipelines
is thus the outcome of the political economy history in Russia, as well as
the distinct population and resource geographies of a country with the
propensity to ‘stretch’ these infrastructures. This feature then magnifies
the energy–society loop: the more Russia has been forced to invest in
energy infrastructures (such as gas pipelines, oil ports, etc.) to maintain
production volumes that allow a particular level of rents, the more its
political choices have been decreased concerning the energy transition
from a carbon-based to a carbon-free energy system.
Energy efficiency objectives promote, at least on the discursive level,
the introduction of renewable energy sources (RES) because renewables
are also seen as a substitute, especially for oil and coal in the domestic
energy mix. Nonetheless, this goal seems very difficult to attain, despite
the fact that the legislative base to invest in renewable energy projects has
been laid, and there are a few cases of recent successful RES projects.
Russia has all the material resources to become a ‘Green Giant’, but at
the moment it is severely falling behind all other major energy powers –
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the EU, China and the United States – in RES deployment. Lastly, the
proportional increases in RES utilization may encourage the idea that a
major transition is already underway in Russia, but this is only due to the
exceptionally low starting point of RES utilized in Russia.
THE ‘ENERGY MIX’ TODAY
Russia is a significant energy exporter and rents obtained from exports of
oil, gas, coal, uranium and nuclear technologies constitute about half of
Russia’s budget revenues, in addition to which the energy sector produces
about a quarter of Russia’s GDP. Around half of the energy produced in
Russia is consumed in the country, which means 730 million tons of oil
equivalent (toe), out of 1370 toe total. Since the 1970s, the share of
natural gas has increased significantly in the energy mix, and today it
accounts for half of the overall energy consumption in Russia. Oil covers
around one-fifth of Russia’s energy demand, coal a little less than 20 per
cent, and nuclear 6 per cent. Hydropower and renewables both cover
between 1 and 2 per cent of the total energy demand, but hydropower
and nuclear power cover one-third of electricity production in Russia,
with each accounting for 15 per cent. Gas dominates electricity pro-
duction with a share of almost 50 per cent, although its role has
diminished during the last decade, whereas nuclear, coal and hydropower
each constitute about one-sixth of the electricity produced in Russia
(Table 1.1).
The transition from heavy oil and coal to gas in heat and power
generation is a paramount systemic change in the energy sector of
Russia. This change is pivotal not only due to its positive local and global
environmental impacts – gas consumption releases far less pollutants
affecting human health and ecosystems on a local (SO2, NOX, soot, etc.)
as well as global (CO2) level than oil and coal – but also concerning the
role of players in the field of energy markets and policy. The gas sector is
consequently central in all energy policy fields in Russia: gas covers half
of overall energy consumption and along with electricity production,
households are very dependent on gas indirectly via district heating and
directly because gas is extensively used in cooking.
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Table 1.1 Total primary energy supply (TPES) in Russia (IEA 2018b)
Essential energy data, 2016
Total energy production: 1373.7 Mtoe (natural gas 39.2%, oil 40.0%,
coal 15.2%, nuclear 3.8%, hydro 1.2%, biofuels and waste 0.6%),
+29.5% since 2002
TPES: 732.4 Mtoe (natural gas 50.7%, oil 23.7%, coal 15.5%,
nuclear 7.0%, hydro 2.2%, biofuels and waste 1.1%), +18.4% since
2002
Electricity generation: 1088.9 TWh (natural gas 47.9%, nuclear
18.1%, coal 15.7%, hydro 17.0%, oil 1.0%, biofuels and waste 0.2%,
geothermal 0.1%), +21.6% since 2002
TPES per capita: 5.2 toe, +21.4% since 2002
TPES per real GDP: 0.34 toe/USD 1000 GDP PPP, –23.6% since
2002
Nonetheless, there are significant regional differences in the energy mix,
with the European part of Russia, excluding the High North, depending
on gas, nuclear and hydropower, whereas Siberian Russia, especially the
Far East, still relies on coal as the main energy source, although central
Siberian industrial cities have evolved around massive hydropower plants
that function as the primary source of energy for the heavy industries in
these centres (Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, etc.). High reliance on
coal, especially in the Russian Far East affects regional and even foreign
policy considerations in the Kremlin. Thus, the national gas distribution
programme, Gazifikatsiya Rossii (see Chapter 3), is carried out not only
to raise gas coverage in the peripheral parts of European Russia and
decrease the high level of energy poverty in these locations, but also to
connect Siberian and Far Eastern regions and population centres to
‘mainland’ Russia. This connectivity is vital both in maintaining central
control over these far-away regions, and subsequently impeding Chinese
influence in this region that Moscow views with a geopolitical glance: as
a potentially separatist region (cf. Wengle 2015, p. 10).
Wood has traditionally been the main source of energy in many
Russian peripheral settlements in the countryside, as well as the source of
energy and raw material for the Russian forestry industry mainly located
in the Northwest and in Southern Siberia. Russia’s overall capacity in
renewable energy is vast, but less than 1 per cent of its total primary
energy production is based on renewables (see Table 1.1). However,
when measured in terms of what is economically viable with today’s
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prices and technology, Russia could produce one-third of its domestic
primary energy with renewables (Shuiskii et al. 2010, p. 325). In add-
ition, more ambitious policies would allow renewables to cover all
electricity demand in Russia (Bogdanov and Breyer 2015).
EXPORTING A BEAR’S SHARE
Russia exports roughly half of its energy production, 640 million tons out
of 1370 million tons produced yearly. European Union countries are still
by far the biggest buyers of Russian energy, but flows to China are
increasing. The EU member states buy approximately 60 per cent, or 330
million tons, of oil produced by Russia, which is equivalent to three-
quarters of the oil exported by Russia. Although oil is economically the
most important commodity between the parties, trade issues and espe-
cially disputes over gas dominate the headlines. Russia produces approxi-
mately 600 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas, but unlike oil most of it –
nearly 70 per cent – is consumed in Russia. Gas is the most important
energy commodity within Russia, and also the most power-vested in
terms of both domestic and foreign policy. The EU countries import
approximately 200 bcm of gas from Russia, accounting for one-third of
all Russian gas production. Almost all gas flows to Europe via a few
major and politically debated pipelines: old pipes traversing Ukraine,
Belarus, Poland and other Central European countries, and the new Nord
Stream I and in all likelihood also the twin pipeline Nord Stream II in the
near future. In combination, they move up to 110 bcm of gas along the
bottom of the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, and from there on to
European markets. In the future, the Russian gas companies Gazprom
and Novatek also aim to export gas to European and world markets in
liquefied form, LNG.
In addition to exports of hydrocarbons – oil and gas, as well as refined
products from oil, gas condensates and gas – Russia is a major provider
of coal and uranium. Again, the EU market is the primary destination for
Russia’s coal and uranium. Russia produces approximately 300 million
tons of coal annually and one-third of this, or 100 million tons (in energy
content this is equivalent to 70 Mtoe), is bought by EU countries. The
volume (2150 t) and share (15 per cent) of uranium of Russian origin
feeding European nuclear power plants, some of which are Soviet/
Russian design, is also significant (WNA 2016). In terms of importing
energy to the EU space, Russia provides approximately one-third of all
imported fossil energy sources – oil, gas and coal – in all the sectors, and
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one-sixth of all uranium. All in all, Russia is a pivotal provider of energy
to the European markets, and an emerging seller of energy to China.
As discussed above, domestic consumption of renewable energy in
Russia has not evolved remarkably. However, real competition for
Russian renewable energy might develop in a decade or two. For
example, about 80–90 per cent of bioenergy produced in Russia is
currently exported. By far the biggest importer thus far has been Sweden,
where a large number of private households rely on pellets for heat
production. Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy have
emerged as important buyers of Russian bioenergy (Aguilar et al. 2011,
p. 90). For Russia, it would make sense to export those forms of
renewable energy that are exportable, mainly bioenergy, and proceed in
replacing domestic fossil fuel consumption with non-exportable renew-
able energy and with hydro and nuclear power. The fact that the EU is
moving fast in the renewables sector and that Russia seemingly plans to
rely more on renewables only after 2020 (Ministry of Energy RF 2009,
p. 23) creates a win-win situation for these energy partners, especially
with consideration to the next decade or two. The Energy Roadmap 2050
(European Commission 2011a), which was formulated between the two
parties and in the framework of the EU–Russia Energy Dialogue (Euro-
pean Commission 2011b), clearly states that Russia could become a
source of both renewable electricity and bioenergy imports for EU
countries.
INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS ON THE ENERGY SCENE
The official agencies in control of energy issues within the Russian
state administration are the Ministry of Energy (min-energo-gov.ru) and
the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (mnr.gov.ru).
The former outlines Russia’s energy policy, such as the Energy Strategy
of Russia (Ministry of Energy RF 2009, 2017), whereas the latter has
the mandate to issue licences for new energy developments, for
example, granting rights concerning which enterprises can access which
energy deposits. The President and the Presidential Administration
(en.kremlin.ru/structure/administration) do not have a separate organ
focusing on energy issues and policy, yet the President has legislative
powers through decrees (ukaz) that also apply to the energy sector.
However, the President has straightforward leverage on the decision-
making of the three state-owned energy companies, Gazprom, Rosneft
and Rosatom – all of which are central actors in terms of defining energy
policies in Russia.
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Gazprom is an open joint-stock company (OAO) in which the Russian
state has owned 50 per cent plus one share since 2005. It is the successor
to the Soviet Ministry of Gas Industry and at the moment employs more
than 450 000 workers, produces 70 per cent of Russia’s gas and also
includes finance and media in its portfolio. Despite the fact that Gazprom
is a commercial enterprise and not a state corporation, it can be defined
as a parastatal company. Naming it as a parastatal company implies that
the Russian state and President Putin’s regime exercise authority over the
decisions of the enterprise to a greater extent than its legal position as a
commercial enterprise would allow. Naturally, not all the decisions of the
enterprise are politically motivated, as business rationale is the main
motivation for operational decisions taken by the company. Moreover,
Gazprom is a vast company that includes dozens of regional subsidiaries
with objectives and political voices stemming from the realities of the
Russian regions. That said, all strategic moves, especially concerning
overseas operations and major infrastructure projects, are decided by
Putin’s entourage. Since the company is controlled by Russia’s political
elite, it has more privileges and also more state-defined societal tasks
than any other enterprise in Russia. In the 2010s, Gazprom lost its
monopoly over gas exports and had to grant other companies, primarily
Novatek, Rosneft and Lukoil, access to the domestic gas pipeline system.
However, the monopoly still predominates in practice despite the fact that
more competition is now allowed. This position has allowed it to
diminish competitors’ opportunities to increase their market share in
regional energy mixes or the national gas market. This makes Gazprom’s
position in the Russian domestic energy sector an exceptional one: it has
the power to block renewable energy and coal producers who have
prospects to increase their production in the Russian regions, as well as
the ability to prevent oil companies from feeding associated petroleum
gas into the national pipeline system (more on Gazprom in Chapter 3).
Rosneft is another state entity focusing primarily on oil production. It
is the world’s largest listed oil company by output and has a workforce of
250 000 employees, bringing it close to Gazprom in terms of its role in
the Russian economy and society. With 50 per cent state ownership,
Rosneft can be similarly defined as a parastatal company, despite its
substantial private and foreign ownership (BP and unknown offshore
owners each hold 19 per cent). The national oil company, which is the
successor to Mikhail Hodorkovsky’s Yukos oil company that was taken
over by the state in the early 2000s, is to an increasing extent challenging
Gazprom’s monopoly in the gas sector and that of the second largest gas
producer Novatek, which is privately owned but still controlled by people
close to the president. Rosneft has a central role in the energy efficiency
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of oil production in Russia, which is a major contributor to the green-
house gas (GHG) emissions and other environmental problems of the
country. This is linked to the fact that Rosneft produces two-thirds of
Russia’s oil and also has the lowest energy efficiency in the oil sector.
This is most pronounced when looking at the issue of burning of
associated petroleum gas on the site of production, also known as APG
flaring (see Chapter 5).
Russia’s third major energy player is Rosatom, a state corporation that
functions in the nuclear energy business in addition to producing nuclear
weapons. According to Russian legislation, Rosatom, unlike Gazprom
and Rosneft, has no obligation to produce an economic surplus. The
nuclear giant is thus better resourced and positioned to promote energy
and other policy objectives set by the state domestically and inter-
nationally. In Russia, nuclear power is prioritized in relation to renewable
energy and coal, but not compared to gas, and internationally Rosatom is
able to compete and increase Russian influence through highly attractive
nuclear power plant and uranium provision offers (see Chapter 4;
Tynkkynen 2016c).
Naturally, a central actor is the Russian society at large. The authori-
tarian nature of the Putin regime means we cannot really talk about
Russian civil society per se having a significant effect on policy
formation or chosen policies – at least not in the way civil society actors
in liberal democracies affect political life, for example, via representative
(local, national elections) and more direct democracy (civic initiatives,
lobbying and protesting, NGO activism). However, despite the fact that
the political and economic elite of Russia enjoys far greater freedom than
their counterparts in liberal democracies with regard to implementing
energy policies based on their incumbent interests, there remains a need
to justify the decisions and actions of the elite to the Russian people via
practical and discursive means. This is shown in detail in the following
chapters.
THE VISION FOR A GREEN AND RESILIENT RUSSIA:
CLIMATE CHANGES GEOGRAPHY, GEOGRAPHY
CHANGES POLITY
As outlined above, I intend to push the discourse on the entanglement
of energy and power further by adopting a spatially conscious take on
energy and power. By means of this theoretical and methodological
choice, I argue that we can know more about Russia – a country, I claim,
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that can turn into a global vector for positive and sustainable develop-
ment. Therefore, I want to use this book to engage in critical discussion
about Russia’s choices. I argue that Russia is suffering from a multitude
of societal problems due to the intertwining of political power and fossil
energy. Fossil energy, oil and gas, is not a competitive advantage for
Russia on the global stage, and thus not a blessing for the Russian
leadership and its people. My view of the current state of affairs
concerning Russia, resources and energy is critical, but far from hopeless
or nihilistic.
I will use empirical studies to not only show why the existing
hydrocarbon-based system is a barrier to development in Russia and
beyond, but also that Russia and the Russian people can choose differ-
ently and prosper. Hence, the book ends with a realistic vision of a future
where the consequences of climate change and the economies that will
flourish due to it, which seem so insignificant to many Russians and the
Putin regime at the moment, will function like a game changer. I argue
that despite the historical inertia of resource-led development and the
authoritarian rule encouraged by it, Russia is not a prisoner of its own
geography. More precisely, geography and resources are Russia’s assets –
as they are anywhere else – but the challenge is to lean not on the most
tempting and disastrous option, as is the case today with oil and gas, but
on those riches that enable a resilient and sustainable Russia and a
healthier planet. Unfortunately, this change will partly come about
because of global environmental change and especially the adverse social
and economic effects this change has on Russia. However, this ‘stick’
effect will be accompanied by a ‘carrot’ effect, and this is where Russia’s
potential as a ‘Green Giant’ or an Ecological Great Power plays a pivotal
role.
Russia is also an energy giant in terms of renewable energy, and here
Russia can play an important role in transforming its own energy system
and drastically reduce its own emissions – Russia is currently the fourth
largest emitter of GHG (Korppoo et al. 2015) – while also providing the
means for others, namely China and Europe, to enable the switch from
fossil-based energy systems to those relying on renewables. This sys-
temic transition and political transformation has good potential to mate-
rialize, because it is well-suited to the socio-cultural and political
self-understanding of Russians. Thus, I argue that Empire or seeing
Russia as a Great Power which is a view shared by many in Russia, is an
asset that can be used for the common good of Russians and humanity
(see N. Tynkkynen 2010). In other words, this new role will suit the
Russians very well, as it appeals to the national identity: the idea of a
Great Power with a special global, even messianic, task has always been
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a central element in Russian political thought (e.g. Kivinen 2002). This
means that Russia, along with other great powers, can be a key player in
fostering the transition to a climate-neutral world. As climate change risk
becomes reality and also because of its nature, Russia can enable positive
change by promoting a new kind of energy policy. Russia can subse-
quently become a strong player, one that is resilient and sustainable both
internally and externally. However, this requires that Russia and Russians
re-evaluate their geography and the strengths it provides, which in turn
entails profound changes in political priorities within the country.
Encouraged but also pushed and forced by global environmental and
economic changes, Russia is capable of drifting onto a positive develop-
ment path where energy and natural resources continue to play a role.
However, the profoundly different spatialities and materialities, geog-
raphies and infrastructures of renewable energies can help to guide this
monolithically-ruled country onto the path of decentralization, regionali-
zation and federalization. Here, the whole territory of Russia becomes an
asset, as opposed to the minuscule points on the peripheral Siberian
tundra where oil and gas are extracted today.
At the moment, a chronic dependence on fossil energy, hydrocarbons
and a characteristic tendency to centralize and strengthen the hierarchy
make Russia weak in terms of domestic and economic policy and
subsequently an unpredictable and dangerous player in terms of foreign
policy. The country dodges potential criticism of the chosen hydrocarbon
culture and its economic rationale by raising nationalistic sentiments
among Russians by waging war and carrying out mafia-inspired manoeu-
vres internationally. This social contract – the people are given bits of the
wealth created via hydrocarbons while political citizenship is denied –
rests on the assumption that the fear of a foreign threat, either cultural
(liberal values), economic (decarbonization) or geopolitical (military
cooperation), unites Russians under the guise of hydrocarbon culture and
Fortress Russia. The blueprint and potential for a new energy-political
system and mentality – a nation and an economy that enables rather than
discourages the global change to a sustainable future – is founded on the
idea that Russia’s geography and its central assets as well as cultural and
political thought act as our guiding light.
16 The energy of Russia
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter1edited /Pg. Position: 16 / Date: 13/9
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 1 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
2. Russia’s energy via a spatial prism:
energy flows in a mycelium of
power
In this chapter I look at Russia’s energy as a relational space. I scrutinize
flows of hydrocarbons, coal, and different renewable energy sources
across geographical space – not in the absolute terms of tonnes and cubic
metres, but based on their ‘ability’ and usability to form economic,
political and societal ties and power-vested practices. Thus, in this
chapter I lay out the conceptual toolkit this book builds on – in other
words, this chapter brings together energy spatialities, materialities and
power. I also introduce the concepts of hydrocarbon culture and energy
superpower, which are central to understanding how fossil energy and
political power are intertwined in Russia.
THE PROBLEMATIC SPATIALITIES OF
HYDROCARBONS
Geographers have argued that the non-territorial and point-like nature of
hydrocarbon production is a major cause of several shortcomings in the
social and environmental responsibility prevailing in energy producer
states (Watts 2004a, 2004b). Oil and gas are produced in specific
locations, points in a geographical space, and then transported to
consumers via narrow strips called corridors. Although modern societies
are ‘soaked’ in oil and gas, and we have become chronically dependent
on them, after all hydrocarbons ‘touch’ the Earth very little at the
production end of the commodity chain. Of course, consumption and
(mal)practices in the hydrocarbon industries ensure that oil and gas cover
the whole planet in the form of soot, sulphur, nitrogen, volatile organic
compounds and carbon dioxide emissions. The very fact that hydrocar-
bons ‘touch’ the ground so selectively and, especially in the Russian case,
are located in the peripheries away from communities and society at large
is a factor producing negative path dependencies. Bridge (2010,
pp. 527–8; 2011, pp. 317–19) argues that, in essence, there are several
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ways in which the materiality of oil (and gas) produces crisis situations
within the normal functions of the industry, as listed in bullet points
below. Here the materiality of hydrocarbons refers to those concrete
material artefacts, such as oil development infrastructure and gas transit
and distribution pipelines, as well as less tangible but still material forms
of substance like oil and gas deposit geology, air pollution and green-
house gas emissions.
+ The discrepancy between hydrocarbon resource geology and the
colossus structure of the oil industry produces a landscape of
leapfrog development as small fields are neglected. This has led to
a focus on mega deposits located in more extreme environments
and depths – with the related dire environmental and social costs.
Russia’s hydrocarbon companies, Gazprom and Rosneft in particular, are
among the biggest in the world. For example, these two parastatal
companies have been granted a monopoly in oil and gas exploration and
extraction in the peripheral offshore Arctic and in some East Siberian
fields. These two major greenfield energy provinces are even more
detached, if possible, from Russian society than the brownfields of today.
In the Russian case, this leapfrog development – the large volumes of
unearthed oil and gas that remain in less opulent deposits in the
brownfield energy provinces of Volga-Urals and Western Siberia – is thus
tied to the structure of the industry, as suggested by global theory. As a
result, the hydrocarbon energy geographies strengthen the fatal connec-
tion between authoritarian rule powered by peripheral resources, and
uncontrolled by society.
This reasoning on the spatial effects of the hydrocarbon commodity
chain is partly based on the arguments expressed in theoretical discus-
sions of the resource curse, or paradox of plenty. The perspective
emphasized here refers to those spatial effects that are related to
internalizing non-renewable resources as infinite. That means that this
distinctive resource curse mentality (Tynkkynen 2007; Watts 2004b)
functions as a catalyst for exacerbating the territorial effects. This
mentality produces a combination of discourses and practices to uphold a
distinctive political setting that dwarfs all sectors of the local economy
except those based on hydrocarbons. In the Russian case, the social cost
is the further encouragement of environmentally unsustainable and
politically unaccountable practices.
+ A ‘systemic leakage’ of carbon along the hydrocarbon commodity
chain produces environmental and social problems ranging from
18 The energy of Russia
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter2editedVPT /Pg. Position: 2 / Date:
17/9
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 3 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
upstream developments to downstream use and from the local to
global level, for example, from human health problems caused by
ambient air to global climate change.
The most problematic and seemingly endemic adverse material dimen-
sion of hydrocarbons is probably the social and environmental effects of
the ‘systemic leakage’ of carbon. Russia is a prime case embodying a
wide range of emissions within and throughout its hydrocarbon commod-
ity chains. Russia is not the biggest polluter of the climate, as its
greenhouse gas emissions, some 2000 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent
(emissions + 2644 Mt CO2 e/y, carbon sink (forests etc.) – 634 CO2 e/y)
put it fourth among polluters after China, the United States and India
(Climate Action Tracker 2018). However, Russia does unfortunately well
on this list with regard to all other ‘records’. Russia has the most oil
pipeline accidents, an estimated 15 000 to 20 000 per year. When
combined with leakages in oil production and refining, this represents
between 1.5 and 5 million tons of oil – up to 1 per cent of production –
released into the environment (for example, Thompson 2017; Vasilyeva
2014). Russia’s hydrocarbon industries are flaring – burning without
using the energy content – the associated petroleum gas, somewhere
between 10 and 20 bcm per year. The vast range of estimates concerning
these emissions tells a grim story: the hydrocarbon-dependent regime of
Putin is unable to exert environmental control over the polluting indus-
tries. Methane emissions in oil and gas production, and also during gas
transportation, continue to be a black box: there is no reliable and
transparent data or ongoing research regarding these emissions. The sheer
size – 40 000 km of pipelines inside Russia – of the gas transportation
system is a sign that we need credible knowledge about emissions along
the hydrocarbon chains.
Furthermore, the costs of pollution along the hydrocarbon commodity
chain are predominantly borne by those who do not enjoy the wealth and
power produced by the commodity trade (Bridge 2011, pp. 318–19). In
other words, the flow of hydrocarbons through societies produces a
cumbersome conflict in which the economic prosperity and growing
affluence of one group produces externalities, such as environmental and
health problems affecting people and communities in a less privileged
socio-economic situation. Campbell (2003, pp. 439–40) argues that the
inability to address this conflict from local to global contexts is the most
important barrier to sustainable development and also poses a severe
security threat.
Chapter 5 looks at the effects of leapfrog development and the
systemic leakage of carbon through the Russian Arctic context, and
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Chapter 6 is devoted to the narrative being built by the hydrocarbon-
dependent regime in an attempt to justify why the global carbon problem
is something Russia and Russians should not worry about.
+ The molecular logic of hydrocarbon production produces societal
power from the ability to control oil and gas wells, not from
administering the territory. Hence, the ‘geography of holes’ pro-
motes the logic of violence and possession, making it difficult to
embrace justice and democracy.
This spatial dimension of a hydrocarbon-dominated Russia is the key to
understanding the resource-driven push towards more authoritarian rule.
Russia has always been economically dependent on resources of the
periphery, so it is no surprise that this spatial drift towards resources has
also been called internal colonialization (Etkind 2011). The resources
have been and continue to be detached from Russia proper, the densely
populated European and Southern Siberian areas, just as the resources of
Africa and Asia were detached from the European colonial centres. In
Eurasia, they were separated by swamps, rivers and forests rather than
oceans as was the case with European colonial pursuit. During tsarist
times and the Soviet era, when extractive industries focused initially on
commodities such as fur and timber and later on ores, coal and precious
stones, the regional geographies of extraction were less dominated by
point-source production and employed proportionally more people than is
the case today in the oil- and gas-dominated economy of Putin’s Russia.
Large workforces and resource geographies were more closely linked to
local communities, which meant that governance and the logic of power
were different. For example, the democratizing and decentralizing factor
in the late-tsarist period was grain – a territorially and subsequently
non-point-source produced resource that was in high demand both at
home and abroad. The spatial extent of the resource, grain, which was the
most valuable export commodity of pre-revolutionary Russia, dictated
that the production, harvest and transportation of it was intertwined with
the society and its local communities, villages, towns and cities. The
Empire did try to resist the decentralizing force of agriculture by
serfdom, but it was the self-governing local body of obshina or mir in the
grain-producing areas of Russia that started the decentralizing and
democratizing process from the bottom up soon after serfdom was
abolished (for example, Dalmatovskii monastyr’ 2016). The hydrocarbon-
dominated economies and geographies of today have no such force
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pushing for the decentralization of economic and political decision-
making, and thus no potential for the emergence of a real federal
governance structure.
+ Flows of hydrocarbons from upstream production areas to con-
sumers produce a ‘horizontal choke-point geography’, as securing
high-value and energy-intensive hydrocarbon transport corridors,
such as pipelines, generates significant opportunities for control.
The fact that oil, and especially gas, is delivered to consumers within
Russia and abroad via controllable corridors that are wide-ranging but
small in number is a feature that allows energy to be used as a political
tool in domestic and transnational realms alike. The potential for political
leverage via energy flows and infrastructures would not be so strong
without state control of the pipelines. However, both oil and gas pipelines
in Russia are controlled by the state-owned companies Transneft and
Gazprom, respectively. This provides extensive opportunities to exert
power via energy flows within Russia by utilizing both soft, alluring and
hard, coercive, means.
Both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of hydrocarbon flows
promote an understanding of geographical space as controllable flows of
resources, not as a territory of communities. Using Castells’ (1999)
concepts of the spaces of flows and places, this implies that the
hydrocarbon commodity chain accentuates the space of resource flows
over the space of personal and communal locations. For example, just
like oil and gas pipelines, highways and airports are seen more as spaces
of flows with attached rules, while residential areas are pictured as
spaces of places resisting the rules associated with spaces of flows.
Interestingly, as we shall see in this book, state-dominated oil and gas
companies in Russia attempt to construct a new kind of sense of
belonging to place and community by using the materiality of hydrocar-
bons as the basis for this cultural and political construction. I argue that
this construction aims to build a hydrocarbon culture. All in all, control
of crucial energy flows is, in a world highly dependent and intertwined
with these flows, a tool any empire would desire. However, this power –
as it conflicts with the global normative must of decarbonization – comes
at a cost: low resilience of the regime due to unsustainability and the
narrow base of the chosen economic policy.
Chapter 3 examines the real-life effects of hydrocarbon geographies of
horizontal ‘choke-points’ and vertical ‘holes’, for example, how energy is
used as a tool in maintaining Russia as a unitary state. In the trans-
national context, energy as a geopolitical tool is as much a discursive as
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a practical issue, and the narrative of energy superpower is unfolded in
the following, whereas Chapter 4, illustrated by Finnish–Russian energy
trade and diplomacy, analyses the practical issues of energy as a foreign
policy tool.
HYDROCARBON CULTURE IN THE MAKING
Putin’s Russia is highly dependent on fossil fuels and other non-
renewable natural resources. Since Putin’s re-election in 2012, we have
seen a more conservative, authoritarian and assertive Russia (Gel’man
and Appel 2015), with an economic policy that increasingly relies on the
fossil energy sector. These developments also explain the change of tone
on climate change and strengthening link between fossil energy and
Russian identity. Thus, changes in political emphasis go hand-in-hand
with the need to define Russia as a ‘hydrocarbon superpower’ (Bou-
zarovski and Bassin 2011). An energy superpower is a country that is
able to influence the political choices of other countries through energy
exports, by producing dependencies via energy infrastructures and eco-
nomic benefits generated by the energy trade. The means are thus both
coercive and alluring, hard and soft. Discussion of whether Russia is an
energy superpower culminates in the question of how Russia has used
energy as leverage in foreign policy with regard to the main customers
for Russian energy, chiefly Russia’s Eastern European neighbours and
the EU.
The main claim in my book is that energy wealth and power has been
turned into a tool for identity construction in Russia – a hydrocarbon
culture in the making. Thus, the economic and political dependence on
fossil energy is profound in nature, also encompassing the spheres of
culture and identity. This concept makes it easier to understand not only
why fossil energy is an identity issue, but also why energy is utilized as
leverage in domestic and foreign contexts, and why responsible climate
policies are not an option in Putin’s Russia. However, it must be
remembered that the political and economic elite of Russia is probably
very aware of the economic problems related to hydrocarbon dependence
and the narrow base of Russia’s economy. The people perceive that this
dependence – exporting raw materials and importing goods – means
Russia is easily seen as a developing nation, which does not fit in well
with the great power frame that is the very heart of the Russian national
identity. However, as Rutland (2015) deftly shows, most Russians simul-
taneously perceive the country as an energy superpower: the weakness of
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a one-sided economy is turned into a strength. As a result, the above-
mentioned identity construction tool that depends on energy and power
has to be used consistently if Putin’s regime wants to strengthen Russia’s
superpower status on the basis of hydrocarbons.
I use the concept of hydrocarbon culture, but similar notions have been
developed by other scholars interested in the intertwining of energy,
power and culture in Russia. Ilya Kalinin (2014), Douglas Rogers (2012,
2015) and Peter Rutland (2015) have inspired others to engage in similar
research with versatile empirical approaches. My own take on the
hydrocarbon culture in Russia relies on my research dealing with the
materialities of hydrocarbons (gas), and how they feed into the national
identity of Russians as citizens of an energy superpower. This power –
projected via international gas pipelines and a military vocabulary –
forms the core of the ability to do harm in the domestic arena as well:
gas energy, infrastructure and the gas industry are defined and viewed in
a manner that underscores the submissive role of individuals and com-
munities. The specific ways of thinking and strategic technologies of rule
are brought together to build a specific governmentality of a hydrocarbon
culture.
The governmental mentality of hydrocarbon culture reflects many
conservative objectives of the state and the regime, but by far the most
important of these is conservative economic policy relying on the
extraction of natural resources and fossil energy. Hydrocarbon culture
can thus be seen as a tool to prevent popular criticism of economic
policies that resemble those of developing states, and the chosen eco-
nomic system – one that is increasingly dependent on the hydrocarbon
sector and in which Russia’s role in the global trade is merely that of a
raw material provider, an ‘energy-producing appendage’ of the West. As
Rutland (2015) argues, despite the fact that the majority of Russians
consider their country an energy superpower, most simultaneously
oppose the wealth enjoyed by the elite and created by the energy trade
while many Russians live in factual energy poverty. Therefore, one
motivation to come up with discourses and practices that valorize
hydrocarbons is the need to change this impression and fortify the
position of Putin’s regime. This hydrocarbon culture in the making not
only fortifies economic and industrial policies and prevents their modern-
ization, it also advocates authoritarian, non-democratic rule and the
regime’s Great Power ambitions throughout Russia. Thus, despite the fact
that weaving energy and natural resources into the social fabric of the
society might have its positive sides, for example, in the form of
eradicating energy poverty in the countryside via the national gas
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programme, the implications of the practices I have observed in con-
temporary Russia do give rise to more worrying thoughts. For example,
the amalgamation of the needs and rationalities of the fossil energy sector
and the domestic and foreign policy interests of the current regime
provide grounds to argue that fossil energy, energy infrastructures and the
versatile ‘epiphytes’ attached to it have allowed the state to construct and
maintain black and white, nationalistic identities. These normalizing
identities make it possible to curtail modernization of Russia’s economy,
suppress political opposition in Russia, and build an illusion that every-
thing and everyone in the international arena opposes Russia.
Hydrocarbon culture is also the antithesis of a sustainable Russia. Due
to domestic and international factors, the need to follow international
environmental objectives has diminished and Russia’s image as a
responsible energy producer is of less concern than before. This leaves
room for the temptation of downplaying climate policy objectives and
promoting identities based on hydrocarbons and fossil energy. In fact, the
climate-denial discourse (see Chapter 6) and hydrocarbon culture being
promoted are only two sides of the same coin: in a nation that sees itself
intertwined with the semiotics, materialities and wealth creation of fossil
energy (e.g. Kalinin 2014; Tynkkynen 2016a), the impetus to be at the
forefront of climate politics is a very unlikely choice. Moreover, the
emerging energy culture of a fossil giant is attempting to monopolize and
distort the environmental agenda, which is in practice transforming it into
a social taboo. We see examples of this on the regional level, where state
energy giants are inhibiting the development of more sustainable energy
and environmental policies and in the nationwide propagation of climate
denial narrative in the state-controlled media. In addition, the heightened
confrontation between Russia and the West, including economic sanc-
tions that target the energy sector, emphasizes the Russian need to
distinguish itself in all possible ways from Western-backed agendas.
Thus, as climate change is elementarily linked to the economic base of
contemporary Russia and the political power of the ruling regime, in
other words fossil energy, it is no surprise that this geopolitical situation
makes it appealing to define the issue via sovereignty and national
identity.
In summary, it is unlikely that Russia will show leadership in global
climate politics and be at the forefront of efforts to cut emissions. If
Russia leads or behaves as a compliant student in global climate policies,
it is because of Putin’s regime’s foreign policy interests (for example, to
subordinate China), not because there is strong civic opposition among
Russians towards Putin’s economic, environmental and foreign policies.
Therefore, in the near future, another important issue to follow in this
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field is the way environmental awareness and civic environmental activ-
ism is handled by Putin’s regime and its fossil energy entourage. An
interesting case to follow is ‘The Year of the Environment 2017’, and
similar environmental agendas of the Russian state. More specifically,
how do state organizations, such as the Russian Geographical Society, try
to use the framework of such projects to channel and control civic
sentiments and empowerment in the realm of the environment and
nature? Judging by the choice of the projects promoted and financed
under the guise of the Year of the Environment 2017, it seems that the
focus is very local: the majority of projects promote household waste and
waste water management, and also aim to curtail industrial pollution.
Despite the fact that there is a category of projects called ‘The Arctic and
Climate’, none of the projects addresses climate mitigation per se. This
shows how the regime prioritizes environmental change that is visible to
Russians (waste, air pollution) while ignoring the global environmental
change that will have much more severe impacts on Russians and Russia.
Once again, this seems to remain in the realm of a taboo for the regime.
THE (POTENTIALLY) GRATUITOUS SPATIALITIES OF
RENEWABLES
In terms of renewable energy, the research by Zimmerer (2011) and
Bailis and Baka (2011) suggests that the spatial effects of this activity are
predominantly positive. As bioenergy is among the most spatially exten-
sive renewables, and thus has potentially wide positive societal and
political effects, it stands out as a good example to unfold these effects.
Despite the fact that the energy return on investment – the EROI ratio –
of most bioenergy carriers is not that good, the CO2 emissions caused by
harvesting and refining are predominantly low (Font de Mora et al.
2012). This implies that the ‘systemic leakage of carbon’, at least in a
global perspective, does not take place in the bioenergy commodity
chain, as the carbon released into the atmosphere is recycled in the form
of new growth. However, the production of bioenergy causes different
environmental effects that can diminish biodiversity in the area of
production (Afionis and Stringer 2012, p. 116) and increase air pollution
at the consumption end of the chain (Haluza et al. 2012). For this simple
reason, the environmental effects of the production and use of wood-
based bioenergy are relative to the harvesting techniques and
re-cultivation practices prevailing in the area of origin, in addition to
burning technology solutions. The same applies to the notion of the
leapfrog development that the hydrocarbon industry has been accused of
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– bioenergy can be produced in both ways: by overharvesting and by
sustainable practices aiming for a sustained yield. The same applies to
other renewables, such as solar and wind power: the climate effect of
renewables is dependent on the overall sustainability of production and
commodity chains. For example, metal extraction requires a lot of energy
and other natural resources are needed to construct wind and solar power
infrastructures, even though the production itself is carbon neutral.
The resource flows and territorial logic associated with wood-based
bioenergy are considered to enhance security in production areas and, in
the long run, between the energy supplier and buyer, since wood
harvesting, thinning and re-cultivation affect large spaces and a multitude
of communities. As a result, bioenergy production employs far more
people in the area of origin than hydrocarbon developments. This is seen
as promoting stability and security, and since large-scale changes in the
living environment and the effects on local economies politicize resource
use issues, they lay the foundation for political activity and for people to
engage in decision-making. This is the argument that the EU has
endorsed in the EU–Russia energy dialogue (European Commission
2011b), claiming that imports of bioenergy from Russia increase stability
and security between the partners via these positive territorial effects. The
same applies to other renewables, but with a slightly different logic
stemming from the fact that renewable energy commodities have differ-
entiated spatial characteristics along the commodity chain: up-, mid- and
downstream. For example, ‘prosumers’ can produce solar power on
rooftops, yet providing output in kilowatts as opposed to centralized solar
power plants with capacities measured in tens of megawatts. Their spatial
constellations are naturally very different, and thus also their potential to
intertwine with the society and produce (positive) political and insti-
tutional effects. The same applies to wind power: mega-sized offshore
wind parks owned and operated by transnationals naturally have a very
different connection to communities in comparison to windmills run by
co-operatives in the densely populated countryside.
In general, however, the transition away from centralized fossil energy
systems towards more decentralized renewables will entail major societal
changes in the future. Scholten (2019) lists six major geopolitical
implications of the transition to renewables on a global scale. First,
geographically more dispersed energy production based on renewables
weakens monopolies and oligopolies and strengthens competitive markets
via an increase in the number of actors. This means that monolithic and
gigantic hydrocarbon industries will be replaced by agile, small and
medium-sized renewables businesses.
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Second, the transition to renewables will decentralize energy produc-
tion: large-scale power plants will be mostly replaced by household,
enterprise and community level energy production infrastructures. This
decentralization via renewables will promote democratization on the
local and regional level, and also sow the seeds for potential separatism.
The latter is surely viewed as a real threat in Putin’s Russia, where
centralized fossil energy is currently used as the ‘glue’ to maintain the
centre’s control in the periphery, Moscow’s reign over the provinces.
Third, dependence on critical minerals (rare earth metals) within the
renewables business, notably solar power, changes energy geopolitics.
For example, China is the indisputable leader in producing rare earth
metals with over 100 billion tonnes per year, whereas Russia stands in
third place, only producing 3 billion tonnes (Kay 2018a). However, when
deposits of these much-needed minerals are examined by country, China
is again the leader with 44 trillion (million million) tonnes, but Russia’s
reserves of 18 trillion tonnes are nearly half of the level of China’s
resources (Kay 2018b). As the reserves of these metals are concentrated
in only a few countries, they expose these countries to a similar risk of
the resource curse as hydrocarbons are inducing today. However, the
impact on democratization and fostering stronger official institutions is
very different, as the energy production infrastructures of solar photo-
voltaic production are far more decentralized.
Fourth, a world dominated by renewables is an electric world. Energy
systems will be based to a large extent on electricity, as transport is
switching from hydrocarbons (gasoline, diesel, kerosene, etc.) to electri-
city, and coal and eventually gas as a commodity in electricity production
will be replaced by solar, wind, hydro and geothermal energy. This
entails the regionalization of energy relations – we are seeing a partial
retreat from and shrinkage of global networks to make room for regional
networks and grids. As Scholten (2019) argues, regionalization will be
fostered by fear of dependence that will probably lead to little intercon-
nection between grid communities. However, the economic and energy
security incentives provided by supra-regional grids will probably push
national and regional electricity grids to form larger entities. The target of
larger grid communities also produces interdependencies that have a
‘pacifying’ effect on all actors. For example, the benefit of connecting the
electricity grids of the EU, Russia, Central Asian countries, China and
India – the major producing and consuming areas of the whole Eurasian
space – is that the super-grid would act as a storage facility. This would
be especially important when hydropower and new energy storage media
are harnessed as adjusting power sources to benefit the whole grid, thus
making it possible to balance supply and demand in an economically
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viable way. Therefore, the inherent problem of natural fluctuation in solar
and wind power production would be buffered due to the super-grid’s
ability to sequence production and consumption over a territory of 12
time zones. From the geothermal Iceland to the solar-powered North
Africa and Middle East (NAME) region, and from the European Atlantic
coast over the Alps, the Urals and the Himalayas all the way to the
Pacific – a west–east zone with high potential for both wind and solar
power – the super-grid will connect people, businesses and nations.
Fifth, increasing the share of renewables will change the nature and
volume of energy trade: instead of transporting commodities globally,
electricity that is produced in a decentralized and highly localized
manner will be transported regionally. Sixth and finally, this will cause
creative destruction in global energy markets. It is clear that today’s
(fossil) energy importers are leading this process and exporters are
lagging behind. The crucial question is: are the exporters, like Russia,
that are highly dependent on sales of fossil energy, capable of reinvesting
the affluence they create with fossil energy in renewables?
FROM BIOPOLITICAL TO ENERGOPOLITICAL
GOVERNMENTALITY
Governmentality, as initially articulated by Michel Foucault in the 1970s,
is a collective way of thinking about different modes of governing, and
especially a government’s relationship to the governed (Dean 1999;
Foucault 1991). Scholars have used the concept of governmentality to
study far more than state-defined systems of government, applying it also
to non-governmental actors, such as companies and civil society organ-
izations (Rivera Vicencio 2014; Rooker 2014). Governmentalities can be
understood by simultaneously studying the practices that amalgamate
actions and collective modes of thinking about government prevailing in
a particular location, institution, or state. Thus, governmental practices
consist of both words and deeds, regardless of whether or not they are
conscious or intentional. In any given context, certain actors are better
positioned than others to promote their rhetorical and material visions of
government, which give rise to dominant discourses that come to
represent certain truths, or, as Foucault (2008, p. 35) terms them,
“regimes of veridiction”. A question posed by the governmentality
literature, therefore, is how both the conscious and unconscious ‘truth’
construed by dominant discourses is produced as part of governmental
practice (Mills 1997, pp. 2–8). The analytics of government are defined
by three central dimensions: power, truth and identity (Dean 1999, p. 18),
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and producing these requires expertise, imagination and tactical skills
(Foucault 1991, p. 87).
Foucault’s dynamic understanding of power and its explicit interest in
discourses and practices, and the focus on strategic thinking and action,
or governmentality, of those in positions of power, is well-suited as a
companion for studying the entanglement of the social and the natural/
material within the realm of energy. According to Moss, Becker and
Gailing (2016), the Foucauldian dispositive, a context where governmen-
tality functions and can be analysed, includes the agency of inanimate
objects and artefacts, but it does so via the discursive: materiality
becomes interesting only through the discourse, that is, after being given
meaning within the social. Foucault’s original dispositive referred to a
“heterogeneous ensemble” that brings together discourses, regulations
and “architectural forms” (Foucault 1980). Thus, although the material
and spatial dimension within the whole Foucauldian power-analytics field
may not be central, there is a firm body of theorizing on that front, as
well (Crampton and Elden 2007).
In this book, I consider Russia’s energy policies, for example, the
all-Russian gas programme executed by Gazprom, Russia’s energy diplo-
macy in the transnational context and knowledge production practices
related to climate change, as a manifestation of the two interrelated
aspects of discourse. The first is the action, as exemplified in the national
gas programme Gazifikatsiya Rossii and the statal agenda of the ‘Year of
the Environment 2017’, which are designed to tell the story of supposed
popular approval of the social responsibility strategy of the state and its
champions. Second, the discourse concerns the collective ‘mentality’
prevailing in energy companies and the energy sector, which are closely
tied to the actions and thinking of President Putin’s regime. In liberal
societies, governing operates primarily through biopolitical tactics
because disciplinary power contradicts its core principles of individual
liberty. In a system defined by biopower, the population living in the
territory of the state is subjugated to techniques that have the goal of
optimizing its health, welfare and life (Dean 1999, p. 20). Therefore,
biopolitical governmentality has to be seen as an inseparable part of the
logic of the actions of neoliberal states, including Russia. A significant
body of literature now exists on Soviet and post-Soviet governmentalities
(e.g. Kharkhordin 1999; Matza 2009; Prozorov 2014). However, these
studies are confined in one pivotal manner: they do not look explicitly at
the material and spatial in their analysis.
Stephen Collier’s (2011) Post-Soviet Social, in contrast, takes an
explicitly material approach. He argues that post-Soviet Russia is a prime
example of a country where, stemming from the Soviet-era objectives
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and norms, the objectives of both the social welfare state and classical
liberalism have come together to form modern biopolitical practices. He
concurs with most analysts of post-Soviet power that governmentalities
in today’s Russia are neoliberal, but with a depoliticizing twist: saddling
individuals with responsibilities is thought to benefit the state economy,
but not to liberalize and democratize state governance. Accordingly, as
Coleman and Agnew (2007, p. 332) suggest, in today’s Russia we are not
witnessing a leap from the goals of the modern into the aims, logic and
action of the postmodern; rather, we are seeing the mutual inclusion and
adaptation of these two goals. But this raises the question of precisely
how these transformations are taking place. Through which networks and
agencies are governmentalities being reworked in post-Soviet Russia?
Given the prominence of Russia’s energy economy, scholars have consid-
ered energy companies and the ‘energy elite’ as one of the most
important objects of analysis when answering this question.
Scholars in the field of energy studies have introduced the concept of
‘energopower’: their traditional inquiries into material cultures are united
with critical social science scholarship on power. Boyer (2014, pp. 22–3)
defines energopower as “a genealogy of modern power that rethinks
political power through the twin analytics of electricity and fuel”.
Energopower is “a discourse … that searches out signals of the energo-
material transferences and transformations incorporated in all other
sociopolitical phenomena”. To search for energopower and energopoli-
tics, then, is to search for the contingent and changing links between the
governance of life and the energy materialities with which it is always
intertwined. Rogers (2012, 2014), for example, examines how Russian
energy companies utilize the materiality of oil and gas to build local and
national allegiances, deploying their power to produce truth and identity.
All modern biopolitical technologies are ultimately ‘wired’ into energy
systems in one way or another. Energopower is an analytical tool that can
help people understand how power and the materialities of energy are
intertwined: it is all about how the governmental concern over energy
supplies is related to both the biopolitical aims of guaranteeing the
(bio)security of the population, as well as the exertion of control over
populations and the production of economic accumulation by keeping
energy flowing in grids and pipelines.
The concept of energopower is particularly useful, for example, when
studying Gazprom’s Gazifikatsiya programme (see Chapter 3), as it
explicitly reminds us of the binary nature of contemporary energy
systems: they both enable and constrain. Modern energy systems and
their extensions (such as communal infrastructure) are a means of
30 The energy of Russia
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter2editedVPT /Pg. Position: 14 / Date:
17/9
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 15 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
delivering amenities and of controlling the population. Taking a specific-
ally geographic approach – I have attempted to elaborate the Foucauldian
power analysis in the realm of energy via the concept of geo-
governmentality – I am interested in the kind of truth and identities that
Gazprom is constructing with its Gazifikatsiya programme as it expands
to peripheral Russia. In this perspective, the goal is to better understand
what kind of practical power, discursive truths, and cultural-political
identities are constructed in and around energy flows and entangled
materialities, and how these forms of political power condition our
understanding of energy as a societal phenomenon. For example, my
study of the Russian national gas programme describes how gas-based
geo-governmentality is being created via powerful discourses (Tynk-
kynen 2016a). Following the logic of Margo Huxley (2007), I ask how
specific resources and spatialities, and the materialities involved, act as
agents as part of the discursive-practical use of power or of governmen-
tality. The ‘geo’ in this approach is the deliberate use of the geographical
characteristics of gas when building and maintaining the desired govern-
mentality. The rationalities and practices of this hydrocarbon-culture
governmentality function in and combine several scales: the subject is
tied to territories and the nation through hydrocarbons, individuals are
made responsible for the (bio)security of the population, and even the
global is harnessed in legitimizing the heavy reliance on hydrocarbons.
The geo-governmentality approach can also challenge where the
boundaries of energy materialities are. It is important to include not only
energy infrastructure but also its ‘epiphytes’ – “ancillary apparatuses and
infrastructures, such as sports halls” – which “potentially serve as
conduits of disciplinary power” (Tynkkynen 2016b, p. 78). Therefore,
this view challenges the clear-cut understanding of energy materiality
reserved only for those linked to extraction, refining, transport and
consumption of energy. In other words, I argue that social infrastructure
built and maintained by energy companies or state ministries can be
understood as a materiality of energy, especially when elementarily
linked to power-vested discourses utilizing material dimensions of the
energy sector as a tool in constructing and maintaining these discourses.
The cases in this book remind us of the different ways the material
and the discursive constitute each other: energy materialities are not
dictating the political, nor is the discursive unaffected by the agency of
the material. Thus, a certain infrastructural form or physical and eco-
nomic tie does not dictate the discourses – or policies and use of power.
Likewise, discourses on energy materialities can reframe how we under-
stand energy materiality. When looking at materiality-inspired energy
discourses, we are also able to see how such materialities are utilized by
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those in positions of power. The important feature is that these energy
constellations are maintained in the ways in which the material and the
discursive constitute each other.
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3. Energy as domestic power: the case
of Gazifikatsiya Rossii
This chapter is based on my interest in major Russian fossil energy
companies as an instrument for promoting a wide plethora of state-led
objectives, encompassing societal phenomena from economy to politics
and from culture to identity. I focus on how hydrocarbon energies,
specifically gas, as it is so central within Russia, are intertwined with
societal and political power – and how the materialities and spatialities of
hydrocarbons are utilized in constructing and maintaining power in the
Russian domestic context.
STATE PRIORITIES IN GAZPROM’S CORPORATE
GOVERNMENTALITY STRATEGIES
Gazprom is the successor of the Soviet Ministry of Gas Industry, and it
has been an open joint-stock company since 2005, with the Russian state
owning the majority of shares (50 per cent plus one stock). Modern-day
Gazprom has more than 450 000 employees and, in addition to the energy
sector, it is active in finance and media (Gazprom 2015e). Although it is
technically a commercial enterprise, given its strong relationship with the
Russian government, Gazprom can be defined as a ‘parastatal company’
(versus a completely state-controlled corporation, such as the nuclear
giant Rosatom). As a parastatal company, Gazprom is subject to the
authority and decisions of the Russian state and President Putin’s
entourage – far more than its corporate legal status would suggest. All
major strategic choices, operations abroad, large infrastructure decisions
and national programmes, such as the Gazifikatsiya programme and other
corporate social responsibility operations, are made with the blessing of
Putin and his peers. This is not to suggest that decision-making in the
company is entirely politically motivated: its executives exhibit clear
evidence that a business rationale is the main motivation for operational
decisions taken by the company (Kivinen 2012). Moreover, Gazprom is a
vast company with dozens of regional subsidiaries – each with differing
objectives and political voices – operating in the Russian provinces and
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internationally (Gazprom 2015b). Overall, however, when analysing the
corporate governmentality practices of Gazprom, we are dealing with a
parastatal company that is steered by the country’s elite and therefore
enjoys privileges in the Russian economic and political context that are
unseen by any other company.
Gazprom’s position in the Russian domestic energy sector is therefore
exceptional. However, in the 2010s, Gazprom lost its monopoly, legally
speaking, over gas exports and control of the domestic gas pipeline
system. Other gas producers, such as the private gas firm Novatek as well
as oil companies, now have the right to feed gas into the national system
and to export it. Despite the fact that more competition is now tolerated,
Gazprom’s monopolistic practices prevail, which enables it to diminish
competitors’ chances to increase their share in regional energy markets
(Tynkkynen 2014). Since the Russian energy scene cannot be further
dominated by Gazprom, the company’s decision-makers perceive a need
to engage in branding or ‘imago-promotion’ activities, such as social
responsibility programmes and infrastructure construction, in order to
safeguard its position – both in the market and in the minds of Russian
citizens. Perceiving the latter to be of increasing importance, Gazprom
engages in a wide range of corporate social responsibility activities.
Sponsoring sports, for example, has been one of the central means of
enacting this agenda (Gazprom 2015a). In welfare societies, which the
Soviet Union and its successor Russia purport to be, local and regional
governments have traditionally been delegated the responsibility of
developing communal infrastructures, including public sport and health
facilities. Thus, in assuming responsibility for developing such facilities,
Gazprom has been granted – and has itself taken on responsibilities – that
are traditionally considered the tasks of the government. In the following,
I will delve into how the Gazifikatsiya Rossii promotional video is
understood as a specific energy- and geography-related governmentality
and as a form of energopower within the hydrocarbon culture in the
making in Putin’s Russia.
GAS’S PATRIOTIC, SACRAL AND GENDERED PATH
FROM SOIL TO SOUL
The aim of the video, as stated in the insert, is to show how the gas used
in Russian kitchens is produced, refined and transported to end con-
sumers. The story starts in the countryside of the Ivanovo region by
claiming that “few of us think how the gas consumed in our stoves is
produced” and what kind of journey that gas takes before arriving at
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people’s homes. In a National Geographic documentary style, the video
then follows the host, a young female reporter, as she visits sites along
the path taken by the gas. When comparing the style chosen and the
ethos promoted by the post-Soviet film scene, I see that the narrative of
Gazifikatsiya Rossii is clinging to the popular patriotic genre, but not
unequivocally dominating the scene at the time the video was produced,
as described by Norris (2012). However, the nature of the video is very
far from the nationalistic-patriotic pathos of many post-Soviet movies
produced during the Putin era, and looks very professional in comparison
to the many quasi-scientific documentaries abundant on Russian televi-
sion during the previous decade. Moreover, the strategic nature of the
promo video is visible also in the fact that it is free from the miniature
fault lines that we see in Russian state television (cf. Hutchings and Tolz
2012).
The host interviews and talks to various people, including: healthy and
physically-fit gas producers at production sites in the Yamal Peninsula
during harsh winter conditions; engineers in clinically-clean compressor
stations; suave and well-off directors at Gazprom’s Moscow headquar-
ters; well-equipped welders and excavators constructing artery and distri-
bution pipelines; male heads of municipalities; and ordinary mothers in
the picturesque Russian countryside, who are happy to receive gas. This
advertising video ends by returning to the sites of gas delivery and
consumption in the Ivanovo and Kaluga regions on a warm and sunny
summer day.
I argue that the Kaluga and Ivanovo regions are chosen not by chance
as end points in the video. They are the ‘peripheral’ regions closest to
Moscow. As I learned, for example, from discussions on Russian social
media, one focal point of criticism towards the state and Putin’s regime is
the fact that it has not been able to provide social amenities to Russians
on an equal basis outside big cities (e.g. Bezperspektivnye … 2014; Selo
#Fedorovka 200 km ot Moskvy … 2016). Thus, the need to counter the
impression that 200 kilometres from Moscow there is no gas and Russia
is merely an ‘energy-producing appendage’ of the West fits in well with
the choice of regions in this video (cf. Rutland 2015, p. 75). The choice
is further justified because it helps tame public dissatisfaction towards the
ruling elite and the chosen economic system that is increasingly depend-
ent on the hydrocarbon sector (Gustafson 2012, p. 493). As Peter Rutland
(2015, pp. 75–6) argues, despite the fact that the majority of Russians
consider their country an energy superpower, most simultaneously
oppose the wealth enjoyed by the elite and created by the energy trade,
even as many Russians live in factual energy poverty. Therefore, one
Energy as domestic power: the case of Gazifikatsiya Rossii 35
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter3editedVPT /Pg. Position: 3 / Date:
13/9
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 4 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
motivation to produce the video is the need to change this impression and
fortify the position of Putin’s regime.
The most obvious aim of the Gazifikatsiya promotional video is to
convince the audience that gas is a reliable and truly Russian source of
energy, while also showing that the extraction and delivery of gas to
settlements and finally to consumers is a far from easy task. From the
beginning of the video, the difficulties that must be overcome and the
sacrifice that has to be made, both at a national and individual level,
construct guilt that is placed on the (Russian) audience. An almost
hallowed message is put forward throughout the video: Russians should
not overlook the importance of gas for their society, nor should they
overlook the difficulties that must be overcome to deliver gas from the
extreme Northern environment to the Russian heartland. The words
trudno (difficult) and tyazhelo (hard) are repeated throughout the video
when gas exploration, production, and pipeline construction, both artery
and distribution, are shown and discussed.
The journey to highlight the path of gas from the gas deposits to the
consumers starts in the kitchen of a typical Russian single-family home
in the countryside of the Ivanovo region, where tea water is boiling on a
gas stove. The philosophical conclusion is that gas links Russians to the
motherland and its geography: gas travels from “uninhabited” territories
(Yamal) to the Russian ethnic and cultural heartland. Thus, gas as a
commodity and the gas pipelines that transport it are a lifeline for
Russians. The video uses both Soviet modernization and traditional
orthodox history to persuade the spectator. The constructed narrative
builds on the idea that the gas flows from the Russian soil and from the
natural environment already tamed by Soviet society and its modern-
ization efforts, as the work of Soviet geologist-explorers is underlined.
Likewise, the final destination of the gas, a traditional Russian village
with orthodox chapels forming the settlement’s skyline and wooden
houses painted in Russian blue, is located close to the core of Russia, the
old Rus’.
Throughout the video, a distinctive normalization takes place: indi-
viduals and local and regional authorities who support the development
of gas infrastructure are presented as true Russians through visual, sound
and vocal hints. People and communities who oppose this development
are presented as abnormal. The video makes clear that people and
communities who refuse to request or accept gas as a source of energy
are responsible for keeping Russia in a pre-modern condition, with a poor
national economy and harsh everyday living standards for the people. A
wide nationalistic-geographical imagery spectrum is utilized as gas
travels and, along its path, links the geology, economy, culture, and even
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theology of Russia. Religious phrases are not utilized, but through chosen
images and sceneries the narrative argues that Russian gas is flowing
from the Russian soil to the Russian soul.
The literature focusing on the societal effects of hydrocarbons under-
lines the specific materialities and spatialities of these energy resources,
coupled with the dominance of this sector in the national economy
especially in Russia, and it promotes an understanding of geographical
space as the controllable flow of resources, not as a territory of
communities (e.g. Bridge 2009, 2010, 2011; Watts 2004a, 2004b).
Referring to concepts used by Manuel Castells (1999), hydrocarbon
commodity chains have agency and accentuate spaces of (controllable)
flows over spaces of (lived) places. This understanding of geographical
space seems to have been taken into account, or at least there are hints
that the producers of the Gazifikatsiya video are aware of it. The identity
of the individual gas consumers, or the settlements attached to the gas
distribution system, are constructed using a distinctive ‘sense of place’
that derives its power from the material characteristics of the gas itself, as
well as from the ability of the gas infrastructure to connect people,
settlements and the nation. The gas flows from the Russian soil to the
Russian soul by producing a sense of Russian place. That place, however,
is ultimately placeless as the multiple localities of the gas nation are
represented as identical by images, maps and discourses. This placeless
image of Russia fits in well with one of the main objectives of President
Putin’s regime – to view Russian territory as culturally and economically
homogeneous in order to suppress regional identities and avoid separatist
sentiments (cf. Laruelle 2014a, pp. 7–9; Warhola and Lehning 2007,
p. 934).
This ethno-culturally coloured plea to the audience is accentuated by
choices about how to define gender roles. All the experts and directors
interviewed in the video that have something to do with gas production,
transport, pressurizing and control are male. The only females in the
video are the female reporter, who is escorted to a male-dominated world
of gas, thus producing a kind of father–daughter relationship; the doctor
who takes care of the health and well-being of the gas workers in the
harsh Arctic environment; the mothers interviewed as gas has reached
their village and homes; and the young girls who have a special role in
the village festivities when the gas is lit for the first time. Thus, gas relies
on and fortifies conservative Russian values. The suffering of men caused
by a harsh and isolated life at remote production platforms and pipeline
construction sites is compensated for by the fact that men are in control
and occupy positions of power. Women are controlled and fall under the
patronage of men, the company, and the state, but have some power in
their role as healers, consumers, and producers of new generations of
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Russians. These gendered roles date partly from Soviet practices and
culture. Women are viewed also as highly educated professionals, but
simultaneously as mothers and ‘beauty queens’, whereas men are pre-
sented either as executive bosses or as heroic and masculine industrial
workers. They also clearly go hand-in-hand, however, with the con-
temporary conservative turn in Russian society and politics. According to
Makarychev (2013, p. 247) the Russian leadership has argued that Russia
is “the bastion of the conservative world”. It is no surprise that parastatal
Gazprom and the gas industry are viewed as guarantors of this Russian
mix of neo-conservative and traditional patriarchal values. Clearly, gas is
a strongly gendered substance and helps to build and maintain a specific
form of geo-governmentality.
The constructed narrative clearly plays with national geographic cat-
egories. My analysis of the video reveals the construction blocks of
Gazprom’s geo-governmentality. Gas as a resource – its spatialities and
the materialities (gas geology, gas networks, hubs, arteries, distribution
lines and connectedness) along with direct (warmth and energy security)
and indirect considerations (modernization, economic growth, promise of
patronage and traditional values) and the ‘work’ of gas – comes across in
the governmentality of a powerful Russian enterprise. In a similar
manner as Watts (2004b, pp. 53–4) describes in his study on Nigeria, I
find how the formation of governmentality is constructed on the different
meanings assigned to hydrocarbon resources. The question I pose follows
the logic of Huxley (2007, p. 194; see also Whatmore 2003, pp. 26, 33).
That is, as she urges us to ask anew in the geographical context at hand,
how do specific resources or spaces act as agents as part of the
discursive-practical use of power, or of governmentality? This ‘agency’ of
space and the materialities it holds link the geo-governmentality
approach to Latour and his actor-network theory to the wider discussions
in science-technology studies about the role of the material and the
technological in human life, culture and politics.
The video shows how the different dimensions of governmentality and
geography come together. Similarly, Legg (2005, pp. 147–9) furthers
Dean’s power–truth–identity nexus described above, and operationalizes
geographically informed governmentality analytics by naming five
“dimensions to regimes of government”: specific ways of thinking,
understanding reality, constructing subjectivities (and refuting others),
strategic technologies of rule, and the values of a specific government.
The thinking, understanding of reality and values at Gazprom are linked
to those constructed subjectivities that are visible in the video: the
strategic technology of rule. Moreover, these different dimensions of
governmentality were approached by studying one programme of rule
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that, as Legg (2005, pp. 145–6) has pointed out, can function on several
scales: as a single subject, as a territory, as a nation, as a population, and
globally. In these dimensions and scales of governmentality, geography
(space, territories, the environment, resources, technologies and infra-
structure) does play a role, and I am able to unfold these links and roles
by studying Gazprom’s gas distribution programme as presented in the
promotional video. Thus, I understand the Gazifikatsiya video here both
as a representation of a specific programme of rule (the Gazifikatsiya
programme) and as research material enabling us to look at the thinking,
rationalities, values and actions of a ‘government’ – a parastatal energy
company – vested with significant power in the Russian political context.
As described above, the power-vested discourses and practices linked to
Gazifikatsiya utilize the whole repertoire of Legg’s scales – tying the
personal to the national and the global territories – to amalgamate
geography with the practised governmentality.
BIOPOLITICAL OBJECTIVES TIED TO GAS
The message put forward in the video is aimed not only at specific
subjectification, but also at producing new responsibilities that have
traditionally been considered the duty of the state. The duty of every
Russian is to take part in the national enterprise to construct a nationwide
gas system. Thus, a national-level objective is turned into a personal task.
Russians, from mothers to the heads of municipalities, are persuaded to
take a central biopolitical problem posed at the level of the Russian state
– the provision of energy and heating for the population – as their
personal problem. The video implies that if we (Russians) do not think
positively about gas and ‘invite’ it into our village, we betray our
countrymen and stand in the way of others’ well-being. Indoor tempera-
tures are explicitly mentioned as a problem, and gas is a solution to it.
Moreover, low indoor temperature is problematized by linking it to the
health of children, Russia’s future generations. Unsurprisingly for a gas
commercial, sources of energy that could be promising in some regions,
such as bioenergy and/or coal, are presented as the source of the
problems gas is trying to solve. Therefore, these local and regional
energy sources are demonized due to the negative societal effects they
allegedly produce.
This narrative plays very cunningly on the topic of scarcity. In the
Russian context, the question of ‘scarcity’ of gas is not only related to
basic needs, but it also has a dimension related to national identity. This
notion of gas scarcity is intertwined with similar national ideals and
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expectations. The Russian national identity is increasingly constructed in
a manner that links Russia’s hydrocarbon abundance to Russia’s societal
modernization and the Great Power aspirations that this energy abun-
dance both enables and legitimizes (Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011,
pp. 784, 787–8). The core appeal of Gazifikatsiya rests in its ability to do
away with several dimensions of scarcity, which is especially appealing
to those generations of Russians who have experienced the shortage
economy of the 1980s (Kornai 1980). The video is trying to convince the
audience that by connecting to the national gas distribution network,
energy security is no longer an issue and Moscow has noticed your
home, community and region and the federal centre will look after you.
This resonates well with Collier’s (2011, pp. 212–14) argument that
indoor temperature is a central biopolitical (domestic security) problem
posed for the Russian state and governing regime. This, again, can partly
be explained by the persistent Soviet legacy – there is a shared under-
standing among Russians that heat and even power should be provided
by the state free of charge or, at least, inexpensively (Collier 2011,
p. 239).
The narrative found in the video combines patronage and (bio)security
in such a manner that it resonates well with the concept of energopower
(Boyer 2014, pp. 321–8; Rogers 2014, p. 436). Thus, governmental
concern over energy supplies is associated with both the biopolitical aims
of guaranteeing the (bio)security of the population as well as the exertion
of control over populations and the production of economic accumulation
by keeping energy flowing in grids and pipelines. Energopower can serve
as an analytical tool that helps people understand how power and the
materialities of energy are intertwined. The energopower approach expli-
citly reminds us of the binary nature of contemporary energy systems in
their ability to do both ‘good’ and ‘bad’; that is, energy systems are a
means of delivering amenities and controlling the population. In the
Gazifikatsiya video, this binary connotation is immanent – Gazprom
delivers, along with its pipelines, (bio)security for individuals and
communities, and also the feeling that the state is able to control from
afar.
GAS (INDUSTRY) AS A GUARANTOR OF RUSSIA’S
MODERNIZATION
One central argument in the video is that the gas industry is modernizing
Russia. Gazprom is viewed not only as a guarantor of Russia’s tech-
nological and economic modernization, but also as a social guarantor.
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The technology utilized in the gas industry is referred to as kosmiches-
kaya tekhnologiya (space technology), which has been developed in
Russia due to the extremely demanding environmental conditions in
which the gas industry is forced to operate and the high standard of
science and engineering that has been developed to overcome this natural
limitation. Again, the geo is part of the modernization narrative and
functions as the cornerstone of governmentality. Furthermore, the way in
which the gas industry is viewed socially clearly bridges the gap between
professions and ‘classes’. This is not a new idea, as during the Soviet
Union period different industrial branches developed distinct identities;
for example, gas workers identified themselves as gazoviki and oilmen as
neftyaniki, regardless of rank. Hence, when in the video the directors of
Gazprom claim to “know the pipeline welders by name”, this feeling of
togetherness is utilized to produce an understanding of the gas industry
as a safeguard of the national social contract, basically arguing that
Russia’s current societal modernization obtains its essence from Soviet
egalitarian discourse.
The implicit message of this picture of the gas industry’s role in
economic modernization hints that a prominent objective of Dmitrii
Medvedev’s presidency, economic diversification away from the domin-
ance of the energy sector, has been abandoned (Gustafson 2012, pp. 490–
492). The video argues that the multibillion rouble investment into
Russia’s gas industry has turned this branch into “the locomotive of
Russia’s economy”. For Gazprom as a commercial company, this kind of
reasoning is understandable. Still, Gazprom has to be viewed as also
reflecting the state’s rationalities: diversification is no longer pursued
with the same vigour as before, which concurs with Gustafson’s argu-
ment that in the eyes of Vladimir Putin and Igor Sechin, the hydrocarbon
sector is and will remain the undisputed locomotive of the Russian
economy (Gustafson 2012, p. 493).
Despite the single possible usage of carbon-based fossil energy, the
modernization of Russia via gas is defined as something with no end in
sight. This argument is supported in the video by references to the
reserves of gas as ogromnye zapasy (enormous reserves) and samye
krupnye mestorozhdeniya na planete (the planet’s largest deposits), as
well as by repeating numbers (trillion cubic metres and for decades to
come), thus giving the impression that modernization based on gas will
continue for an unlimited period. This speech derives its core from, once
again, Soviet or even tsarist-era discourse: natural resources are an
unlimited cornucopia for the nation (Fryer 2000). Here again, geographi-
cal imageries and scales – endless, globally vital recourses – form the
basis of this modernization narrative and governmentality.
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The gas industry is presented as a modernizing agent in peripheral
Russia, both upstream and downstream. Gas infrastructure not only
provides warmth and well-being for peripheral communities where gas is
delivered, but brings ‘civilization’ to the extreme North, as well. The gas
production infrastructure enables the societal and economic development
of the “uninhabited” northern production territories. A significant share
of the video is devoted to describing how transport infrastructure (roads,
airports) built for the gas industry promotes economic opportunities in
these regions. In addition, ‘civilization’ is transplanted to the Yamal
North as gas workers are taken care of in a scientific and precise way,
including a daily physical examination (by the female doctors), while the
workers’ diet and working hours are adjusted for the requirements of a
northern environment. Gazprom and Gazifikatsiya are viewed as central
actors promoting regional development – modernization and civilization
– involving both the peripheries of production and centres of consump-
tion. The viewer is assured that by buying into this gas strategy, one
promotes these objectives on a national scale. Gas and the Gazifikatsiya
governmentality thus tie the individual to both Russia’s physical and
economic geography.
PIPELINE AS CONTROL TOOL AND MODERN
WARFARE
The Gazprom video argues that local and regional authorities are not
fulfilling their obligations in constructing gas infrastructure in the settle-
ments. According to the Gazifikatsiya programme, the obligation of
Gazprom is to deliver gas “to the municipality’s border” while the local
authorities’ task is to build a local gas distribution network. Gazprom is
working to encourage local populations to pressure district and region
leaders to prioritize working with Gazprom on Gazifikatsiya projects.
The obligation to take part in and promote national biopolitical goals by
focusing, for example, on indoor temperature and children’s health has
another dimension to it: Russians are not only gently enticed (discur-
sively) to take part in this national endeavour but also urged to succumb
to the patronage of the parastatal company. The promise to deliver
patronage and the claim to submit to it is exemplified by the way the
arrival of gas to a peripheral locality is organized and shown in the video.
First, Russians are made to believe that gas infrastructure extends
everywhere, as even the most remote settlements are the focus of
attention for the state and the company. Second, the video tries to assure
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all Russians that gas will arrive and link them with state-run infrastruc-
ture. The fact that the state ‘arrives’ together with the gas is exemplified
in the video by the arrival of federal authorities and Gazprom officials at
the villagers’ house to cook food on gas stoves and to light up a fakel
(flare) located in the village square. The message is that through a gas
connection, villagers are connected to the company and the state, coming
under their patronage and also under their control. What I see at play
here, when viewed from the geo-governmentality and energopower
perspectives, is a combination of both identity construction and disciplin-
ary power made possible via the materialities of energy.
The geo-governmentality and energopower of Russian gas that I aim to
unfold here dovetail well with theoretical contributions in the disciplines
of political geography and ecology regarding the materialities of energy.
I refer here to the work of Bakker and Bridge (2006; also Bridge
2009; Bridge 2010, pp. 527–8; Bridge 2011, pp. 316–20; Watts 2004a,
pp. 200–202; Watts 2004b, pp. 75–6). The main contribution of this work
has been the taxonomy of effects that the hydrocarbon sector has had on
societal development via its spatialities and materialities. For example,
the proposition that hydrocarbon industries produce a specific choke-
point geography – in other words, the agency of narrow oil and gas
transport corridors (such as pipelines) to promote by their physical
character coercive rule and militarization in the affected societies along
the route – is directly linked to the societal effects produced by gas
distribution pipelines.
Gazprom claims that it distributes prosperity to the Russian regions via
gas pipelines, but when approached critically it also produces the means
to strengthen its monopoly position in the Russian domestic gas market,
as well as fortify its position in the eyes of the political elite, namely,
Putin’s regime, as the guarantor of central state power in the Russian
regions. Naturally, the ability to control regions is not openly stated in
Gazprom’s strategies, rhetoric, or the Gazifikatsiya promo video,
although the vast social programmes tied to it bear witness to the fact that
the entire gas programme is a national endeavour linked to regional
development and federal unity aims, especially in the coal industry-
dominated Russian Far East (Stolica na Onego 2012). This is not merely
the commercial campaign of a company, as underscored by visual and
discursive hints in the video.
Gas and its infrastructure – the geography of gas and the materialities
it encompasses – are viewed as a tool for control on an international scale
as well. Here, the narrative builds on the above-mentioned energy
superpower discourse that has been intensively constructed in the Russian
domestic arena during the 2000s. The topic of whether Russia is an
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energy superpower was hotly debated especially after the 2006 and 2009
gas disputes between Ukraine, Russia and the EU, but the issue was
revived during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. The way in which official
Russia has talked about its energy as leverage is noteworthy: the assertive
position of the early 2000s that Russia uses energy as a geopolitical
resource, clearly stated in the Energy Strategy of Russia from 2003, was
softened after 2008–9, when Russia articulated its energy policy aims
towards the West. However, at the same time, the construction of the
energy superpower discourse has intensified (especially during the 2014
crisis) with the Russian domestic audience, as clearly shown by Grib
(2009). An energy superpower identity is built on tying together the
subject nation and the energy rich nation. The video bases its argument
on this discourse, as gas and gas infrastructure are defined as Russia’s
modern warfare. For example, military and geopolitical vocabulary and
visions are used when discussing the gas infrastructure. Yamal gas
resources are defined as “strategic” and the steel in the gas pipelines is
referred to as having a “similar thickness to tanks”. Moreover, when the
personnel controlling the flow of gas in Gazprom’s system are inter-
viewed, a control screen focusing on Ukraine and Europe is shown in the
background. The message is clear: Moscow and Gazprom’s headquarters
are defined as the centre of domestic and trans-boundary power. The
director of the control room states that “any pipeline connection or
compressor station can be controlled from here [while viewing the
pipeline map of Europe] and we can intervene at any point” (v liuboi
moment my mozhem vmeshatsya). This evokes the idea that Russia has
the power to control others through gas, and individual Russian con-
sumers have a duty and a privilege to be part of building this geopolitical
power.
MUTED ISSUES: WHAT IS NOT SHOWN OR
DISCUSSED?
Central to the use of power via discourses and practices are the issues
and phenomena not discussed. Choosing to be silent about a topic
deserving of mention is a power-vested tactic. Two important areas for
the hydrocarbon businesses worldwide that are ignored in the video
include the social inequalities and environmental problems produced
along the commodity chain (Bridge 2011, pp. 318–20; Watts 2004a,
p. 202; Watts 2004b, p. 59). For example, the indigenous people living in
the gas producing region of Yamal receive no mention. Moreover, no
ethnic groups other than Russians are shown in the video at all. The
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production region is presented like any other Russian region or territory,
giving no hint about the ethnic diversity found there. Despite the fact that
the Yamal is inhabited by the northern native Nenets, Hanti, Komi, and
Selkup people – accounting for some 10 per cent of the population of the
region – the video explains on two occasions that “no people live in this
extreme environment”. One explanation for this silence is the need to
define gas culturally and ethnically as purely Russian, as argued earlier.
The other reason could be the fact that by commenting on the ethnic
history of the region, Gazprom and the state would be forced to comment
on the societal effects of the hydrocarbon industries on the local
communities, which would focus attention on issues such as land rights,
welfare provision, and the economic equality of native people. Therefore,
in the Gazifikatsiya governmentality, the geo is utilized also in a reverse
manner as decisive geographical issues are excluded from the narrative.
Likewise, it is striking how the environmental question of gas produc-
tion and transport is almost completely ignored in the video. Thus,
nothing is said about the environmental consequences of gas production,
locally or globally, except for the vague notion that gas is a goluboe
toplivo (‘baby-blue fuel’), hinting that gas is pure. There is no mention of
the environmental consequences of gas transportation, which places a
significant burden on the environment. The inefficiency of gas compres-
sor stations is one reason why Gazprom is Gazprom’s biggest client
(Sutela 2012). Furthermore, the video does not comment on the energy
inefficiency caused by a de facto pipeline monopoly of Gazprom. One
central reason why oil companies have not been able to meet the
associated petroleum gas utilization levels is because Gazprom blocks oil
companies from feeding gas into the national pipeline system because it
wants to avoid competition (e.g. Hulbak Røland 2010, p. 37).
Interestingly, another Gazprom promotional video intended for the
international audience emphasizes that their operations in Vietnam, for
example, are conducted according to the highest international environ-
mental standards and follow the procedure of environmental impact
assessments (Gazprom International 2012). Thus, being aware of this
criticism of the upstream end, a question arises about whether companies
such as Gazprom are trying to construct an image of a socially respons-
ible player, both in their domestic upstream and downstream operations,
while ignoring the environmental question that is internationally central
for the hydrocarbon businesses. However, as stated earlier, this respons-
ibility is ethnically discriminative because the indigenous people of the
North are ignored in the video. The Russian private oil company Lukoil
as well as the parastatal Gazprom have been criticized for neglecting
their social and environmental responsibilities at the upstream end of the
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commodity chain (Greenpeace 2016). Yet they have both started to
construct a self-image of a socially responsible company by using the
material dimensions of energy as one medium in this construction
(Rogers 2012, pp. 288–9; Rogers 2014, pp. 437–43).
My analysis reveals that the geo-governmentality practised by Gazifi-
katsiya derives its power from geographical knowledge and Soviet and
post-Soviet imageries, and from the ability to do ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The
materialities of gas and gas infrastructures are used for both purposes.
This bipartite energopower, a specific form of geo-governmentality, is
invested with meaning by the existent materialities of hydrocarbons; the
pipelines, for example, embody energy security and connectedness to the
nation and its resource geography. The physical manifestation of Gazifi-
katsiya profoundly affects the construction of the social. Notions of
Russia as a Territorial Superpower, Energy Superpower, and Ecological
Great Power are all based on the centrality of this materiality. At the
same time, this construction lumps together the material-specific and
nationalistic image of energy with universal (neoliberal) binding goals,
such as economic growth and modernization, and also with particular
Russian values, including conservative gender roles. The materialities of
gas thus feed into the national identity of Russians as citizens of an
energy superpower. This power – projected via international gas pipelines
and a military vocabulary – forms the core of the ability to do harm in
the domestic arena as well: gas energy, infrastructure, and the gas
industry are defined and viewed in a manner that underscores the
submissive role of individuals and communities.
The production of truths, identity and power in this geo-
governmentality take place via Foucault’s dispositif, which includes
institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge
structures. Several discourses, rooted in both the Soviet and post-Soviet
nationalistic modernization ethos, are combined with the spatial and
material characteristics of the gas industry to form a compelling narrative
where institutional and administrative mechanisms – the Gazifikatsiya
programme of a parastatal energy company – provide the frame. Further-
more, the five dimensions of the regimes of government defined by Legg
(2005, pp. 147–9) are unfolded in my analysis: specific ways of thinking,
the understanding of reality, the construction of certain subjectivities and
refutation of others, strategic technologies of rule, and the values of a
specific government. Moreover, the rationalities and practices of Gazifi-
katsiya geo-governmentality function in and combine several scales: the
subject is tied to territories and the nation through gas, the subject is
made responsible for the (bio)security of the population, and even the
global is harnessed when legitimizing the heavy reliance on gas.
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Gazprom’s Gazifikatsiya Rossii promotional video shows how the
leadership of the company wants gas (as a substance and source of
energy), the gas industry, and the Gazifikatsiya programme to be seen by
the Russian people. I argue that this desire is also partly shared by the
leadership of the country. The overt aim of the video is to show how
many positive things gas can provide for Russians but, as I have stated
above, there are subtle hints in the advertisement that gas has the ability
to do harm as well.
The way Western observers understand harm is naturally influenced by
the liberal and democratic understanding of what constitutes a negative
societal development. Moreover, it can be argued that this Western, or at
least European, understanding of energy as a societal force or actor is
also biased. The fact that European consumers have become alienated
from carbon energy – from the facts about how their mundane gas and
gasoline are produced, where it comes from, the social and environmental
consequences it causes, and how it actually keeps our mobile societies
and democracies running – can be seen as a troubling issue. The Russian
hydrocarbon culture takes a completely different approach to what energy
means culturally, socially and economically. The Russian way of con-
structing an energy culture can also be seen as a more rational way of
thinking about the energy dependence of society and the individual than
the prevailing Western approach, which is more prone to dilute and push
aside the fact that modern nations are deeply rooted in and dependent on
fossil energy. Thus, hydrocarbon-culture construction efforts such as the
Gazifikatsiya promotional video can serve as a sobering reminder for
Western societies of what ultimately keeps our societies and economies
running (Mitchell 2011).
Contrary to the Western understanding, the Russian people may choose
to join the gas infrastructure and voluntarily remain under the patronage
of the national monopoly and the federal centre. This positive under-
standing of patronage certainly has its roots in Soviet history (Collier
2011, pp. 238–9). According to this view, Gazifikatsiya simply mirrors
some of the needs of the Russian population. In dialogue with this need,
fostered by the present-day Soviet nostalgia among Russians, I will now
take a more focused look at the hydrocarbon-culture governmentality by
examining how Gazprom’s programmes in the field of sports and youth
reach beyond what is traditionally considered energy materiality, and how
these materialities are utilized by those in power.
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SPORT, ‘GREATPOWERNESS’, AND GAZPROM
When approaching sport, the critical social sciences start with the
assumption that it is as political as any other realm of international
relations and cooperation (e.g. Sugden and Tomlinson 2002). Sport is
political in at least three senses. First, doing sports and exercising is tied
to the health of an individual as well as the population. Constructing
sports facilities to promote sports and the health-oriented lifestyle it
entails is therefore an essential social policy question in modern societies.
Second, a healthy population links sport to soft-power issues, such as the
national economy (individual as a worker), and to security and hard-
power topics, such as military potential (individual as a soldier). This
promotion of the ideal citizen as an able-bodied worker-soldier is related
to the third way in which sport is political: it is about competition and,
internationally, the pursuit of victory over other nations. Success in sport
is not only seen as important for the self-esteem of an individual, but it
can also function as one of the building blocks of national or ethnic
identity. Faring well in global competition has long been understood as
crucial to promoting a positive national image in the eyes of the
international community (e.g. Koch 2013; Smith and Porter 2004).
Sport was an essential part of the Cold War rivalry between the
capitalist and socialist world, led by the United States and the Soviet
Union. In the Soviet Union, it was utilized to persuade global audiences
that the socialist economic and societal model was better than capitalism.
Significant investments were therefore made in sports training and
coaching, and also in sport infrastructures and facilities of all kinds (e.g.
Edelman 1993; Peppard and Riordan 1993). Indeed, many Russians
today are nostalgic for the perceived success of the Soviet state in
socio-political and cultural realms, including sports (Lee 2011; Mankoff
2009). In the context of the recent surge in Russia’s Great Power
ambitions, Russians continue to emphasize sports success in global
arenas as one supposedly objective indicator of ‘derzhava’ or ‘Greatpow-
erness’ (Jokisipilä 2011). For example, organizing and doing well at the
2014 Sochi Olympic Games was widely framed by the media and the
state as important for the self-esteem of ordinary Russians, which Putin’s
regime strategically leveraged as a tool to promote national pride
(Persson and Petersson 2014).
In Sochi, as well as in nearly all Russian regions, major state-owned or
dominated corporations have been obliged and are prepared to sponsor
sport infrastructure construction and the communal infrastructures needed
to operate these premises (e.g. Müller 2011; Trubina 2014). Gazprom and
48 The energy of Russia
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter3editedVPT /Pg. Position: 16 / Date:
13/9
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 17 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
the state-dominated oil company Rosneft were accorded the widest
responsibilities in this field. The Sochi games thus illustrated a wider
triangle uniting Russian sports, energy and Great Power status – with
accumulated energy wealth not only being invested in the military
apparatus to expand Russia’s ‘Greatpowerness’ (Baev 2008), but also
poured into sports and the related infrastructure.
Gazprom’s extensive social responsibility programmes, namely ‘Gaz-
prom – for Children’ (Gazprom 2015d) and ‘Sponsoring Sports’
(Gazprom 2015h), are part of the company’s general strategy and
operations. The largest share of Gazprom’s sport sponsorship goes
directly to ice hockey and soccer clubs and associations. For example,
from 2008 to 2014, the Director-General of Gazprom Export, Alexander
Medvedev, was the President of the Russia’s Continental Hockey League
(KHL), which is only economically viable due to generous funding from
the national energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft. Seen by some observers
as a ‘soft’ geopolitical tool of President Putin’s Great Power agenda, the
KHL has expanded beyond the borders of Russia to purchase and include
teams from regional neighbours, including Serbia, Slovakia, Latvia,
Finland and Kazakhstan (Jokisipilä 2011). In ice hockey, the link
between the state and the energy sector is the strongest, yet Gazprom is
also a major sponsor of European soccer. Internationally, Gazprom’s
sport sponsorship is primarily justified on the economic grounds of
promoting visibility in its main market area, but the soft power aims of
the Russian state also play a role.
Domestically, sponsorship of and investments in sports are overrepre-
sented in both the upstream (energy producing) and downstream regions
(those with little or no gas coverage) of the gas commodity chain. The
highly visible and spatially extensive social responsibility projects in the
sphere of sports are thus treated as one of Gazprom’s tools for promoting
the national gas programme in these key areas. Sport is an ideal means to
do so, as it has so many positive connotations for Russians, both
individually and on a broader socio-cultural level. By amalgamating the
gas programme with sports-related social responsibility, Gazprom can
cultivate an image of ‘doing good’ for society, while simultaneously
promoting the less benign objectives of the Russian state and the present
regime in biopolitical and energopower terms – namely, emphasizing the
importance of a physically and mentally healthy population that suits the
needs of the Russian economy and military. The pact of energy and
sports advances a conservatively defined communality (communitarian-
ism) via sports halls and clubs, and fosters a national identity based on
the idea of Russia as a Great Power. For example, as part of Gazprom’s
‘Sponsoring Sports’ programme, and in addition to more than a thousand
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sports infrastructure projects carried out since the mid-2000s in the form
of ice hockey halls, tennis courts, sports halls, and various athletics
fields, the company promotes a Russia-wide programme of physical
training and sports called ‘Ready for Work and Military Defence’ (Gotov
k trudu i oborone), which is led by the Ministry of Sports (Gazprom
2015f; Ministerstvo Sporta RF 2015). Gazprom sponsors this national
sport and military preparedness programme, and has also started to
require its employees to take the battery of physical tests, including short
and long distance running, swimming, skiing, pull-ups and long jump, as
well as (artificial) grenade throwing and shooting with a rifle.
Another example accentuating the biopolitical objectives (for example,
that physically and mentally fit bodies serve economic but also military
and other patriotic ends) is visible in the social responsibility programme
‘Gazprom – for Children’. This programme is dominated by local-level
sports sponsorship and infrastructure construction projects carried out by
Gazprom and its regional subsidiaries, but it also includes a patriotic
song contest called ‘Flare of Hope’ (Fakel Nadezhdy) (Gazprom 2015g).
If the sports projects aim at physically fit patriotic citizens, this project
aims specifically at producing a mentally strong and unified youth that
shares the government’s patriotic goals to benefit the country economic-
ally and militarily. A quote from the head of the Culture and Arts
Department of the City of Orenburg on Gazprom’s website advertising
the song contest makes the connection clear: “I am sure these children
will grow up to be good, wise people who will make this country richer
and more powerful. Thank you, Gazprom, for your loyalty towards
traditions!” (Gazprom 2015c). Here, traditions can be understood as a
reference to traditions of the Russian state – with its emphasis on Great
Power status, loyalty to authoritarian rule and its leader, and the
obsequious citizen as a patriotic ideal.
CASE: RUSSIAN GAS AND SPORTS FIELDS
DISPLACING LOCAL RENEWABLES IN KARELIA
Gazprom’s numerous projects and programmes are firmly tied to the
countrywide gas programme Gazifikatsiya Rossii. On the grounds of
enhancing energy security, promoting economic growth, regional invest-
ment, and environmental protection, Gazprom and the Russian govern-
ment assert the importance of extending the country’s gas distribution
network to its peripheries. The Republic of Karelia, which borders on
Finland and the EU, is one such peripheral region. Exemplifying the
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themes discussed so far, the remainder of this chapter focuses on a case
study of Gazprom’s projects in Karelia.
The Gazifikatsiya programme has been running since the mid-2000s,
but the most intensive phase started in 2010–11 (Gazprom 2012),
including the republic of Karelia. One specific feature of Gazifikatsiya is
that all gas pipeline projects and gas-powered plants built by Gazprom
have a social infrastructure component. In the case of Karelia, this has
been significant: in its Ladoga district, a deal was struck in 2012 to invest
six billion roubles in gas infrastructure, while at the same time earmark-
ing two billion roubles for social infrastructure (Peterburgregiongaz
2012). These figures may be staggering, but Gazprom, along with other
major Russian enterprises, is in fact legally obliged by the government to
carry out certain philanthropic activities. As Gazprom cannot evade these
obligations, its executives prioritize acts of charity that can maximize
gains for both the company and its backers in the state. As discussed
above, Gazprom-branded sports halls and athletics fields have topped the
list of preferred projects.
In Karelia, settlements predominantly import their electricity from
outside the region and heat supplies have traditionally come from oil or
coal, even though the region is rich in wood resources and has a long
history of local forestry. As a whole, the Republic of Karelia imports 70
per cent of its energy, indicating that the forest industry, in supplying the
remaining 30 per cent, is responsible for a significant share of the
region’s local energy. In fact, Karelia made several plans and agreements
from 2001 to 2003 to decrease energy import dependency by constructing
new power plants running on woodchips and peat (Pravitelstvo RK
2001). But by 2004–5, Gazprom started negotiations to expand its gas
distribution pipelines in Karelia and to construct gas-burning heat plants.
This resulted in an agreement between Gazprom and the government of
the Republic of Karelia in 2006 on ‘Gasification of the Republic’, with
Gazprom launching pipeline and heat plant construction in 2007 amount-
ing to 490 million roubles through 2010.
In 2011, Gazprom invested an additional 180 million roubles in the
Karelian heat and power sector (Peterburgregiongaz 2012). All these
investments laid the foundation for the 2012 Ladoga deal mentioned
above, in which Gazprom would undertake the gasification of the
Northern Ladoga territories of Karelia at the cost of six billion roubles
for gas infrastructure (pipelines and power and heat plants), plus two
billion roubles for social infrastructure – predominantly indexed for
constructing sport facilities (Stolica na Onego 2012). However, the gas
investment programme was not sold to Karelian politicians and author-
ities simply on the basis of economic and energy security arguments, but
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with promises of social infrastructure construction in the form of several
sports halls and fields. Such projects offered links to ‘positive’ national
objectives, making gas look more appealing than local energy sources
and energy self-sufficiency. In the Ladoga region, these social sports
projects consumed one quarter of all money invested in Karelia as a
whole. By prioritizing these sport facilities over other potential social
infrastructure projects, Gazprom’s initiatives have helped to further
entrench the nationalist valorization of sports as united with Great Power
aspirations, while also advancing the state’s biopolitical and energopoliti-
cal objectives.
While these national biopolitical objectives are certainly pivotal for
Gazprom’s programmes to gain acceptance and support inside Putin’s
regime, the local practices evolving in and around such programmes are
implicated in a more nuanced and multifaceted set of power relations.
During the 1990s, before the era of state corporations’ social responsibil-
ity programmes and sport facility sponsorship in the Russian regions,
Karelia’s municipal and regional leaders preferred visible infrastructure
construction and renewal projects, such as paving of streets, building
pedestrian streets and shorelines, and statues and fountains, over invis-
ible, yet more vital renewal projects, such as enhancement of drinking
water safety by investing in obsolete water treatment plants and the
deteriorating drinking water and sewage pipeline systems (Tynkkynen
2001). Sports facilities have increasingly become one such visible project
preferred by regional leadership.
As highly visible sites in urban centres impacting and ‘traversing’ the
everyday life of many people, Gazprom-sponsored sport facilities play a
multidimensional role in allowing localities to reassert power and control
within national hierarchies. For example, one strategy for local and
regional politicians in Karelia to remain in positions of power involves
promoting the objectives set by the nation’s corporate champions, like
Gazprom, so that central officials in the Kremlin see them as reliable and
submissive technocrats. However, sports halls and athletic fields that
structure urban space are also a way to legitimize chosen policies in the
eyes of the local inhabitants, and to show people that the local elite is
aligned with the national power and its supra-local objectives. Further-
more, sport infrastructure construction is a highly profitable business
with large possibilities to divert money to the regional leadership’s
entourage, and is thus a means to build and fortify allegiances and local
centres of power. Indeed, across Russia and the post-Soviet space,
state-sponsored sport facility construction business is not only lucrative;
it also enables corruption better than other businesses (Müller 2011;
Trubina 2014). Therefore, this ‘potential’ for lubricating local power
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machines is possibly one central motivation for local and regional
politicians and authorities to promote social responsibility programmes
set by the centre that include building sport infrastructure.
As seen in the Karelia case, Gazprom’s decision to emphasize sports
facilities that are highly visible ‘commercial’ objects, raises the question
of whether these projects are appropriately categorized as social charity.
This in turn raises the related question of whether such projects are more
closely related to the company’s marketing campaign – aimed at high-
lighting the company as a socially responsible actor and ‘whitewashing’
its image – than engaging in philanthropic activities that would promote
the well-being of the populace in a more substantive fashion, such as by
developing social housing, hospitals, schools, etc. By claiming to be
socially responsible via the provision of sport facilities, the state giant
signals in a markedly neoliberal biopolitical way that ‘social responsibil-
ity’ entails promoting fit citizens who might benefit the society, its
economy, and military might, in other words, its Great Power ambitions
through self-help and exercise. The state and the company cooperate to
provide a setting that enhances communitarianism via local sport insti-
tutions, but the individual and communities are ultimately made respons-
ible for accomplishing the biopolitical objectives set by the state.
Without doubt, Gazprom’s Gazifikatsiya campaign produces positive
impacts as it expands to new areas, increasing the reliability of energy
deliveries in comparison to peripheral settlements being dependent on
imported oil and coal. At the same time, connecting new areas to
centrally-governed pipelines makes these territories and regional actors
much more dependent on Gazprom and the state. As scholars have
pointed out, pipes matter (Bridge 2009, 2011; Collier 2011) – especially
in the post-Soviet context. Not only do gas pipelines construct depend-
encies and interdependencies between Russia and its consumers (mainly
in Europe), but they are also key to forming and sustaining structures of
power inside Russia. Gazprom-funded sports infrastructure thus acts like
an extension of gas infrastructure, an ‘epiphyte’ both luring and compel-
ling towns and settlements to join the nation-building project, Gazifikat-
siya Rossii. It is here that the national energy, cultural, and military
‘Great Power’ narratives converge.
SPORT, ENERGOPOWER AND CORPORATE
GOVERNMENTALITY
Discursive (biopolitical) and coercive (anatomopolitical) governmentality
come together in the energopower practised by Gazprom and the Russian
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state. The amalgamation of energy and sports makes it possible to
practise discursive and coercive power cunningly, as the ‘presence’ of the
state is made concrete through both gas pipelines and visible and
spatially extensive sport facilities. Gazprom’s all-Russian gas programme
and its practices on the local level, as exemplified via the Karelia case
study, may be a form of corporate whitewashing, but it also advances the
Great Power ambitions of Putin’s regime in the name of social ‘respons-
ibility’. Parastatal Gazprom has managed to construct a truth in which it
has cast sports-related investments as a form of ‘responsible’ social
provisioning and infrastructure development. However, genuine philan-
thropy in the form of investments in basic social infrastructure and
communal amenities such as schools and hospitals, or pure drinking
water and non-toxic sewage, or assistance of disabled groups and poverty
relief, does not take place.
Thus, the position of major energy corporations in post-socialist Russia
as formulators of what is worth knowing and what is the truth, is
exceptionally strong. This is partly due to the fact that Russian people
demand and expect patronage from the state and its corporations, as they
used to do during the Soviet era. For the most part, the population, local
and regional stakeholders find themselves agreeing with the hegemonic
discourse that the state defines what is good for the people and the
regions. However, as a Foucauldian theoretical approach suggests, power
produces counter-power that both opposes more hegemonic claims to
truth and also adapts to its objectives by changing it slightly and adding
contextual nuances and peculiarities to it (e.g. Tynkkynen 2009a). In the
Russian regions, therefore, we find that the national patriotic agenda is
utilized locally not just to maintain power, but also to challenge it – and
Russians actively demand concessions from the state. For example, in the
Perm region bordering to the Urals, where Gazifikatsiya has been carried
out far longer than in Karelia, the municipalities, the local power and
heat providers, as well as private households have come to expect
inexpensive delivery of gas as a civil right. And as Gazprom has steadily
raised gas prices, the communal companies and households have refused
to pay. In the Perm region alone, the municipalities had in 2013 accrued
a debt to Gazprom of approximately two billion roubles. Gazprom may
thus ‘deliver’ state power along with gas pipelines and its sporty
‘epiphytes’ as it enters new regions like Karelia, but at the same time it is
aware of the oppositional potential of communities to both counter and
redeploy the hegemonic discourse of state patronage.
However, Gazprom’s sports-orientated social programme ultimately
aims to responsibilize individuals to ensure the well-being of both self
and nation, its economy and military might. Its unique form of corporate
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governmentality can thus be defined as a matrimony of the energy
superpower ideal and military Great Power identity that are constructed
with the help of sports metaphors, values and infrastructures. Sport is
utilized to steer energy policies on the local and regional level, as was
clearly shown in the Karelian case when the gas programme pushed local
bioenergy and energy self-sufficiency goals off the regional agenda. The
compelling nationalist narratives manifested in the triangle uniting Rus-
sian sport, energy and Great Power status are therefore just as important
as the mundane energy security objectives used to persuade Karelian
leadership and communities to join Gazifikatsiya Rossii.
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4. Energy as international power: the
case of Russian–Finnish energy
trade
In this chapter, I will focus on energy power in action in the trans-border
context. Geopolitical power sought by the Russian hydrocarbon culture
relies on a similar discipline–reward apparatus as that used domestically
by the oil- and gas-inspired geo-governmentality of Putin’s Russia. Then
again, in the international setting we witness a much wider repertoire of
strategies combining these alluring and coercive means. Russian–Finnish
energy trade is an interesting case of energy power, because it leans on
the soft approach and builds on goodwill. Although it is well-veiled and
spoken of and performed indirectly, the coercive is still present even in
this highly ‘neutral’ political atmosphere. Both strategies are an elemen-
tary part of the practices and discourses of the Russian hydrocarbon
culture, yet one might think that the ‘nuclear diplomacy’ that has recently
dominated the Russian–Finnish energy scene is a departure from hydro-
carbons. I will demonstrate that the opposite is true.
ENERGY AS ‘BUSINESS ONLY’ AND ‘A WEAPON’
Since the mid-2000s, when oil prices rose steadily, President Putin
consolidated his grip on power and a growing share of Russian oil
production fell into the hands of the state, some scholars have begun to
argue that Russia is emerging as an ‘energy superpower’ (Goldman 2008,
pp. 7–10, 206–7; Rutland 2015; Smith Stegen 2011, p. 6506), especially
in relation to the main buyers of its energy: the EU countries. ‘Energy
superpower’ refers to a Great Power status that is gained not by
traditional military means, but through a dominant position in global
energy production and trade that enables the country to use its energy
wealth as leverage for political and geopolitical aims. The argument
claiming that Russia is moving towards this logic stems especially from
three episodes in EU–Russia energy relations: in 2006, 2009 and 2014
Russia reduced its deliveries of gas in pipelines running through Ukraine,
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which affected EU countries at the end of the pipeline. In addition, it
evokes fears that the Russian energy giant Gazprom has started to acquire
shares of national gas distribution companies in the territory of the EU
and the former socialist states (Closson 2014). Europe could fall victim
to the Russian spider web, where energy supply, transnational pipelines
and distribution networks are governed by one country. As a matter of
fact, as soon as Russia gained WTO membership the European Commis-
sion (2012) started to investigate whether Gazprom might be hindering
competition in European gas markets. Basically, the issue here was the
entanglement of Gazprom and the Russian state, and it demonstrates that
the fear of Russia using energy as a political tool is real in Europe. Court
rulings have recently compelled Gazprom to change its monopolistic
pricing strategy and partly abandon ownerships it had in European gas
distribution businesses. Despite these changes, there are fears that Russia
is able to exert significant geopolitical and geoeconomic power in Europe
via major gas pipeline infrastructures, such as Nord Stream I and II
(Vihma and Wigell 2016).
Assessments regarding the importance of energy resources as part of
security policy have varied according to changes in the relations between
Russia and the European Union. After the break-up of the Soviet Union,
energy and transport infrastructure was seen as an important element for
promoting economic integration and interdependency (Aalto and Fors-
berg 2016). The situation changed at the turn of the millennium. The high
market price of oil fuelled economic growth in Russia. The policy
changes that accompanied reforms in the energy sector diverted state
income to strategic projects designated by the Putin entourage. This
included, for example, the construction of new oil export ports in the
Gulf of Finland. The main idea was expressed in the Energy Strategy
(Ministry of Energy RF 2003), according to which energy resources and
control of energy flows are one kind of “geopolitical tool”.
The Russian leadership as well as the parastatal energy companies
have argued, as have many European politicians and scholars (Kivinen
2012; Perovic 2009, p. 11), that Russia is only pursuing stable market
relations and economic prosperity via energy exports and downstream
businesses – energy is only business and driven by economic interests.
For example, Rutland (2008, p. 209; see also Judge et al. 2016) argues
that Russia’s ability to influence foreign states via energy relations has
been exaggerated. The main argument is that Russia would not jeopardize
its energy relations with the EU, its biggest customer, by using energy as
a leverage for political goals. This notion stems from the belief that
Russia is more dependent on rents derived from the EU energy markets
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than EU member states are on Russian energy. On paper, when compar-
ing EU imports (a third of which come from Russia) to Russian exports
(two-thirds going to the EU), this is surely the case. In my view, this idea
is also based on an outdated understanding of energy power. It looks at
energy security via the loop of a hard energy weapon, failing to see the
logic and effectiveness of the soft one. Moreover, I argue that this mainly
European understanding of the interdependence within Russia–EU
energy relations rests on false assumptions. Namely, interdependence can
arise when parties are equal in size and power – and many think that the
EU is equal to Russia in energy political terms. What this approach fails
to take into account is the fact that the EU as an institution has no
leverage via energy trade vis-à-vis Russia, as the EU does not buy a
single barrel of oil, cubic metre of gas, tonne of coal or uranium from
Russia. Russia has also used its leverage within the energy field and
refused to negotiate energy trade issues with the EU. It is a fact that
energy trade takes place between gigantic Russian state-owned com-
panies and Europe’s mostly privately-owned energy companies, which
are influential within individual EU member states but not throughout the
EU. Thus, I argue that what we are witnessing in energy security terms in
Europe is an institutional delusion that prevents us from seeing the power
of geoeconomics of energy. As a result, the soft energy weapon is used,
thus making it possible for Putin’s Russia to influence the EU’s foreign
policies. A concrete example of this divide and rule strategy is the fact
that the EU still lacks a common voice in energy policy. This is despite
recent efforts, driven by the war in Ukraine and Russia’s aggressive
behaviour, to revive the original consensus potential of common energy
policy via the EU Energy Union, as was the case with the predecessor of
the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community of post-war Europe.
The Russian domestic discourse on ‘energy superpower’ has grown
stronger ever since its onset (cf. Grib 2009, p. 7). Since the early 2000s,
when energy exports greatly increased Russian revenues, the Russian
government has been building its national identity on a foundation of
energy prosperity and military strength. Energy money has trickled down
to enhance the population’s well-being and, to an even greater extent, has
been channelled to the military. This has made Putin’s government
popular. Energy prosperity has allowed Russia to emphasize its special
status and helped detach it from the framework of European mutual
dependence and the institutional integration promoted by the EU. The
potential and actual attempts to increase Russia’s political bargaining
power through energy in relation to European countries are viewed as
plausible, and even inevitable. In the frame of an ‘energy superpower’,
Russia has a dominant position in comparison to its European partners,
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and the country has presented itself as a ‘benefactor’ in relation to its
neighbours, such as Ukraine. From Russia’s perspective, the country has
supported the economies of Ukraine and other former Soviet states for
years in the form of affordable energy prices. Especially during the first
years of the Ukrainian war, in 2014 and 2015, the Russian identity
became even more closely linked to energy and Russian state-controlled
media was saturated with the story that the West and particularly Ukraine
are so chronically dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and uranium that
they have been brought to their knees before the all-mighty Energy
Superpower Russia. Putin’s government and the Russian people have
interpreted Europe’s tepid response to the occupation of the Crimea as a
sign of European weakness. This is seen as evidence that Russia is an
energy superpower in both speeches and actions.
Today’s Russia, with no significant international debt on its shoulders
and an accumulated energy wealth as its muscle, has the financial
potential to act as an energy superpower, and use soft means to influence
European energy and thus also foreign policies. This potential is verified
by historical practices: Russia has used uncertainties and irregularities
related to price negotiations as well as pivotal infrastructures in the
energy sector to link decision-makers more closely to the Kremlin’s
sphere of influence or direct control (see Balmaceda 2013). Russia’s
ability to use energy as leverage is judged not only by the potential to
carry out such manoeuvres, but by the effects of this enterprise. In this
respect, the analysis made by Smith Stegen (2011; Table 4.1) on Russia’s
ability to use the energy weapon, in other words aiming for and gaining
political concessions by using energy supply as leverage on energy-
dependent countries, goes a step further than previous studies. Her main
argument is that although Russia’s energy superpower status has previ-
ously been evaluated from the viewpoint of the state’s ability to control
energy resources and transit routes as well as the fact that the state must
try to use energy resources to further its political objectives, the effects of
this enterprise have been neglected. She proposes that we focus our
analyses on the reactions of energy-dependent governments to the threats,
price hikes or cut-offs orchestrated by Russian actors. In the case of oil
and gas trade between Russia and the EU, Russia’s potential to behave as
an energy superpower not only exists, but has been played out. Smith
Stegen (2011, pp. 6509–10) shows that in the field of gas trade the effect
has been more pronounced than in oil, despite the fact that attempts to
use the energy weapon have been made in both energy fields during the
new Russian era after 1991.
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Table 4.1 Energy weapon framework (Smith Stegen, 2011)
Energy resources in country
1. State consolidation of resources
2. State control over transit routes
3. Implementation of threats, price hikes, disruptions
4. Target state acquiescence and concessions
Energy resources as political leverage
The model strives to expand the analysis to any case in which an energy
export country attempts to use the resources and flows that it controls to
influence the political behaviour of a country purchasing energy. How-
ever, the metaphor of the ‘energy weapon’ concept is misleading. This is
because Russia has not used tough means of influence in the context of
Western Europe. For example, if Russia’s energy strategy vis-à-vis
Ukraine can be defined as a hard energy weapon (‘squeezing flow’), in
Finland – as in most EU countries – Russia’s foreign energy strategy
resembles a soft energy weapon (‘lubricating flow’). However, the
analytical model applies just as well to contexts in which an explicit
‘stick’ is not evident. These cases show how influence is built in a
positive manner, which is a far cry from a weapon. Russia has skilfully
used this tactic in Western Europe and the EU (see Hogselius 2013).
From the Finnish perspective, this is also a key method of exerting
influence via energy. The question is not whether Russia can use the
‘hard’ energy weapon, because this is a possibility that cannot be ruled
out. However, as there have been no problems in energy trade and flows,
Russia has preferred more covert measures like pricing and contracts.
The attractiveness of the energy sector as a channel of influence is the
sum of many things. The energy sector plays a key role with regard to
security of supply for modern societies. The importance of the sector as a
channel of influence can be attributed to the fact that this is a matter of
dependency relationships built over decades and to the central role that
the Russian government plays in the Russian energy sector. In Europe,
energy dependency has been seen as a symmetric alignment in which
both the EU and Russia are dependent on the continuation of trade
relations (Goldthau and Sitter 2015). As I argue above, this does not
apply to the situation with individual countries or companies, which can
be subject to occasional or systemic use of the ‘energy weapon’. In the
following I will use Smith Stegen’s model to assess Russian energy trade
with Finland. The analysis focuses on factors contributing to and/or
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undermining a positive interdependency created via energy trade between
Russia and Finland.
RUSSIA’S ENERGY AS POLITICAL LEVERAGE IN
FINLAND
In Finland, 45 per cent of the energy consumed is of Russian origin while
71 per cent of imported energy comes from Russia. Although renewable
energy accounts for one-third of the energy palette and self-sufficiency is
high on a European scale, nearly all of Finland’s fossil and nuclear fuel
comes from Russia (see Table 4.2). Thus, the energy relationship between
Finland and Russia can be described as asymmetric. With the exception
of electricity, Finland accounts for a small percentage of Russia’s energy
exports while imported Russian energy, excluding electricity, represents a
large share of total imports in Finland. The dependency of Finland’s
energy sector on Russian hydrocarbons, nuclear power technology and
nuclear fuel exports creates a possibility for leverage.
Table 4.2 Finland’s dependency on Russia by energy form (Statistics
Finland 2017)
Energy form Imports from
Russia as
share of total
imports
Amount Share of Russian
exports by energy
form
Coal
Oil
Refined products
Natural gas
Uranium
Biomass
Electricity
88%
89%
80%
100%
71%
70%
7%
2.5 mill. t.
11 mill. t.
3 mill. t.
2.4 bcm
38 t.
127,000 t.
5TWh
3%
4%
n.a.
2.5%
n.a.
n.a.
80%
Finland is aware of its energy dependency on Russia, but considers it
manageable. At the root of this thinking is a worldview based on liberal
values, democracy and free trade that together enable positive inter-
dependency and cooperation. However, increased global competition
for economic and natural resources presents challenges to previous
policy assumptions. Currently, economy and trade are even more suscep-
tible to the pursuit of other (foreign) policy objectives (Goldthau and
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Sitter 2015; Wigell and Vihma 2016); influence produced through trade
is based on the dependency relationships created through commodity
flows, economic benefits and political ‘goodwill’ – and the threat of its
absence.
Consequently, security of supply thinking based on a ‘turn off the taps’
scenario has become an inadequate frame. Instead, the analysis of energy
security should consider how energy trade practices, flows and policies
have affected Finland’s energy policy and understanding of energy
security. Accordingly, the set of measures available to influence the
energy policy of the target country vary across individual sectors (oil,
gas, uranium/nuclear power, coal, bioenergy), but more importantly, they
go beyond a single sector. In other words, the build-up of energy leverage
– influence on the target country’s energy policy – is one element of the
asymmetric measures aimed at furthering Russia’s national security
interests. Thus, the Russian energy sector is seen as an integral part of the
state’s strategic resources rather than an autonomous actor (e.g. Ministry
of Energy RF 2009, 2017; Strategiya 2015). Therefore, the Russian
leadership looks at its trade partners with a strategic geoeconomic
perspective: trade policy is executed with comprehensive state interests in
mind. This entails that even if Gazprom strikes a gas trade deal or
Rosneft contracts oil with the Finnish state majority-owned companies
Gasum and Neste respectively, we cannot know precisely how choices
made within these sectors reflect and influence decisions in, for example,
the nuclear business. It may well be that Russia wants the outside world
to think that all its decisions are centrally made and governed, despite the
fact that in reality we can easily find scattered interests and decision-
making within the Russian energy sector (e.g. Kivinen 2012). However,
when looking at economically and symbolically important projects for
the Putin regime, like the Rosatom–Fennovoima nuclear deal, it is more
likely that the actions of Russia are closer to the ambitions stated in
central strategic documents and also in line with Russia’s foreign and
security policy thinking: foreign relations are built and maintained via
comprehensive strategic action. This aspect is not always understood in
the energy policy discussion in Finland, and elsewhere in Western
Europe, where the major energy companies operate on the basis of
market logic as opposed to the logic of state security interests.
It can be even argued that the responsibility for defining Finland’s
energy security has been partly turned over to the corporate world.
Finland’s significant energy dependency on Russia has been justified
by the economic profitability of this trade for both parties, without
paying attention to what is expected from Finland in return for low prices
and favourable provisions. However, the state of Finland is, through
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many different links, tied to these long-term, economic dependencies.
Examples of these include Neste Ltd, a state majority-owned company
and an important international hub for Russian oil and gas flows, and
Fortum Ltd, via complex Finnish and Russian nuclear power and gas
industry cross-ownerships and partial ownership in the Nord Stream II
project. This puts pressure on ownership steering in companies where the
state is the majority owner. Controlling these overall impacts would
require a systematic approach and sensitivity towards geoeconomic
issues, yet thus far Finland has not developed such a strategic approach to
energy.
The above discussion of Finland’s energy security serves as an
introduction to the analysis below, which examines the processes of
energy trade between Finland and Russia via political-economic influ-
ence and dependencies. Table 4.3 presents the factors that appear to be
key for each energy sector from the perspective of our analysis (see
Sipilä et al. 2017), which is based on detailed and concrete cases
related to energy companies and actors. The table concludes with an
important summary of the significance and logic of Finland’s overall
dependence, which is the foundation on which Finnish–Russian energy
cooperation and the mainstream Finnish understanding of energy security
has developed.
The Finnish energy security discussion often refers to the fact that all
energy flows imported from Russia could be replaced. In truth, they
could be replaced in a crisis situation but only hypothetically in normal
conditions. In a business-as-usual situation, factors that maintain depend-
ency limit the choices. Russia is well aware of this. Thus, Finland’s
manoeuvrability is in many ways more limited than in a decentralized
energy procurement scenario, where the market is not dominated by a
single energy supplier. Russia could compensate for this trade – and the
subsequent loss of revenues from Finland – but for Finland it would be
very expensive. Under normal conditions, it is impossible to imagine a
situation in which Finland or the entire EU region could simultaneously
purchase its oil, gas, coal, uranium and electricity from somewhere else.
The price would inevitably rise and company profits would decrease. It is
extremely difficult to prove what this would really mean in terms of
freedom of choice regarding decisions on economic, energy, environ-
mental and foreign policy made by Finland or the EU; what decisions
have been made or not made because of these dependencies.
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Table 4.3 Russia’s methods of influencing Finland via energy trade
Phase 1
‘Russia’s
state
ownerships’
Phase 2
‘Russia’s
control of
flows’
Phase 3
‘Russia’s
measures’
Phase 4
‘Finland’s reactions’
Gas Controlled
by the
Russian
state via
Gazprom
ownership
Export
controlled
by Gazprom
Low pricing
used to maintain
customer
relationships and
‘goodwill’
Share of gas reduced
in the energy palette
and new gas
infrastructure aims at
decentralization, but
Neste’s flows remain
unchanged, difficult to
replace
Oil Russian
state owns
2/3 of oil
production
State-owned
Transneft
exports 85%
of oil
Oil exports to
Finland have
remained high
mainly for
geoeconomic
reasons
Oil imports from
Russia are high
(80–90%) due to
price, refining and
infrastructure inertia,
which have prevented
decentralization
Nuclear
power
State-owned
Rosatom
owns the
entire chain
Rosatom
controls the
chain
Share of Russian
uranium is high
due to pricing
and power plant
customer
relationships; the
plant and
electricity are
provided for
Fennovoima at a
low price
Despite obvious
foreign and security
policy links, nuclear
cooperation and trade
is defined using
economic concepts; a
major crisis in
EU–Russia relations
did not change
Finland’s stand on
Russian nuclear power
Bioenergy Russia’s
bioenergy
sector is in
private
hands; a
large
number of
actors
Bioenergy
and wood
exports
under state
control, but
also many
private
actors
Bioenergy trade
indirectly
politicized
(export policy),
but decoupled
from direct
Russian state
interests
Reactions directly
related to bioenergy
cannot be identified;
potentially a lack of
desire to increase
imports due to
Finland’s own forest
sector interests
Joint impact
of overall
dependence
The majority
of Russian
actors in
Russia–Finland
energy trade
are state-
owned
The
majority of
flows in
Russia–
Finland
energy trade
are
controlled
by the
Russian
state
Pricing, good
terms and
minimizing
politicization
ensure continuity
in the energy
trade, which is
important for
relations
between Finland
and Russia
Finland has the need
to define its energy
cooperation with
Russia using
economic concepts
and underline its
importance to good
relations, in which
case a 70% import
dependency level is
not seen as a problem
but as a sign of trust
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Assessing the political consequences of this form of dependency is not
popular in the EU; energy-security thinking is dominated by the security
of supply, thus a fear of the ‘hard energy weapon’ (cf. Szulecki et al.
2016). However difficult it is to ponder the possible political ramifica-
tions of economic dependence, it needs to be done for the sake of future
symmetric interdependency between the EU and Russia. For example,
one essential question involves determining how the Fennovoima–
Rosatom nuclear power plant (NPP) project influenced Finland’s position
concerning the focus of EU sanctions set after Russia waged a proxy war
in Ukraine; nuclear ‘carrot projects’ provided by Rosatom – two of which
are under construction in the EU space, in Finland and Hungary (Aalto et
al. 2017) – could have affected the focus of sanctions set for Russia.
Specifically, it is odd that the Russian nuclear sector, which produces
uranium, power plants and electricity as well as nuclear weapons and is
thus linked organically to Russia’s violence in Ukraine, fully escaped
Western sanctions even though oil and gas production was targeted. In
light of this, the fact that Finland’s dependency on Russian energy has
grown – imports from Russia increased from 65 per cent in 2015 to 71
per cent in 2016 – since the Ukrainian war is a very interesting
development. Regardless of whether this was dictated by the energy
economy or not, it can be interpreted as a sign of trust in foreign policy:
while other Western countries ‘politicize’ energy trade, Finland is a
‘rational’ actor that does not mix the economy with security policy.
Ensuring the continuity of energy trade is, as such, already an
important part of maintaining good relations with Russia, but the
economic advantages formed via trade further strengthen this link. In a
static world not threatened by climate change, this would not be an
energy policy problem. For Finland (and the rest of the EU countries)
which is pursuing an energy transition towards a decarbonized society, it
may be difficult to break these dependencies because the current flows of
non-renewable energy produce major economic benefits for the country
and its state-owned companies. Thus, it is the international effects and
path dependencies of hydrocarbon culture in Putin’s Russia that hinder
not only the energy transition within Russia, but also in the societies
dependent on Russian energy, hydrocarbons and nuclear power. Energy
produced via atomic fission is therefore simply one ‘branch’ of the
Russian hydrocarbon culture, as nuclear power makes it possible to
preserve the present political and economic strategy that is not aiming at
decarbonization or decentralization. Vice versa, a significant share of
wealth created by selling oil and gas on the international market is
directed to the Russian nuclear sector (cf. Josephson 2019), to both of
them. The possibility for Rosatom to offer NPPs, the ‘peaceful atom’, to
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Finland and other countries at a low price is by and large made possible
by hydrocarbon profits; calculations reflecting the sources of Russia’s
state revenues show that half of all funding for Rosatom’s branch
responsible for production of nuclear weapons – the ‘bellicose atom’ – is
in fact covered by oil and gas sales.
CHERISHED NUCLEAR TRADE BREEDS PATH
DEPENDENCIES: AN ANTITHESIS FOR
DECARBONIZATION
Nuclear power has a special meaning for Russia, and from the Russian
viewpoint nuclear cooperation is a top priority in terms of Finnish and
Russian relations (see President of Russia 2017). Natural gas plays a key
role in building an energy superpower, but the fact that Russian oil, coal
and uranium are so essential to the European energy supply also
contributes to this identity. In Russia, the progress of Rosatom’s project
in Finland in this particular political situation is presented as a victory
that makes it possible to combine traditional power policy with the idea
of an energy superpower. Moreover, it promotes the Putin government’s
target of normalizing the Ukrainian situation and creating a new frozen
conflict on its borders. Finland is being given the opportunity to assume
a multidimensional role in this process. As a country with strict control
over its nuclear power, Finland is an important reference for Rosatom in
terms of promoting Russia’s soft power image on a global scale. The
project also gives Finland a special position in Russian policy in
exchange for overlooking Russia’s actions in Ukraine. This may be one
reason why some Finns want to see the Rosatom project become reality:
Finland accepts a project that supports Russia’s Great Power ambitions
and move to a ‘new normal’ that simultaneously maintains Finland’s
traditional special status in the eyes of Russia.
Hanhikivi 1, the Fennovoima NPP that is being constructed by
Rosatom and its subsidiaries but still waiting for a building permit by
Finnish authorities, is primarily being financed by the National Wellbeing
Fund of Russia. The cost estimate for the project is highly competitive in
comparison to other nuclear power plant suppliers. The state-owned
Rosatom, the legal aim of which is to promote the interests of Russia, is
not obliged to produce profit and can also offer Finland a significantly
less expensive nuclear power plant. The nuclear sector is fully controlled
by the state corporation Rosatom, which handles practically everything
related to nuclear issues: nuclear policy, running of NPPs, transport and
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reuse of nuclear fuel, radiation safety as well as the nuclear weapon
complex (Dobrev 2016). Rosatom was recently granted sole responsibil-
ity for the services and logistics on the Arctic Northeastern Sea Route, a
central part of this being the ice breaker fleet that runs on nuclear fuel.
For this reason, the nuclear sector represents Russia’s strategic interests
in the field of geoeconomic and geopolitical leverage in its most refined
manner. This leverage may well explain why it was not possible for
sanctions set by the West to focus on the Russian nuclear sector (cf.
Pajunen 2014).
In terms of nuclear technology Russia is very much self-sufficient, and
Rosatom has managed to increase its nuclear power portfolio by 60 per
cent between 2011 and 2017. With a 17 per cent market share, it is now
one of the biggest companies supplying uranium (Dobrev 2016; Rosatom
2017). This upscaling has its economic rationale to be sure, but construct-
ing, owning and providing fuel for NPPs makes it possible to promote
geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives by sealing the Russian presence
for 60 or more years. Hence, nuclear power institutionalizes political
power with a long-standing infrastructure (Oxenstierna 2014). However,
the political leverage is far greater in those cases where Rosatom delivers
uranium to NPPs constructed, owned and run by the corporation. In the
case of Finnish Hanhikivi 1, Rosatom has a contract to deliver uranium to
the plant for the first ten years, but it is very likely that the Russian
nuclear giant will continue to provide the uranium after this time frame.
This is explained by the fact that Rosatom has a mastery of the technical
and chemical requirements of the uranium pellets, as they are designed
and fine-tuned for Rosatom’s own nuclear plants. Another important
factor is that Rosatom, as a state corporation with no obligation to
produce profits, can provide the uranium at prices below the market rate.
This makes it possible to maintain long-term control over resource flows
as well as produce political leverage that radiates beyond the nuclear
sector, despite the fact that on paper the uranium trade is based on (free)
market considerations. Hence, although Fennovoima can buy its uranium
from elsewhere after the ten-year uranium delivery contract expires, fuel
economics will discourage such moves.
The progress of the Fennovoima–Rosatom–Fortum negotiations from
2014 onwards provides a good example of the special nature of nuclear
power and underlines the strong foreign policy links in Russian–Finnish
nuclear power cooperation: the decision-making processes included flex-
ibility concerning the promised time limits, the government was closely
involved in the processes alongside a private company (Fennovoima) and
the state majority-owned company Fortum was encouraged, if not
compelled, to become a shareholder. Nuclear power cooperation and the
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Fennovoima–Rosatom project are officially (see Ministry for Foreign
Affairs Finland 2016) an important part of promoting good relations
between Finland and Russia as long as the project progresses without
problems. The government and several political parties have presented
the dimensions of the Rosatom project as being no more than an
economic, environmental and energy policy matter. Thus, a foreign or
security policy assessment was considered unnecessary. However, the
problems faced by the project reflect on relations between the countries
and, for example, the opportunities for Finnish companies, such as
Fortum, to operate in Russia.
Nuclear energy cooperation does not only have important ramifications
for and, to a certain extent, to frame Finland’s foreign policy consider-
ations vis-à-vis Russia; it also potentially hinders a rapid energy trans-
formation in Finland. Hanhikivi 2, yet another new NPP project that is
already on Russia’s trade policy agenda, would limit growth in the share
of renewable energy in Finland because a large and inflexible amount of
nuclear energy in the electricity system makes it difficult to increase the
share of variable renewable – primarily wind and solar – energy (see
Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento 2012).
When Finland obtains its energy and energy production infrastructure
from Russia at a very low price, it is worth considering what else has
been factored into it – in addition to market price calculations. Taking
into consideration other objectives that are not directly related to energy,
one of Russia’s most central objectives is that it would like Finland and
Sweden to remain militarily non-aligned countries. Against this back-
ground, it is worth asking the question of what would happen to the
pricing of oil (such as, transports) and especially energy flows and
technology in the gas and nuclear power sectors if Finland chose
differently by, for example, joining NATO?
THE FENNOVOIMA–ROSATOM DEAL IS SATURATED
WITH ENERGY POWER
In autumn 2015, Finland’s government accepted the NPP proposal
prepared by the Finnish–Russian power company Fennovoima (which
translates as ‘Finnish Power’). The government decided to go ahead with
the Rosatom 1200 MW project right after Russia had occupied the
Crimean Peninsula and launched a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine. The
Fennovoima NPP was originally supposed to be financed and built by a
German–Finnish consortium, but the German energy company E.ON
withdrew from the project in October 2012. This consortium sought to
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build a larger 1600–1700 MW NPP in Pyhäjoki, located in Northern
Finland, using either Areva’s French or Toshiba’s Japanese technology.
The Finnish energy company Voimaosakeyhtiö SF – with investments
from Finnish heavy industries, retail companies and municipal power and
heat enterprises – held a 66 per cent share and the German E.ON covered
34 per cent.
In 2013, Rosatom proposed not only to build the new Finnish nuclear
plant, but also to cover the required investment costs, amounting to
one-third of approximately 8 billion euros for the entire project. The
French company Areva was (and still is in 2019) building the notorious
Olkiluoto 3 NPP in southern Finland and, after experiencing severe
problems in quality assurance leading to delays and cost overruns, was
not included in the new Fennovoima bid. Toshiba submitted a full
application, but the Finnish side accepted Rosatom’s application. The
Fennovoima management was certainly less interested in Toshiba’s
technology after the Fukushima accident, and attracted by Rosatom’s
generous offer to partially finance and build the NPP in addition to
providing support and uranium fuel.
After Russia became involved in the war in Ukraine, the likelihood of
the Fennovoima project becoming politicized increased significantly. In
February 2014, at the same time as Russia occupied the Crimea, the
Finnish government signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with its
eastern neighbour. The fact that the head of Rosatom, Sergei Kirienko,
acted as Russia’s signatory revealed the true nature of the corporation:
Rosatom is practically the ‘Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Weapons of
the Russian Federation’. This deal reinforced Rosatom’s position vis-à-
vis other international nuclear companies, such as Rosatom’s competitor
in the Fennovoima project, Toshiba, which were trying to compete in the
Finnish energy market.
The Hanhikivi 1 NPP process became even more interesting from the
foreign policy and political energy-power perspectives when the Finnish
government set a 60 per cent threshold for domestic financing – in order
to be accepted, at least 60 per cent of Fennovoima ownership should be
in the hands of Finnish or other EU actors. This decision came following
increased public discussion concerning whether Finland should let
Rosatom build and own the Hanhikivi 1 NPP in a situation where Russia
is flouting international agreements and law. This issue became even
more acute after several domestic investors withdrew from the project,
possibly fearing image losses when investing in a Russia-backed project,
meaning that the foreign ownership share might exceed 50 per cent.
Rosatom had expressed willingness to finance more than the 34 per cent
initially agreed upon.
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In late 2014, the Finnish state majority-owned energy company For-
tum, which produces heat and power in the Nordic and Russian markets,
announced that it could invest 15 per cent in the Fennovoima NPP. This
would guarantee the necessary level of domestic ownership. Fortum’s bid
was conditional, and included transferring the hydropower assets of
Gazprom in the regional energy company TGK-1 in Northwest Russia to
Fortum. The negotiations on Russian hydropower assets continued
between Fortum, Gazprom and Rosatom from late 2014 until summer
2015, but were not successful for Fortum.
The hydro assets were clearly, both economically and strategically
(geopolitically and geoeconomically), too important for Gazprom and
Putin’s regime to be used as a trade-off in the Fennovoima–Rosatom
deal. In June 2015, contrary to the desires and expectations of Fortum
and the Finnish government, Gazprom did not hand over the hydro
assets, but instead introduced a Croatian company as a new domestic
investor. It was soon revealed that the Croatian Migrit Energija was
owned by two sons of Russian oligarchs with newly acquired Croatian
citizenship. Thus, this ‘Croatian’ miniature enterprise of two persons,
with a liquidity of a few million euros, was supposed to invest 150
million euros in the Fennovoima project. It was clear that this was a
Russian shell company, especially since Sberbank Rossii was to be the
creditor for this Croatian company. This gambit by Rosatom and Putin’s
regime politicized the project even further. The Finnish government had
promised the Finnish Parliament that the necessary domestic ownership
shares would be acquired by June 2015. But as no domestic (European)
investors were found before the deadline, the Russian party tried to
further the project with the help of this Croatian puppet (Nikkanen 2015).
This manoeuvre gave the Russian side an opportunity to keep the
process alive while testing the Finnish side. The deadline set by the
government to gather the necessary domestic investors was superficially
met, but it was clear that the Finnish government would refuse to accept
the Croatian company as domestic. Moreover, this bid further diminished
Fortum’s chances to succeed in their hydropower trade-off. Parties in
Moscow were well aware – for example, via the former head of Rosatom
and the Russian Ambassador to Finland Alexander Rumyantsev – that the
Finnish conservative government was keen on pushing the Fennovoima
NPP through. In early autumn 2015, Fortum finally announced that it
would step in as an investor (covering 6.6 per cent), and therefore
guarantee the required domestic euros for the plant. To everyone’s
surprise, the investment commitment was made without Fortum getting
its hands on Northwest Russian hydropower. This outcome caused
suspicion that the Finnish government had pressured Fortum – an
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independent listed company – to make the asymmetric move following
ministerial level negotiations in Moscow. The CEO of Fortum announced
that “[t]aking part in this project was not the objective of Fortum Ltd, but
our (financial) commitment makes it possible for the Fennovoima project
to proceed following the schedule set by the Finnish Government”
(Fortum 2015). This reflects perfectly the pressure exerted by the Finnish
government on a state majority-owned, but still independent stock
company during and after the negotiations in Moscow regarding the
nuclear deal.
This chronology demonstrates that major energy deals, not least
nuclear, have foreign policy ramifications and are saturated with energy
power. However, Russia is a party to the war in Ukraine and Finland has,
along with other EU member states, imposed economic sanctions on
Russia that specifically target the energy sector. In light of this, the
assurances that the Fennovoima NPP has nothing to do with foreign and
security policy made by Finnish and Russian actors who want to see the
project materialize are, to say the least, odd.
Politicians who support the Rosatom NPP have accused its critics of
being biased and unpatriotic, which in itself demonstrates that foreign
policy plays a strong role in the project. Former Prime Minister Alexan-
der Stubb has talked about the demonization of Russia. Critics of the
project have been accused of Russophobia (Eduskunta 2014). This is
surely political rhetoric, but one cannot help but wonder at the power of
energy when projects like this make the Prime Minister argue that
criticizing a corporation owned by a country at war is considered
equivalent to criticizing the entire country and its citizens. The same
members of Parliament that voted for sanctions targeting the Russian
energy sector seem to have no problem with Finland’s commitment to a
project that is of great symbolic and actual importance to Putin’s regime.
This illustrates how sensitive the topic is for Finland. What makes the
discussion so interesting and also problematic are the assurances that
energy policy, especially regarding nuclear power, can be separated from
foreign policy. Finnish energy policy is presented as being immune to the
power that is exercised globally through energy.
CAN NUCLEAR POWER PROMOTE
INTERDEPENDENCE AND PEACE?
A key argument in favour of the Rosatom project is the implicit
assumption that nuclear power promotes cooperation between Russia and
Finland, Russia and the EU, and that this cooperation promotes peaceful
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relations between the parties in the long run. Basically, this idea leans on
the legacy of Ost-Politik initiated and carried out by Social Democrats in
West Germany from the 1960s onwards (e.g. Högselius 2013). It assumes
that all economic activity, regardless of the traded commodity or sector it
concerns, is beneficial for both parties: it produces affluence, but it also
builds mutual trust and goodwill in particular. Implicitly, the trade is
supposed to tame the more authoritarian party, and commit all those
involved to transparency, stronger institutions and, ultimately, to democ-
racy. Although this idea has not been directly expressed as such in the
Finnish debate on Russian nuclear power, it is included in, for example, a
statement made by Jouni Backman, a former Social Democratic MP and
Parliamentary Group chair at the time, who in 2014 said “we have
cooperated with Russia on nuclear power for decades, and one crisis (the
war in Ukraine) is not going to change that” (Helsingin Sanomat 2014).
This call for pragmatism can be based on one of two assumptions. Either
all economic cooperation with bellicose authoritarian governments pro-
motes peace and democracy or, despite supporting ethically problematic
development, trade and politics should not be mixed. The first of these is
idealistic and the latter is cynical. Backman’s further argument supports
the cynical interpretation: “We’ve never had any problems.” In other
words, ethical issues do not matter as long as energy is available on a
reliable basis.
Regardless of their real reasons, Backman and the Centre Party’s
Mauri Pekkarinen, an MP at the time (Helsingin Sanomat 2014),
encouraged Finland to overlook the occupation of the Crimea and
Eastern Ukraine in the same way many Western European countries
turned a blind eye to the occupation of Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. In
the spirit of the Ost-Politik, in the aftermath of the Prague Spring of 1968
and the consequent Soviet occupation, a number of Western European
countries – Finland, Italy and West Germany at the forefront – struck
several oil and gas deals with the Soviets. Now Finland is basically
repeating this behaviour in the Fennovoima deal, as is Germany by
pushing forward the Nord Stream II gas pipeline project.
In the light of this appeasement strategy chosen by some EU countries,
it is interesting to unfold the argumentation and justifications made
concerning why nuclear power is an area of energy supply that should be
left outside the scope of power politics. For example, in radio interviews
(Pajunen 2014), both National Coalition Party MP Sinuhe Wallinheimo
and the former Minister of Defence Carl Haglund, representing the
liberal Swedish People’s Party, suggested that a nuclear power project
with Russian backing is not a security policy issue. Former ice hockey
goalkeeper Wallinheimo does not “believe that Russia will pressure
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Finland” and states that for this reason, the nuclear power business
should be separated from politics in a pragmatic sense. He does,
however, see Russia’s KHL ice hockey league as part of “old geopolitical
thinking” that links former bordering states to the Russian sphere of
influence and “burnishes Russia’s political image”. Ice hockey is geopo-
litical, but nuclear power is not in this rhetoric.
On the other hand, the former Minister of Defence Haglund stated that
construction and operation of an NPP is not related to security policy.
However, declining to use a Russian supplier would be an open insult to
Russia. Operation is regulated by the Nuclear Energy Act and is based
solely on society’s need for energy. The fact that a minimum level (60
per cent) of domestic ownership was set as an additional condition for the
Fennovoima project makes this selective disregard for security policy an
odd choice. If there was no foreign policy risk associated with the
ownership and operation of NPPs – and the production and selling of
nuclear electricity was simply business – no such ownership limitations
would have been set for the project in the first place. Thus, nuclear
energy policy must also be part of foreign and security policy consider-
ations, and failing to do so furthers the greatest desire of Putin’s regime:
Europe should separate the economy from politics now that Russia has
achieved its military targets, thus creating yet another frozen conflict on
its borders. It also inevitably paints a picture of Finland as a country that,
regardless of the political situation, enjoys a historical special status
granted to it by Russia and – in this case – a reasonably priced NPP
guaranteed by the Russian state.
What if Finland and the EU (the West) wanted to use energy policy to
promote interdependency and peace? In that case, cooperation should
focus on completely different areas than Russian hydrocarbons or nuclear
power – the latter of which is linked to the manufacturing of weapons of
mass destruction, both organizationally and via its fuel chain. Further-
more, uranium mining and nuclear power generation promote a central-
ized energy infrastructure, which allows power to be exerted in the
energy sector and throughout society by a significantly smaller group
than is possible in a decentralized energy system. Therefore, the nuclear
cooperation with Putin’s Russia is equivalent to promoting the centralized
energy power of a hydrocarbon culture, along with propping up the most
violent component of Russia’s Great Power aspirations: nuclear weapons.
Furthering nuclear power is a perfect fit for Putin’s authoritarian
government, because secretive activities – we are unlikely to see certified
uranium commodity chains in Russia that present the social and environ-
mental effects of activities in a transparent way – within the sector make
it easier to keep control in the hands of the country’s leadership. The
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impact of nuclear energy on production and consumption is opposite to
that of solar electricity, wind power or bioenergy. Renewables are
typically produced and consumed over a broad area: a larger part of the
population, many organizations and small and medium-sized companies
are all involved in energy production and transport. Therefore, a transi-
tion away from non-renewable oil, gas, coal and uranium towards
renewable energy promotes economic diversification – all along the
commodity chain, which means in both Russia and Finland. A diversified
economy promotes transparency and an equal playing field for all
entrepreneurs, small, medium-sized and large. This subsequently pro-
motes stronger institutions and democracy and is the antithesis of Putin’s
hydrocarbon culture, a topic I will return to in the concluding chapter.
Like the oil and gas sector, uranium is based on specific points of
production and narrow corridors of transport – which are vertical and
horizontal choke-point geographies in the same way as hydrocarbons.
They employ only a small share of the workforce in Russia, even though
energy exports account for more than half of Russia’s budget. Finland
could more effectively promote a sustainable and resilient Russia by
means of trade built around renewable energy than by importing nuclear
energy or hydrocarbons.
WILL ‘FINNISH POWER’ DECREASE FINLAND’S
(ENERGY) DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIA?
One of the reasons used to justify the Fennovoima project has been
reducing Finland’s dependence on electricity imported from Russia –
electricity from Russia covers a little less than 10 per cent of Finland’s
needs. After Rosatom was selected as the supplier and part-owner,
supporters of the project changed their tune. In his energy policy report
to Parliament (Eduskunta 2014), former Prime Minister Stubb claimed
that “contrary to intuition, the project will decrease our dependence on
Russian energy”. According to that statement, the project would no
longer reduce Finland’s dependence on imported electricity, but would
now reduce its dependence on Russian energy.
However, nuclear electricity will not replace Russian gas because a
significant amount of gas consumption occurs in industrial processes,
first and foremost in oil refining by Neste Ltd, and co-production of
electricity and heat that is mainly supplied to the Helsinki Capital Area.
On the other hand, if we assume that Rosatom’s plant would completely
replace the electricity that now comes to Finland from Russia, the
dependency would actually decrease in terms of electricity. The new
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NPP’s capacity of 1200 megawatts is three times what has been imported
(400 MW) from Russia to Finland. However, Rosatom’s one-third
ownership share allows it to sell 400 megawatts of the electricity
production to whomever it wants: in the electricity markets of the Nordic
countries, the Nordpool, or to Russia and Estonia (via Estlink).
Electricity trade became bilateral in 2015, which means that in the
future Rosatom can sell its own share to Russia if it so desires, leaving
the situation unchanged with regard to electricity supply. Furthermore,
cross-border electricity trade is completely controlled by another Russian
state-owned company called Inter RAO. Although Finns do not have the
power to decide how much electricity crosses the border, the national
grid operator Fingrid has argued that operations that do not observe
market logic – such as selling electricity to Russia when the price is
higher in Finland – are easily detected. However, it is easy to recall the
electricity import situation in 2011 and 2012; after citing economic
reasons, Inter RAO reduced electricity imports during peak winter hours,
thus managing to manipulate the price of electricity in Finland. In
response to the threat of such market distortion situations, former Prime
Minister Stubb tried to reassure people by stating that nuclear power
produced by Rosatom also accounts for approximately half of Ukraine’s
electricity and has remained outside the scope of military actions. This is
despite the fact that Ukraine’s chronic dependence on Russian energy in
2013–16 was based on the joint impact of nuclear power and gas, and
that Russia has used this as a means of exerting pressure for decades.
There is no need to use nuclear power to influence Ukraine. But such a
possibility does exist, which makes gas an even more effective method of
applying pressure. Ukraine has recently decreased its dependence on both
Russian gas and uranium.
It is a fact that Russia is using energy to promote its geopolitical
interests; energy is a central component in Russia’s foreign policy. Within
the frame of the Great Power desires of the Putin regime, it is fully
rational for Russia to use energy as a source of political power in the
international context. In addition to a nuclear deterrent, Russia has very
few means other than hydrocarbons and nuclear power to exert influence
internationally. Russia’s energy-related power strategies vary in different
contexts: what is effective in Ukraine and Moldova, for example, cannot
be copied in Finland or Germany. Therefore, Finland is part of Russia’s
energy diplomacy even though Finland has never had any problems with
energy deliveries from Russia. However, Finland’s dependence on hydro-
carbons and uranium from Russia (70 per cent of imported energy comes
from Russia) does emphasize the risks of electricity production. The fact
that the possibility for manipulation of the electricity market even exists
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is enough. The insistence by some Finnish political and economic actors
that the Russian nuclear power deal has nothing to do with foreign and
security policies is therefore worrying, as the measures taken by both the
Finnish and Russian actors clearly demonstrate that the nuclear business
in particular is highly political. Although nuclear power produces very
little of the greenhouse gases that are warming the planet, the fact that
the nuclear strategy of Putin’s regime is firmly based on the hydrocarbon
culture, its power networks and rents is the antithesis of the decarboni-
zation and decentralization needed to bring about a resilient and peaceful,
and thus respected and trusted Russia.
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5. The national taboo of hydrocarbon
culture: changing the Arctic
environment
In this chapter, I want to examine how the Russian hydrocarbon culture
manifests itself in the Arctic. Specifically, I ask what role does the
Russian North, a central geopolitical direction of Putin’s Russia, play in
safeguarding the future of the regime and its chosen economic and
political trajectory. Moreover, I use the spatialities of energy, including
the pivotal leakage of carbon, to show how the Russian hydrocarbon
culture contributes to environmental problems ranging from the local to
the global, and in fact functions as a ‘geological force’ that is transform-
ing the Arctic environment to serve the needs of this very culture.
However, in doing so the culture relies on three Arctic paradoxes: local,
national and global. The hydrocarbon culture is unable to address these
paradoxes, and instead they are implicitly defined as societal taboos. The
inability to address these problems is a central obstacle on the path
towards a resilient and sustainable Russia.
PATH DEPENDENCY AND NATION-BUILDING IN AN
‘EXCEPTIONAL’ ARCTIC CONTEXT
The Arctic arouses many associations and emotions. Discovery, human
bravery, exploration and scientific progress are connected to the ‘adven-
ture’ Arctic. The Cold War, submarine chases, closed military compounds
and regional environmental problems, such as the fall-out caused by
nuclear tests, are attributes of the ‘battlefield’ Arctic. Inter-governmental
cooperation to build understanding across the North Pole, and the
international environmental movements and Northern indigenous people
that emphasize the urgency to act regarding global climate change fall
into the semantic field of the ‘global’ Arctic. Over the course of the
twentieth century, the political image of the Arctic has undergone a
metamorphosis, and it seems like we are witnessing a new turn in Arctic
contestation.
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During the last decade, the Arctic cooperation agenda that emphasizes
the grassroots level, such as cooperation between inter-governmental
institutions, non-governmental organizations and Northern indigenous
people, has witnessed a revival of so-called ‘hard’ issues. There are high
hopes that environmental change will open up new resources for extrac-
tion and, in the wake of economic ambitions, geopolitics is once again
assuming a more pivotal role in defining the Arctic. The global ‘Arctic
paradox’, which describes the situation when the changing climate
enables the exploitation of new Northern energy resources and further
intensifies climate change (Heininen 2018) seems to be ignored as the
world fixes an intense gaze on the Arctic mineral riches (Gritsenko
2018). The global Arctic paradox is in fact an ethical problem, since the
greenhouse gases released from hydrocarbon extraction and use have a
particularly strong impact in the Arctic. In addition, the uncertainties
related to the rapidly melting sea ice and thawing permafrost are being
covered up, while the economic prospects of Arctic industrialization are
exaggerated (Gritsenko and Tynkkynen 2018; Palosaari and Tynkkynen
2015; see Chapter 6). These global tendencies seem to be particularly
true in Russia, where the Arctic is actively being turned from an
‘uninhabitable’ periphery (see the section on the definition of sustainabil-
ity below) into a geopolitically central area interwoven with nation-
building and Great Power political identity construction in a novel way.
A few years ago, Marlene Laruelle (2012) proposed that the three
central discourses linked to geopolitical, national identity and state
construction in Putin’s Russia are Eurasia, Cosmos and the Arctic. For
those following Russian politics, Eurasian-ness and the geopolitical
fervour linked to it are familiar via the demagogues that have occupied
podiums in Russia and beyond after the break-up caused by the Ukrain-
ian war: Russia is a rising Eurasian Empire that is separate from the
decadent and thus declining Europe. Cosmos refers to both the Cold
War-era space race that draws on deepening Soviet nostalgia among
Russians and the importance of spirituality that has grown hand-in-hand
with the political power of the Russian Orthodox Church. Finally, Arctic
objectives and ideals are also discussed with history, since this discourse
is constructed by referring and appealing to achievements of the Soviet
state in the High North: the state-building geopolitical discourse of
Putin’s Russia is thus partly dependent on the selective utilization of
history from the tsarist and Soviet eras (for example, Tynkkynen 2016a).
This discourse naturally aims at and looks into the future, where
achievements in the Arctic will pave the way for the strengthening of
national economic power.
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The geopolitical discourse on the Arctic that began in Russia during
the last decade is, nevertheless, a consequence of several global, regional
and national phenomena and processes. One of the most important
drivers is the climate change that is advancing at an accelerated pace in
the region. The vision of an ice-free Arctic Ocean as well as the estimates
of rich hydrocarbon deposits located on the Russian Arctic continental
shelf have been pivotal in pushing economic activity in the region. The
expectations that the loss of sea ice will transform the Northeast Passage
into a key route linking Europe and Asia, forming an interface between
the geopolitical discourses of Eurasia and the Arctic, highlight how the
economic and political needs of the governing regime are intertwined
(Medvedev 2018). Domestic and foreign policy needs that are partly
symbolic and partly compulsive force Putin’s Russia to be an increas-
ingly military presence in the Arctic and emphasize its sovereignty in the
region, for example, via territorial claims (Baev 2018). In addition, the
emphasis on hydrocarbon sector development, chosen both for economic
and power-related reasons, is compelling Russia to expand its Arctic
activity. However, this is not a choice in the original meaning of the
word, but rather a path dependency caused by hydrocarbon culture and
its spatial logic: it creates favourable conditions for oil and gas to the
detriment of other sectors of the national economy, and also accentuates
large-scale, state-led projects with the help of authoritarian rule. This
path dependency is not limited to the sphere of Russian economics and
politics; in the spirit of building the hydrocarbon culture, it also encom-
passes the society and culture (Tynkkynen 2016a, 2016b).
For the time being, many Arctic mega-projects have been put ‘on hold’
due to the relatively low price of oil. The large-scale plans to turn the
Russian Arctic into a patchwork of offshore oil rigs and gas pipelines, as
envisioned in the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation in 2009,
have not materialized, despite the fact that Russia tried to influence the
price of oil by striking a deal with OPEC to cut oil production in late
2016. The two energy complexes envisioned before the oil price drop in
2014 and subsequently carried out – the Prirazlomnaya oil field at the
Kara Sea and the Yamal LNG production and transport facilities on
the Yamal Peninsula – may prove to be risky investments both for the
Russian state and private investors. International companies participating
in Arctic energy projects are very scarce at the moment, primarily
because of low oil prices but also due to sanctions imposed by Western
countries on Russia after it began its aggression in Ukraine (e.g. Aalto
2016). The sanctions specifically target Russia’s future hydrocarbon
developments in the Arctic. Given the importance of the Arctic for
Putin’s vision of the Russian future, it cannot be anticipated that the
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large-scale plans to exploit the Arctic, now firmly locked in the drawers
of the governing regime, would be scrapped. However, without energy
technologies of Western origin – which are now subject to sanctions –
Russia’s Arctic energy conquest is not going to be easy, if it is even
possible at all (Aalto 2016). Hence, the importance of Arctic cooperation
is underlined in Russian foreign policy discourse, which claims that the
Arctic forum is actually an arena of like-minded actors and thus insulated
against conflicts elsewhere – in Ukraine, Syria and beyond. At the same
time, however, the domestic discourse and rhetoric targeting the Russian
people have defined the Arctic as a territory where Russia’s interests are
at odds with those of others, especially Western actors, whose aim is to
plunder Russia’s natural riches (Gritsenko and Tynkkynen 2018; see
discussion below). Therefore, framing of the Arctic as an ‘exceptional’
context – one in which all actors emphasize the rule of law and play by
the international norms – fits in well with the alternative-less trajectory of
a Russian political elite that is compulsively clinging to hydrocarbons.
For some Western and Asian actors, it may be appealing to nurture this
exceptionalism in the hope of quick economic returns, even to the point
of naivety. Arctic cooperation in the field of energy, environment and
culture is a good candidate to become a source for advancement that
leads to détente between Russia and the West. This should be nurtured,
while still keeping in mind the political and environmental risks that
potentially accompany such a choice. At this moment, therefore, it is
worth asking explicitly: what objectives are being promoted in the name
of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’? Does the global community want to foster a
Russia that nestles in and around hydrocarbons, strengthening the hydro-
carbon culture and dooming it to a deeper resource dependency that
further erodes its democratic institutions and maintains a centralized and
unpredictable rule? Or is it able to see Russia and its northern expanses
as a context where local livelihoods are a central component in a
flourishing and sustainable economy, and mitigation of and adaptation to
climate change is taken seriously, including a bold investment pro-
gramme targeting the vast potential in renewable natural resources and
energy?
PARADOXES OF AN ARCTIC-CENTRED
HYDROCARBON CULTURE RUSSIA
Russia’s great power ambitions coalesce in the Arctic through a combin-
ation of traditional sovereignty staking out a ‘new’ territory, economic
rents captured from the region’s natural resources and sea routes, and
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strengthening of the global energy superpower image. Despite all this
Russian blustering Lebensraum thinking (e.g. Laruelle 2012), the Arctic
policy of the future will also be defined by cooperation. However, the
present trajectory poses several paradoxical risks to Russia as it reaches
towards its Arctic.
The Russian Arctic paradox is of a less profound nature than the
ethical problem raised by the global Arctic paradox – climate change
melts the ice and further accelerates the exploitation of Arctic hydro-
carbons – as this national paradox is linked to the fluctuating global price
of oil and potentially changing ideas about Russia as a Great Power. The
Russian Arctic paradox is caused by the need for Russia to be visibly
present in the Arctic and along the Northern Sea Route in order to
enhance its Great Power status, as well as the fact that Russia has, in an
economic, political and even cultural sense, become chronically depend-
ent on hydrocarbons (for example, Gustafson 2012; see Chapter 3). These
factors push the Russian state to promote and finance non-viable oil
projects in the Arctic for the time being, and to do everything in its power
to influence the price of oil via its energy diplomacy and foreign policy
in the global arena in order to make Arctic oil projects profitable and
increase budget revenues. At the grassroots level, in contrast, we see the
local Arctic paradox: hydrocarbon-based workers’ towns are well main-
tained and even indigenous communities are ‘subsidized’, or compen-
sated for the economic losses produced by the industries, but the
long-term economic and sociocultural strategies that reach beyond the
time frame of hydrocarbon industries are missing (for example, Henry et
al. 2016). This local Arctic paradox mirrors the general paradox facing
Russian society: how to prosper after oil? Unlike the global Arctic
paradox, the local Arctic paradox in the Russian High North is easier to
act on, for example, via corporate social responsibility practices that we
monitored (Tynkkynen et al. 2018) in the Yamal Peninsula. However, as
long as this activity is labelled as ‘charity’ – as it predominantly is by
major actors in the High North: Gazprom, Rosneft and Novatek – we are
unable to resolve this paradox on a strategic level. In this respect,
internationally agreed supply chain and commodity certificates could
play a decisive role (see the concluding chapter). After all, it is us in the
EU, Japan and China who are the primary consumers of Russia’s energy
resources, and it is in our interest to increase responsibilities along the
energy supply chain.
By approaching Russia’s Arctic paradoxes from different disciplinary
traditions, in addition to the above-mentioned spatial approach, we are
able to draw a more nuanced picture of the factors and path dependencies
behind these paradoxes. First, seen from the perspective of political
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economy, the agenda and decisions concerning industrialization of the
Russian Arctic seem legitimate, at least in the short term. Arctic
hydrocarbons are pivotal in the quest to maintain high levels of oil and
gas production, and the related rents. The resource rents are central to
Putin’s popularity; along with boosting military capabilities and the
domestic security structures, these rents have been utilized for the benefit
of Russian citizens in social transfer schemes and via the economic
trickle-down effect. The link between energy rents and the regime’s
popularity seems to be holding for now, despite the fact that during the
Putin era that began in 2000, the affluence of the Russian nation – the
energy-linked capital – has accumulated in fewer and fewer hands than
ever before, while a significant share of the population persistently
remains below the poverty line (Shorrocks et al. 2016). Control over
these rents is also vital to the self-preservation of the governing regime,
as the political and economic elite – first and foremost the oligarchy – is
kept loyal through ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ derived from energy flows and
rents. Thus, the entanglement of economic interests and those of the
political elites and the resulting absolute priority of the natural resource
sector is a key reason why Putin’s Russia cannot avoid leapfrogging to
the Arctic ‘big fish’ with its major virgin and greenfield deposits of oil
and gas (for example, V.-P. Tynkkynen 2010; Tynkkynen 2014; also see
Bridge 2011). As a result, the spatialities and materialities of hydrocar-
bons, such as leapfrog development, vertical and horizontal choke-point
geographies and the excessive leakage of carbon that has grave effects on
the environment from the local to global scales, play a pivotal role in
defining not only Arctic futures, but also the future of a Russia that is
clinging to a hydrocarbon culture.
Second, from the perspective of politics of identity and culture,
Russia’s Arctic paradoxes do not seem as lapidary as the political
economy of the Russian Arctic would entail. However, the way in which
the governing regime constructs identities and promotes certain cultural
forms does pose challenges for sustainable Arctic development. The
manner in which Russian political discourse on the Arctic is constructed,
and the way in which the Arctic is intertwined with nation-building
efforts (Medvedev 2018), is very much related to how Russian territory
and its resources in general have been operationalized by the regime as
parts of national identity and culture. I refer here to the efforts by the
governing regime and its central actors, such as Gazprom, Rosneft and
Lukoil, to use the spatialities and materialities (infrastructures, flows and
connectedness) of energy to construct a specific form of identity that
views the nation’s deep dependence on natural resources, especially fossil
energy, as a strength that enhances Russia’s role as a Great Power (see
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Chapter 3). Trying to sell this hydrocarbon culture and Energy Super-
power identity to the Russian people (e.g. Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011;
Rutland 2015) is thus fundamentally linked to selling the Arctic as a
central geopolitical direction for the development of the Russian state and
its sovereignty, as demonstrated by Laruelle (2012).
This identity coil amalgamating the Arctic and its resources is there-
fore also a pivotal factor influencing, if not determining, the way
economies, cultures and the environment are treated at the level of
policies and underlying politics. In order to understand why the question
‘What comes after hydrocarbons?’ has been seriously pondered in Russia
– from Vladivostok to Moscow – so little, we must be aware of the
cultural and identity dimensions of the issue. Among other things,
constructed identities of hydrocarbon culture, coupled with meta-level
processes in the sphere of political economy, explain why indigenous
communities are kept in line and their livelihoods maintained through
‘artificial respiration’ taking place via subsidies provided by the hydro-
carbon industries in compensation for pollution and loss of habitat. The
practice of ‘milking the oil men’, which means distributing crumbs of
wealth in the form of consumer goods and some social services instead
of long-term strategic planning to enhance the Northern (indigenous)
economies and cultures, has evolved because the regional and local
administrations in the Russian Arctic are also part of a game that puts the
hydrocarbon industry in the driver’s seat and sets the direction (Henry et
al. 2016).
Third, when examining the political ecology in the Russian Arctic, the
problematic directions set by the political economy in Putin’s Russia and
the cultural and identity practices tied to it become even more evident.
Russia’s hydrocarbon industries pollute the air, waters and soil in the
sub-Arctic and Arctic regions, first and foremost, to the detriment of
Arctic ecosystems and the health of local populations. Since Russia’s oil
industry has been renationalized – following the privatization of Russia’s
oil industry in the 1990s, the state has acquired control of two-thirds of
oil production – the state is to blame for the insufficient environmental
policies in this field (Shapovalova 2017; Shvarts et al. 2016). An
estimated 1–2 per cent of Russia’s oil production, or 5–10 million tons of
crude oil, is released into the environment during extraction and transport
and 500 000 tons of hydrocarbons enter the Arctic Ocean via rivers (Hese
and Schmullius 2009). The yearly number of spills from failing oil
pipelines ranges between 15 000 and 20 000, but the exact number is
unknown due to lack of transparency in the business and the state’s lax
attitude concerning environmental consequences (e.g. Vasilyeva 2014).
Therefore, official figures concerning oil spills are not available and the
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numbers provided by energy companies are for the most part unreliable
(Shvarts et al. 2016).
Moreover, approximately 15–20 billion cubic metres (bcm) of associ-
ated petroleum gas (APG), which is equivalent to 3 per cent of Russia’s
annual gas production and 10 per cent of the volume that EU countries
import from Russia, is burnt in flares at Russia’s oil production rigs. The
increased level of APG utilization that has fortunately occurred since
2008 is the unintended result of the electricity sector reform carried out
in Russia since 2008. Oil companies have been producing electricity
from APG in mini-power plants and thus avoiding both capacity and
retail electricity market payments, which has made them more energy
efficient (Vasilyeva et al. 2015). However, even after this drastic reduc-
tion in APG flaring from over 50 to just 15–20 bcm, Russia is still by far
the biggest polluter and accounts for from one-fifth to one-quarter of all
APG flared globally even though it only accounts for 13 per cent of the
world’s oil production (Elvidge et al. 2018). Russia’s APG flaring is
exceptionally detrimental to the Arctic environment in two ways: gas
flaring accounts for about 1 per cent of global energy-related GHG
emissions (IEA 2018a) – meaning that 0.25 per cent comes from Russian
flared APG – and the black carbon (BC), also known as soot, emitted
during flaring accounts for half of all BC settling on and melting Arctic
ice and snow. Recent research (see Shapovalova 2017; Stohl et al. 2013)
suggests that BC is responsible for roughly one-third to one-half of all
climate forcing in the region, thus contributing significantly to the
double-pace warming the Arctic has experienced compared to lower
latitudes. The root causes for the global Arctic paradox are global GHG
emissions, to which all nations and economies contribute. However, the
climate warming impacts of BC emissions from the Russian hydrocarbon
industry account for a significant share of the overall climate impacts of
Russia’s emissions, and even a pivotal share of the warming in the Arctic.
To put it bluntly, the Russian hydrocarbon industry, backed by the
political economy of Putin’s hydrocarbon culture, is speeding up warm-
ing of the Arctic and its subsequent exploitation. This is where a
significant share of its future wealth is located, and it is as if the Russian
hydrocarbon culture had turned into a ‘geological force’ transforming and
forcing the Arctic natural ecosystem to serve the needs of the chosen
culture. Oil and gas extraction is literally melting the ice to uncover yet
another virgin deposit of Arctic oil and gas.
When the above-mentioned factors are taken into consideration, the
way in which Arctic environmental change and global warming have
been framed by the Russian elite for the general public comes as no
surprise. There is consensus that Russia has not been at the forefront of
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global climate governance, but it has not openly tried to forestall
international climate agreements either. Russia was part of the Kyoto
Protocol and signed the 2015 Paris Agreement, although ratified it only
in late 2019. However, the way that climate change in general, especially
in relation to the Arctic, has been communicated by the state and its
media tells a story of increased scepticism and outright denial of
anthropogenic climate change and its negative impacts on Russia and
especially its Arctic expanses (Palosaari and Tynkkynen 2015; Poberezh-
skaya 2015; see Chapter 6). I argue that a political economy tied to
hydrocarbons and the identity construction needs of the governing regime
concerning the Arctic and its energy resources leads to a regime-
favouring and self-preservation narrative in which hydrocarbons and their
societal effects are viewed in an exorbitantly positive light. In this
narrative, the negative economic, social and environmental effects of
deep socio-cultural dependence on hydrocarbons turns into a social
taboo, as does climate change and its negative impacts on Russia and its
Arctic expanses.
RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY
STORIES ON THE ARCTIC
Next, I will examine in greater detail how Putin’s Russia has defined the
Arctic to the domestic and foreign audiences. I argue that, as with the
issues of energy as a geopolitical tool (see Chapter 4) and the causes of
and need for action due to climate change (see Chapter 6), the story told
about the Arctic is schizophrenic: the Russian people hear a message
about how Russia the Fortress is threatened by forces from outside,
whereas the narrative uttered by official Russia at foreign arenas and
forums pictures Russia as an ideal law-abiding citizen of the global
community aiming for mutual benefit via economic and political
cooperation. Every country tries to define itself as a do-gooder on the
international scene: all nations and states have a tendency to communi-
cate in a different manner internally than with the outside world.
However, the Russian double-speech (cf. Gessen 2017) is flagrantly
beyond comparison among industrialized nations, and on par with highly
authoritarian governments like China. I argue that this double-speech is a
product of the hydrocarbon culture: in order to avoid jeopardizing its
legitimacy, the Putin regime has no option other than to securitize
environmental issues and exaggerate security threats to the Russian
people.
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The analysis of domestic and foreign discourses is based on our
(Gritsenko and Tynkkynen 2018) work concerning how the Arctic is
defined in Rossiiskaya Gazeta (RG; domestic audience) and in official
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) communications between 2011 and
2015. On the surface, the key terms in internal and external communi-
cation alike reflect the agenda set by the official Arctic strategies of
Russia: advancing international cooperation and harvesting the economic
potential of energy and shipping. Moreover, both policy stories are in
agreement about the basic assumptions that the Arctic has huge commer-
cial potential for Russia; and Russia needs partners to unlock this
commercial potential. However, while the point of departure on a
meta-level is shared, the policy problems and solutions are defined quite
differently. The internal story told by the state media includes a broad
range of issues from socio-economic development and culture to security
and the natural environment, whereas the MoFA narrative fed to foreign
audiences focuses mainly on the international level and covers almost
exclusively political and diplomatic issues.
Until 2014, the internal story was mainly concerned with unlocking the
economic potential of the Arctic, but during and after that year the tone
changed drastically: the Arctic was securitized to the Russian people.
This included a claim that the Arctic may become a stepping-stone for
other powers to influence and weaken Russia; and according to the Putin
regime the remedy was to ensure a safer and more secure Arctic by
building up Russian military capabilities in the region and beyond. At the
same time as the domestic story became obsessed with territorial
sovereignty and security, the story told on the international fora repeated
the previous message, along with some nuances depicting the new
security constellation between Russia and the West. Namely, the Arctic
was now – more than ever – considered an exceptional area where
conflicts elsewhere do not change the setting. This included reassurances
that Russia is a ‘good international citizen’, and that Russia underlines
the primacy of international law in the Arctic. At the same time, however,
it was emphasized that economic sanctions set by the West are an
obstacle to furthering bilateral cooperation. And here is the twist: the
Arctic is pivotal for the continuation of hydrocarbon culture in Putin’s
Russia, and Russia is trying to build an image of itself as a law-abiding
player while simultaneously trying to use Arctic resources – oil, gas and
transport (from sea and aviation routes to telecommunication cables) – as
leverage to get other powers to invest in Russia’s Arctic hydrocarbon-
propelled futures. This is in the hope that these economically attractive
deals will persuade others to drop the sanctions against Russia.
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As our analysis shows, there are two clearly separated policy stories.
We argue that the dualism in communication is first and foremost a sign
that the Arctic is pivotal for the Russian government and the Putin
regime. Each narrative not only serves a specific audience, but also
presents us with a different set of policy problems and solutions relevant
in a given setting. This finding further underlines the idea that there is not
one, but at least two Arctics: one is a region within a sovereign state, the
other is a region within a globalized world (Heininen 2018). The
relationship between the two facets of Russian Arctic policy can be
grasped by studying the relationship between the policy narratives.
Russia as a ‘Great Arctic Power’ is a powerful narrative for ‘domestic
use’ that serves the goals of identity-building and justifies increased
activity in the Arctic zone. Raising domestic awareness of the economic
potential in the Arctic aims at strengthening political support among the
domestic publics. Demonstrating how this potential can ensure the
country’s economic prosperity helps to justify public investment in
expensive Arctic infrastructure projects. At the same time, this storyline
has implications for international cooperation on Arctic-related issues. In
order to meet the ambitious goals set by the Putin regime, the country
needs to rely on cooperation with foreign partners to ensure access to the
technology and capital needed for extensive Arctic exploration. Russia’s
image as a ‘good citizen’ in the world community who plays by the rules
is a precondition for successful cooperation with other countries that will
enable Russia to reap the benefits of the Arctic resource base, while
sustaining the fossil fuel-based economy chosen by the regime (Gustaf-
son 2012). This requires not only cooperative rhetoric in international
fora, but a coherent set of international policy actions that strive to ensure
multilateralism and regional cooperation in the Arctic. The policy stories
built around the problems of Arctic industrial development and maintain-
ing international stability support each other, particularly through
cooperation.
We observe a different relationship between the two communication
styles when it comes to the arguments that favour Arctic energy develop-
ment. Russia’s geopolitical leverage via energy, in other words, the
energy superpower position (see Chapter 2), is an argument that supports
Arctic energy development in the domestic story, while internationally
energy trade is emphasized purely as a source of economic benefit.
Again, the dualist communication strategy used in relation to the Arctic is
not exceptional. For example, Russia’s international discourse on climate
change primarily pictures it as a serious threat, whereas domestically
climate change is more and more defined via denial (Poberezhskaya
2015; see Chapter 6). Our study shows that in the case of Russia this
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contradiction between the two stories also exists regarding the Arctic.
Moreover, the internal communication is more vulnerable to changes in
the international political situation, as exemplified by the time frames
before and after the Ukrainian crisis.
Finally, an interesting difference between the external and internal
communication can be found in the sphere of the environment. While the
domestic policy narrative is understandably broader than external com-
munication, the fact that the natural environment is discussed three times
more often in the RG newspaper than in the MoFA documents may
appear counterintuitive, as the environment is usually considered an ideal
candidate for international cooperation. On the one hand, this demon-
strates that environmental issues are important for the Putin regime – at
least rhetorically – when it discusses the Arctic and its exploration. This
emphasis can be explained as a central legitimizing component in the
otherwise economic-utilitarist discourse: by promising to clean up the
environmental consequences of past Arctic exploitation and protect Arctic
nature during the new rush, the regime is ‘buying hearts’ to support its
Arctic nation-building effort. The relative lack of attention to inter-
national environmental cooperation in the Arctic in the MoFA documents
can be attributed to the overall diplomatic orientation, which focuses on
procedures (such as international cooperation via international organ-
izations and bilateral instruments) and international law. In the absence of
an Arctic environmental convention and the overall downplaying of
climate change on the Russian Arctic policy agenda – climate change is
treated as a source of opportunities and recognition of the local impacts
of climate change is limited – relative ignorance regarding the environ-
ment in the external communication is understandable.
The environment, however, is used in the domestic story to legitimize
the chosen policies of hydrocarbon culture: the environment is one of
many tools used to move ahead with exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbons.
The agenda of ‘The Year of the Environment 2017’ (Ministry of Natural
Resources 2017) in Russia is telling: the Arctic environment is discussed
only in terms of solving the problems of littering and pollution caused by
economic and military activities of the Soviet state in the High North, as
well as providing the energy companies and authorities with means to
tackle future spills from the extraction of oil and gas in the Arctic.
Importantly, none of the projects addressed climate mitigation. This
indicates that environmental change that is visible for Russians, such as
urban waste issues and local air pollution, also catches the attention of
the regime, but the global environmental change that will cause much
more severe effects for Russians and Russia does not. Environmental
change in the Russian Arctic, partly caused by the actions of the
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hydrocarbon culture, remains in the realm of a taboo for the regime,
whereas the environment is defined to serve the needs of the culture.
Therefore, this story cannot include protecting the Arctic environment
through climate mitigation, as that would challenge the rationality of the
whole Arctic enterprise of Putin’s Russia. Next, I will explain how
the environment and sustainability are defined in the specific case of the
Arctic gas business. This helps us to better understand the way in which
the environment is operationalized for the cause of hydrocarbon culture.
RUSSIA’S ARCTIC NATURAL GAS AND THE
DEFINITION OF SUSTAINABILITY
Sustainability as a corporate governance objective entered the Russian
energy sector in the early 2000s. Major state-owned companies publish
corporate social responsibility and sustainability reports. Instead of
looking at these documents, I am interested in how sustainability is
defined in advertisements directed towards the general public at home
and abroad. I argue that the narrative found in these advertisements better
reflects how the companies and audience that these commercials are
intended for understand sustainability. Thus, advertisements are a pro-
ductive site for analytically unmasking how Russian energy, political
elites, and beliefs about commerce and responsibilities can be brought
together.
When comparing how social and environmental sustainability is
defined in two commercials produced by the Russian gas giant Gazprom,
I see two distinct sustainabilities at play: an ethno-racist narrative
intended for the domestic audience and a mainstream sustainability
narrative targeting the international audience. Here, the same dualist take
is visible as that unfolded above in the analysis of domestic media and
government statements. My first example is a 30-minute documentary-
style video advertisement called Gazifikatsiya Rossii that tells the ‘story
of gas’ (see Chapter 3), how it is produced in the Arctic periphery,
transported through Russian lands and delivered to consumers in the
Russian ethnic heartland. The narrative is appealing: gas is the substance
that ties Russian space and ethnically Russian people together. Further-
more, amalgamating energy and people in this way promotes a Great
Power identity based on natural resources and energy, an energy super-
power identity that has been constructed during Putin’s reign. The
comparative ten-minute video is directed for the international audience
and shows how Gazprom is committed to global social and environ-
mental standards in its operations in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Vietnam
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(Gazprom International 2012). Here, the narrative abides by the scientific
understanding of sustainability, and portrays Gazprom as an international
company that is fully compatible with international social and environ-
mental norms.
This brings up the question of whether Russian energy companies are
trying to construct an image of a socially responsible player in an
ethnically selective way in their domestic operations, while bypassing the
environmental question that is central for the branch. I argue that
Gazprom has tailored these commercials in a way that reflects what the
audience anticipates, but also how the company and the political elite
behind the company want to define their responsibilities. Thus, we see
two distinct sustainabilities in Gazprom’s videos: an ethno-racist narra-
tive intended for the domestic audience that confines social responsibility
to ethnic Russians and a mainstream sustainability narrative aiming at a
balance between economic, social and environmental objectives while
still pleasing the international audience. As I compare the narratives in
these videos to the discussion on sustainability in Russia (Koch and
Tynkkynen 2019; V.-P. Tynkkynen 2010), the lack of references to the
need to reconcile social and environmental needs via democratic grass-
roots level empowerment is understandable. Thus, the challenge posed by
environmental sustainability is viewed merely as a top-down manage-
ment problem that is low on the political agenda. However, a new
observation is that social sustainability is more central, but defined in a
very narrow and ethnically discriminatory way. Moreover, the centrality
of social responsibility in Russia’s energy developments is, in my view,
linked to both the official egalitarian discourse of the Soviet era as well
as to the pressure experienced by hydrocarbon businesses as they operate
in culturally fragile environments worldwide – from the indigenous lands
of the Russian and Canadian Arctic to the Ecuadorian Amazon and the
Nigerian Delta.
In light of the Arctic paradoxes facing Putin’s Russia that were outlined
above, we are very likely to see a balance between emphasizing ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ topics and approaches in Russia’s Arctic policies: they are used
in tandem for the benefit of the hydrocarbon culture, which is itself
dependent on Arctic resources. However, as the High North is so central
for Putin’s Russia, there is a window of opportunity in the Arctic
allowing the promotion of more socially and environmentally responsible
policies and practices. Therefore, it is more likely that Russia will be
more susceptible towards ambitious environmental policies within Arctic
cooperation, as the Arctic needs to be kept ‘exceptional’ for the simple
reason that the success of the Putin regime is tied to the fossil energy
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futures of that region. The problem in engaging with Putin’s hydrocarbon
culture in the Arctic is the difficulty of promoting practices that push
Russia away from that culture and discouraging actions that are adding
fuel to the fire for a regime that thrives on hydrocarbons. Thus, the
practices and discourses of Russian hydrocarbon culture – the deeds and
words of Putin’s geo-governmentality (see Chapters 2 and 3) – maintain
its power via the materialities and spatialities of energy, including the
environmental dimension, in a very selective way. This environmental
‘cherry-picking’ needs to be confronted. The whole spectrum of the
environmental effects of Russian energy, impacting first and foremost on
the fragile Arctic, need to be unfolded and politicized (see concluding
chapter), and turned into a tool that discourages investments in (Arctic)
hydrocarbons and enhances a transition towards a carbon-neutral Russia.
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6. The global taboo of hydrocarbon
culture: “There is no climate
change”
With Nina Tynkkynen
This chapter1 looks at how the Russian hydrocarbon culture positions
itself regarding the question of global climate change. In this chapter,
I argue that the Putin regime’s increasing dependence on hydrocarbons
makes a serious climate mitigation policy an impossibility. The inability
to address the negative consequences of the chosen fossil fuel-based
economic policy, and the social contract to which this economy is tied,
pushes the regime to build a narrative that turns a problem into a social
taboo. The switch towards a climate denialist narrative is documented in
the following, but a more important question remains unanswered: which
individuals, companies and institutional players in the Russian society are
the masterminds behind a clearly changed discourse on the changing
climate? Or is this just an outcome, the ‘collateral damage’, of a social
contract related to the hydrocarbon culture espoused by the Russian
people and the elite alike? In either case, the recorded discursive change
shows that the Putin regime is a step further away from becoming an
Ecological Great Power, a possibility that is discussed in the concluding
chapter. Now, Russia’s global Messianic role as a conservative and
authoritarian Energy Superpower and hydrocarbon culture is the anti-
thesis of a resilient and sustainable Russia.
1 Published previously as Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen and Nina Tynkkynen (2018).
‘Climate denial revisited: (re)contextualizing Russian public discourse on climate change
during Putin 2.0’, Europe-Asia Studies, 70(7), 1103–20. Copyright © University of
Glasgow, reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd, www.tandfonline.com on
behalf of University of Glasgow.
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In 2005, the Russian Academy of Sciences signed, together with major
international academic institutions, a joint statement endorsing the con-
sensus that climate change is caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, and that climate change mitigation and adaptation
measures are needed on a global level (National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, Medicine 2005). For Russian academia, it took a relatively
long time to reach this majority consensus. Joining the consensus was
linked to Russia’s pivotal position2 in climate negotiations that eventually
led to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 (Wilson Rowe 2012,
pp. 712–13). Five years later, in 2009, Russia adopted a policy document
entitled ‘Climate Doctrine’ (Klimaticheskaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Feder-
atsii; see President of Russia 2009), which, due to its declarative and
non-binding character, has been criticized by the Russian greens in
particular as a soft power effort (Kokorin and Korppoo 2013). Yet, by
adopting the Doctrine, the Russian leadership recognized that climate
change is a human-generated problem requiring policy measures. To
amplify this message, then President Dmitri Medvedev stated in 2010
that climate change was a serious threat to Russia (Laruelle 2014b,
p. 85).
In Russia, a strong public discourse of climate change denial emerged
as the same time as academic and political consensus on climate change
was finally reached (Henry and MacIntosh Sundstrom 2012, p. 1302;
Kokorin and Korppoo 2013, p. 6; Korppoo et al. 2015, pp. 28–9). Even
evidential events, including the forest and bog wildfires during the
drought of 2010, indicating the intensification of climate change and its
negative impact on Russia, did not significantly change public discourse
or convince the national media to endorse climate change as a scientific
fact (Laruelle 2014b, p. 82). On the contrary, climate change denial
voices seem to have strengthened since Putin’s new term as president,
starting in 2012. Presumably, Putin’s new term and the related political
changes give voice to actors and opinion-makers in Russian society who
emphasize sovereignty rather than international cooperation and Russia’s
(short-term) economic interests rather than international image.
According to a poll, after a heatwave that led to extensive forest,
farmland and bog fires in Central European Russia in 2010, the propor-
tion of Russians worried about climate change increased from a pre-2010
figure of 46 per cent to 55 per cent. By 2013, the figure in Moscow had
2 Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was decisive for the enforcement of the
Protocol, because without Russia the requirement that GHG emissions of the Protocol
members have to cover at least 55 per cent of the GHG emissions of all industrialized
countries for the Protocol to enter into force, could not have been met.
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risen to 70 per cent.3 Our hypothesis is that the 2010 smog, together with
the 2011 demonstrations against Putin’s return to presidency, redefined
the Putin regime’s stance on climate change communication. Concern
over climate change became a potentially destabilizing threat for the
regime, which, as a response, started to feed the public discourse with
climate denialist arguments.
In this chapter we are interested in looking at how this turn is visible in
the public discourse on climate change and, furthermore, in assessing
how the Russian case fits the general theory of climate denial elaborated
by Jacques (2012), who argues that the main impetus for climate denial is
the threat it poses for those wishing to maintain the (economic or
political) status quo (see also Norgaard 2011). Accordingly, we analyse
Russia’s public discussion on climate change in the period 2011–13, after
Putin’s return to power; specifically, how the arguments and topics of
public discourse on climate change in general, and its denial in particular,
are tied to the Russian context: the prevalence of and change in historical
cultural categories, including certain ‘sacred objectives’ (Kivinen 2002,
pp. 215–22) of the Russian modernization agenda (see later), the import-
ance of fossil energy for the Russian economy and society, and the power
vested in political and economic positions related to energy. The overall
aim is to gain an insight in the implications of these discourses for
Russia’s future climate policy.
We aim to understand recent public discussion on climate change by
looking at newspaper articles and popular science books on climate
change as well as documentaries and talk shows on national television
channels focusing on the climate issue. While we note that there exists
another, less official, public discourse on climate change, advocated by
environmental activists through alternative media and social networks in
Russia (Smyth and Oates 2015), the discourse that we address here as
‘public’ refers mainly to national media discourse. We focus on this
particular discourse because we are interested in the discourse ‘construc-
tion efforts’ of those in power, and because alternative public discourse(s)
is (are), according to our observations, much weaker and more frag-
mented than the national media discourse. One reason for the weakness
of the public debate on climate change in Russia is, as noted by
Poberezhskaya (2015), the relatively limited media attention to the issue;
that is, the omission of the topic altogether rather than biased coverage.
3 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 21 August 2013, available at: http://www.rg.ru/2013/08/21/
prichiny-site.html, accessed 29 March 2018.
94 The energy of Russia
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter6edited /Pg. Position: 3 / Date: 17/9
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 4 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
Our research material and analysis are limited in one critical aspect,
namely assessing how widely climate change denial discourse is accepted
by the Russian public. Discussions in the state-controlled media do not
reflect the attitudes of Russian people, nor do they necessarily predict the
moves that Putin’s Russia will make in the framework of international
climate negotiations (Korppoo et al. 2015, pp. 44, 47; Smyth and Oates
2015, p. 302). The fact that the state-controlled media does not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the Russian people does not, however, reduce
the importance of the analysis: any attempt to frame the issue via
state-controlled media may have long-term political ramifications affect-
ing energy and environmental policies, as the Russian populace by far
relies on state-controlled media as the primary source of information
(Poberezhskaya 2015).4
CLIMATE DENIAL IN THE LITERATURE
There is a rich body of research concerning public perceptions of climate
change internationally (Demeritt 2006; Hulme 2009). Significant research
has been conducted to understand actors and interests behind climate
change denial discourse (Goeminne 2012; Jacques et al. 2008), including
those studying climate-denial discourses beyond the linguistic analysis
(Kolk and Levy 2001; Lahsen 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2003; Nerlich
2010). What is interesting within this body of literature is, from the
viewpoint of this chapter, the way in which Jacques (2012) argues that
the main impetus for climate change denial is because it is serious and
threatening to those wishing to maintain the (economic or political) status
quo. Norgaard (2011) argues, on the basis of her case study on Norway,
that while the perception of threat posed by climate change is tied to
psychological processes in an individual, it is also related to culture and
the political economy of a particular context. Dunlap and McCright
(2011) emphasize that climate change denial has to do with individual
and collective economic interests – for example, the oil industry and
actors dependent on its funding – but even more so the denialist position
is linked with groups with conservative political views, as governmental,
and especially global, climate mitigation governance is viewed by these
4 Our understanding of the term ‘discourse’ is defined as a shared way of apprehend-
ing the world (Dryzek 1997, p. 8). Discourses (re)produce specific ideas, concepts or
statements and affect those who produce them or their context. Discourses carry legitimacy
and power. Thus, it is important to study how discourses are produced and maintained by
intended practices aiming to define the truth by those in positions of power (Foucault
2008, p. 35).
The taboo of hydrocarbon culture: “There is no climate change” 95
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter6edited /Pg. Position: 4 / Date: 17/9
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 5 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
groups as a threat to economic and even civic liberties. These cultural–
political approaches, emphasizing the role of culture and political
economy, inform the contextualizing approach we adopt here.
We understand climate change denial discourse in a way that includes
both the rejection of the theory that climate is changing as a result of
anthropogenic emissions, and that this process may also bring negative
societal and environmental effects, along with the idea that this phenom-
enon should be addressed by redefining the political agenda. Thus,
denialist discourse can take the form of outright dismissal of the
anthropogenic climate change theory, and emphasize either that the
climate is not warming or that the climate is cooling instead. Another
denialist viewpoint includes accepting that the climate might be warming,
but that this has natural origins (the Sun, changes in the Earth’s orbit, for
example) and that all that governments and nations can do is adapt to the
phenomenon; there are no grounds to implement mitigation measures.
This is a relatively clear framing of the climate issue. Denial discourse
also includes a midway position that Wilson Rowe (2009, p. 598)
describes as ‘causally agnostic’: climate change might be of anthropo-
genic origin, but the issue cannot be resolved by scientific means.
In Russia, this agnostic position seemed, from the early to the
mid-2000s, to mean accepting, without further scientific evidence, that
mitigation measures were justified regardless of the origin of climate
change. Politically, this tallies with what Henry and MacIntosh Sund-
strom (2012) described as Medvedev’s (2008–12) modernization agenda
effect: climate mitigation was considered as a positive goal insofar as it
pushed forward energy efficiency measures important for the modern-
ization agenda of the former president (see also Korppoo et al. 2015,
p. 27). Also, energy efficiency as an economic problem was topical right
after the economic crisis that affected Russia in 2008–9 (Laruelle 2014b,
p. 86).
While Russia’s climate policy per se and its links to international and
domestic climate science are well covered by research (Henry and
MacIntosh Sundstrom 2007, 2012; Korppoo et al. 2015; N. Tynkkynen
2010; Wilson Rowe 2009, 2012) as well as the media coverage of climate
change in Russia (Poberezhskaya 2015), our scrutiny of the denial
discourse, closely tied to the domestic policy context, is original and
necessary to an understanding of the dynamics of Russian climate
politics and their impact on global climate negotiations.
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THE CHANGING POLITICO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT
DURING PUTIN 2.0
The re-election of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation
in 2012 marked a further expansion of autocratic elements in Russia’s
political system (Gel’man 2015; Ross 2015; Wegren 2013). President
Putin’s increasingly authoritarian stance is visible in domestic and
foreign policy issues alike. A range of actions indicate an emphasis on
sovereignty rather than international cooperation (Palosaari and Tynk-
kynen 2015), among them, limiting the freedom of expression and LGBT
rights, forcing foreign-funded institutions to register as ‘foreign agents’,
taking a unilaterally tough position on the Syrian crisis, annexing Crimea
in 2014 and supporting a hybrid war in Ukraine with a consequent
souring of relations with the EU, and arresting Greenpeace activists in
the Arctic.
Despite the seemingly drastic changes in Russia’s domestic and foreign
policy brought about by Putin’s third term – developments that, accord-
ing to our analysis, explain the changed tone on climate change – we
argue that there are continuities in the Russian political culture that frame
major societal challenges facing Russian regimes. As Kivinen (2002)
notes, political decision-making regarding the modernization agenda of
basically all Soviet as well Russian leaders has allegedly been based on
the ‘sacred’ objectives of science, that is, promoting progress and
modernization, and producing economic growth and well-being via
expanding industrial production. This consecration has unintended
results that are turned into a ‘negative sacred’ that cannot be addressed in
the political and public arenas (Kivinen 2002, pp. 215–22). The ‘negative
sacred’, especially three such taboos – the demonization of reality,
chaos and consumption – are pivotal in understanding Russia’s stance in
global climate politics. The strengthened authoritarian stance presumably
indicates that the ‘negative sacred’ has also gained force in recent
years; constraining government effort to justify political decisions to
domestic and international audiences (Gel’man 2016; Pomerantsev
2014).
Accordingly, Putin’s return has not contested the policy objectives of
modernization and efficiency set during Medvedev’s presidency (e.g.
Gustafson, 2012): it is the reasoning behind these measures that has
changed. During Medvedev’s term, energy efficiency and modernization
were justified not only on economic grounds but also by foreign policy
gains (Henry and MacIntosh Sundstrom 2012; Korppoo et al. 2015).
Since Putin’s re-election, the motivation behind modernization features a
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more economic bias, in addition to emphasizing harsh geopolitical
objectives and sovereignty instead of international cooperation (Gel’man
and Appel 2015).
Studies such as that of Gustafson (2012) hint that Putin’s agenda rests
not on diversification of the Russian economy, but on granting the
hydrocarbon sector an even greater role in paving the way for Russia’s
future success. Russian economy and society as a whole are dependent
on the extraction, transport, refining, consumption and export of fossil
energy. Fossil energy is central to Russia’s economy: more than half of
Russia’s budget revenue and 70 per cent (in 2014, compared to 54 per
cent in 2000) of exports are accounted for by oil, gas and coal; the oil
and gas industries alone account for a fifth of national GDP (Federal
State Statistics Service 2015; Kurdin 2016). Moreover, the interests
behind Russia’s national gas programme, run by the parastatal gas giant
Gazprom, are at odds with regional interests aiming at energy self-
sufficiency via regional renewable sources of energy (Tynkkynen 2014,
2016b).
In short, Putin’s changes of political emphasis have given impetus to
the strengthening of Russia’s status as a ‘hydrocarbon superpower’
(Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011). An energy superpower is a country that
is able to influence political choices of other countries via energy
exports, by producing dependencies through energy infrastructures (coer-
cive) and economic benefits produced by the energy trade (alluring).
Discussion on whether Russia is an energy superpower culminates in the
question of how Russia has used energy as a foreign policy tool vis-à-vis
its neighbours and the EU, the main customer of Russian energy. Thus,
energy wealth and power have been turned into an identity-construction
tool. In this story President Putin is the person responsible for bringing
energy assets back to the state and the people from the hands of the
oligarchs (Grib 2009). Yet, recent studies indicate that elites and the
public have an inconsistent and at times contradictory attitude to the idea
that hydrocarbons form the fundamental basis of Russia’s superpower
status or national identity (Levada Centre 2014; Rutland 2015). There-
fore, in case Putin’s entourage wants to strengthen Russia’s hydrocarbon-
superpower status in real terms, the above-mentioned identity-
construction tool based on energy and power needs to be used even more
aggressively, as well.
At the same time, global hydrocarbon markets have changed signifi-
cantly during the last couple of years, mainly due to shale gas and oil
entering the market. This change is clear in the gas market, as the ‘shale
gas revolution’ that started initially in the United States is reconfiguring
the global gas trade. Production of shale oil is also growing, with a
98 The energy of Russia
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter6edited /Pg. Position: 7 / Date: 14/10
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 8 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
negative impact on the traded volumes of Russian hydrocarbons and on
future export prospects (Sharples 2013). The Russian leadership and
major energy companies came to grips with the new energy market
situation in the period 2011–12. Dwindling energy export prospects in
Europe, coupled with anti-monopoly measures by the European Commis-
sion and price cuts demanded for Russian pipeline gas (Riley 2012), were
a powerful inducement for the Russian political elite to look for greater
export prospects elsewhere, especially in North and Southeast Asia
(Bradshaw 2014), instead of relying on European energy partners that are
institutionally incompatible and demand ethical standards from energy
producers. In 2000–4, the EU–Russia Energy Dialogue had an explicit
environmental component to curtail pollution related to oil and gas
extraction and transport, but ecological aims were pushed aside and an
economy-driven agenda prevailed from 2004 onwards (European Com-
mission 2011b, pp. 16–19), at the same time as the price of oil and gas
increased, and Russia’s economy boomed. Thus, we argue that during
Putin’s third term, the need to pay lip service to international environ-
mental objectives has diminished and Russia’s image as a responsible
energy producer is of less concern to the leadership than before.
Ultimately, with a general public and a leadership that see themselves
intertwined with the cultural meanings, materialities and wealth creation
of fossil fuels (Kalinin 2014; Tynkkynen 2016a), the impetus to act in the
forefront of climate politics is minimal.
RESEARCH MATERIAL
We analysed climate change discourse in Russia by collecting newspaper
articles published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta and Izvestiya between January
2012 and December 2013. This time frame specifically excludes the
distorting feature of the Ukrainian crisis, which erupted in early 2014.
These two newspapers have a conservative tone and are considered close
to the official view of the Russian political and energy elite (Makeenko
2013).5 Rossiiskaya Gazeta is the official newspaper of the Russian state,
whereas Izvestiya positions itself as an independent newspaper with a
readership of educated elites.6 Both newspapers have a relatively limited
5 Media Atlas of Russia, 2015, available at: http://www.media-atlas.ru/, accessed 26
November 2015.
6 Media Atlas of Russia, 2015, available at: http://www.media-atlas.ru/, accessed 26
November 2015.
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circulation, which is quite typical for newspapers in Russia: 234 500 for
Izvestiya and 400 000 for Rossiiskaya Gazeta. Of course, they can also be
followed online.
The 101 articles analysed – 75 published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta and 26
in Izvestiya – were chosen using the search phrase ‘global warming’
(global’noe poteplenie). We preferred this term to ‘climate change’,
mainly because of the relatively reasonable volume of articles: in
Rossiiskaya Gazeta alone, 1400 articles published in the period 2012–13
contain the term ‘climate change’ (izmenenie klimata), which in Russian
is a broad term that can refer to various phenomena, including the
business climate. However, focusing on ‘global warming’ instead of
‘climate change’ had its own problems. First, it is a more politicized
term, as warming refers to one-directional change without acknowledging
regional changes that can lead to both warming and cooling. More to the
point, ‘global warming’ by definition excludes the idea, widely supported
by Russians (Wilson Rowe 2009), that, as a result of climate change, the
climate might actually be cooling as a whole, not warming – a crucial
argument for climate denial. As we found out during our research, the
keyword ‘global warming’ also brought up many articles on global
cooling. Usually the articles that discussed cooling also mentioned the
international mainstream understanding of warming in order to contradict
it. Even though choosing the term ‘climate change’ might have led to a
more neutral tone concerning the phenomenon, it would have excluded
from our sample documentaries and products of popular culture, such as
cartoons, which hold the keys to understanding the breadth of climate
denial discourse.
The second set of research material analysed consists of television
documentaries and popular talk shows and programmes broadcast on
national television between 2010 and 2013. Because the electronic
media – television and internet – are the major sources of information
for Russians today (e.g. Smyth and Oates 2015), we also included
popular television documentaries and talk shows discussing ‘global
warming’ that had been downloaded on YouTube (see the list in the
Appendix). With this choice we found programmes on the topic that
reached both traditional television viewers and younger generations who
use the internet and social media instead for news, information and
entertainment.
In addition, we included in our research material two Russian books on
climate change, sold in central academic bookstores in Moscow (Biblio
Globus) and St Petersburg (Dom Knigi) in 2011–13. During these years
we managed to find a few translated international academic books on
climate change for sale in these bookstores, but these two books were the
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only ones intended for a wider public and written by Russian authors.
The books are: Myths of ‘Sustainable Development’: ‘Global Warming’
or ‘Creeping Global Takeover’ (Pavlenko 2011) and Climate Paradoxes:
Ice Age or Burning Heat? (Karol’ and Kiselev 2013).
We chose this combination of material – the two newspapers, national
television and the two books – in order to gain a systematic understand-
ing of climate change discourse in Russia. Thus, focusing on the role of
newspapers and television as official and semi-official sources of infor-
mation allowed us to uncover the discourse construction efforts led by
state-owned and controlled media. As the books were aimed at a wider
public, their intended audience differs from that targeted by the news-
papers and television, ultimately complementing our research material on
the selected topic.
METHOD: BENCHMARKING AND CATEGORIZING
CLIMATE DENIAL ARGUMENTS
Our analysis developed in two phases. First, we set out to discover the
nuances of Russian discourse generated by the Russian elite to influence
public opinion on climate change and to identify main elements of that
discourse. At this stage, only the newspaper material was used because
going through all the material (TV documentaries, cartoons, etc.) and
categorizing all arguments in that material would have been time-
consuming. Focusing on extensive newspaper material enabled us to
provide an overview of the discussion and to identify the main elements of
climate change discourse in Russia. We categorized all the articles accord-
ing to their main stance towards climate change, using four arguments. The
first argument was ‘denial of mainstream climate science’, which denied
the anthropogenic nature of climate change or claimed that no mitigation
measures are needed. Second, ‘naturalizing climate change’, exemplified
by the argument that climate change is a completely natural phenomenon
and all societies can do is to adapt. The third argument notes that ‘climate
change is beneficial’, regardless of its origin. Finally, a fourth argument –
climate change is real and negative – appeared to be consistent with
international mainstream climate science, as it claims that climate change is
an anthropogenic problem while remaining a natural phenomenon with a
negative impact.
These categories are not mutually exclusive: individual media publica-
tions may include up to three of these arguments: it is not uncommon to
find articles in which climate change is viewed as non-human-induced
that also argue that mitigation is useless, but that the changing climate
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brings beneficial effects (for Russia). As Aleksey Aronov, a Rossiiskaya
Gazeta journalist, puts it:
The truth is, the human factor in it [climate change] is clearly exaggerated.
All that we ‘messed up’ in 100 years, all our emissions are ‘covered’ many
times over by a sole change in sun’s activity or by a catastrophic eruption of
a volcano. … In all: changes are not going to be unambiguous but, as I said,
in sum Russia is winning … That is, [our] harsh (cold) climate causes
(economic) losses in the energy sector.7
The categorizations are shown in detail in Table 6.1. After choosing the
categories, we conducted basic statistical analysis to gain an understand-
ing of how much each category was supported in the newspaper material.
The results of this analysis are presented in the next section.
In the second phase of our research, the focus of analysis shifted to
identifying the elements of denial discourse. At this stage, all the material
– the newspaper articles, television shows, documentaries and the two
books – was used. For consistency, one of us focused on denial
arguments and benchmarked them in the material, applying climate
change denial categories identified by Washington and Cook (2011) (see
also Berger 2013, pp. 35–62). These categories are as follows: first,
circulating conspiracy theories (‘Climategate’); second, publicizing fake
experts (‘There is no consensus’); third, burdening scientists with
impossible expectations (‘Climate models are unreliable’); fourth,
relying on misrepresentations and logical fallacies (‘The climate changed
in the past’); and fifth, cherry-picking (‘Measurements are unreliable’;
‘Warming stopped in 1998’; ‘It’s the sun’; ‘Global warming is good’).
We highlighted articulations that best crystallized the category in
question: these articulations will be described later in this chapter as
examples of the categories in question. Accordingly, the method applied
can be characterized as thematic analysis (see, for example, Guest et al.
2012) in which themes (that is, categorizations) were, at the first stage,
derived inductively from the material and, at the second stage, dissected
with the help of further categories identified by Washington and Cook
(2011).
7 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 14 May 2013, available at: https://rg.ru/2013/05/14/
poteplenie.html, accessed 14 April 2018.
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS DENIAL IN THE
RUSSIAN MEDIA
Main Characteristics of Climate Change Discourse
As Table 6.1 demonstrates, 26.9 per cent of 101 newspaper articles
analysed could be placed in the first discursive category ‘denial of
mainstream climate science’, marking a strong denialist position. The
category of regarding climate change as a neutral issue with no reference
to the origin of this phenomenon was dominant in 16 cases (15.9
per cent). The volume of articles arguing for international climate
science was, in turn, very small: only 8 articles out of 101 were
categorized as being fully in accordance with the mainstream inter-
national understanding of the problem. Moreover, contrary to the popular
discourse of the early 2000s (N. Tynkkynen 2010), only 7 out of 101
articles were categorized as presenting climate change as beneficial for
Russia.
When looking at the occurrence of different arguments in the news-
paper articles, ‘denial’ and ‘neutral’ arguments can be found in nearly
half of all the articles, 47 per cent and 45 per cent respectively, whereas
‘negative’ arguments appeared in more than every third (38 per cent)
article. The relatively high volume of negative connotations related to
climate change may imply that stronger emphasis on the unwanted
effects is how the mainstream understanding of the problem is entering
and affecting Russian discourse. However, the way the negative effects
were discussed, mainly in articles arguing that there is no anthropogenic
climate change, emphasized implicitly that in Russia the effects would be
much less severe than in other parts of the world.
‘Positive’ arguments related to climate change could be found in
only 17 per cent of all the articles, confirming the above-mentioned
move away from understanding climate change as a predominantly
welcome and beneficial process for Russia. This category sees global
temperature rises as a positive development: the melting of the polar
ice cap is seen as an opportunity to develop Arctic energy resources
that, along with new sea routes, will further strengthen Russia’s role as
an energy giant and a territorial Great Power (see also Laruelle 2014b,
p. 40; Palosaari and Tynkkynen 2015). As stated in a Rossiiskaya
Gazeta article: “Global warming and the ongoing melting of the ice is
turning the Arctic … into a giant international promising project of the
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twenty-first century, potentially into the largest investment platform of
the current era.”8
Analysis of the Denial Discourse
The second stage of our analysis, which centred on the arguments
concerning climate change denial, revealed that the five categories of
arguments defined by Washington and Cook (2011) are also present in
the Russian denial discourse. Here, we focused on three categories that
drew principally on Russia’s domestic context: conspiracy theories,
misrepresentations and logical fallacies, and cherry-picking.
Conspiracies behind both international climate science and inter-
national efforts to promote climate mitigation policies were emphasized
in Izvestiya articles and in all television documentaries and talk shows. In
Pavlenko’s book (2011), this argument is taken to the extreme: the author
claims that the 2010 heatwave that had dire environmental and health
effects was a result of a ‘weather weapon’ (klimaticheskoe oruzhie),
which the United States used to weaken Russia. The way in which the
conspiracy argument is presented brings together the threat of ‘global
governance’ to Russia’s sovereignty and alleged Western political and
economic interests – embodied by references to former US vice president
and Nobel Prize winner Al Gore – lying behind international climate
governance:
As crowd is attacking [climate sceptics], Albert Gore gets his peace prize [the
Nobel Prize] named after the producer of explosives. … [to be used] in the
battle against global warming that no one has proved, but which has already
turned into a vast bird feeder [source of money] for bureaucrats. … Obser-
vations by the public—‘Where’s the warming? Snow is covering Europe
now’—are challenged by scientific conclusions: ‘This is a visual proof of
global warming.’ And look, straight off there is an institute and another
getting funding to prove global warming—yet it is actually global cooling.
Peace is war, love is hate. … We had already read this in Orwell’s books
when words like ‘global warming’ were not yet in our swill.9
Pavlenko – as the title of his book, Myths of ‘Sustainable Development’:
‘Global Warming’ or ‘Creeping Global Takeover’, ultimately suggests –
sees the objective of sustainable development and international climate
8 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 31 May 2013, available at: http://www.rg.ru/2013/05/31/
led.html, accessed 17 April 2018. All translations are by the authors unless otherwise stated.
9 Izvestiya, 17 September 2013, available at: http://izvestia.ru/news/557239#ixzz
3u6DTLZH6, accessed 17 April 2018.
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policy as an extension of Western hegemonic power (see also Korppoo et
al. 2015, p. 29; Oldfield and Shaw 2006). He argues that global climate
policy is diminishing Russia’s sovereignty in two ways: via Western-led
global governance, and by demonizing the hydrocarbons crucial for
Russia’s economy, society and culture: “At the same time, what is most
important for the economic independence and sovereignty of nations—
energy, machinery and metallurgy—is [through global climate govern-
ance] included into the league of the most ‘dangerous’ sectors of the
economy” (Pavlenko 2011, p. 106). Izvestiya journalist Anatolii Vasser-
man, in turn, argues:
The aim [of climate mitigation policies] is the massive destruction of
developing countries. They do not possess the strength to restructure their
[fossil fuel-based] economies, as obliged by [climate change] theory. This
way it is possible to perpetuate the economic gap prevailing between
developed nations and the rest of the world. More, measures already taken
based on this leading—and obviously for any literate physicist—fraud have
led to losses equivalent to millions of deaths.10
Some versions of the ‘eco-conspiracy’ argument, evident throughout our
research material, claimed that banks funding and corporations producing
green technologies and renewable energy are the institutional actors
behind this Western-led conspiracy. For example, Pavlenko writes:
Why [are critics of climate change not listened to]? One of the reasons,
without any doubt, is related to the economy. A widely known factor is the
interest of financial giants, such as J.P. Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley,
Goldman & Sachs … to engage in trade with greenhouse gas-emissions
quotas. … In the situation of ‘catastrophic’ [climate change] … there is a
[pressing] need to expand financing of environmental programs. (Pavlenko
2011, p. 103)
With regard to the category of ‘cherry-picking’, our analysis shows that
the arguments ‘It’s the sun’ and ‘Warming is good’ were used more
frequently than other arguments. For example, the main argument pre-
sented in the book Climate Paradoxes: Ice Age or Burning Heat? by
Karol’ and Kiselev (2013) can be classified in this category: the authors
do not deny anthropogenic climate change, but they fail at the same time
to criticize Russia for not taking responsibility for climate policy
measures or reducing emissions. Karol’ and Kiselev describe the current
situation as follows:
10 Izvestiya, 13 December 2012, available at: http://izvestia.ru/news/537615, accessed
17 April 2018.
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In Russia, solar, geothermal and wind power have so far been developed very
little. Their intensive exploitation is planned for 2030 … Maintaining and
developing the hydrocarbon sector important for Russia’s economy is at odds
with the global trend to invest in energy efficiency and saving … Of course,
during the next few years the priority of hydrocarbons in providing the main
source of energy [for Russia] is hardly going to be challenged. (Karol’ and
Kiselev 2013, p. 245)
The arguments prevalent in the ‘cherry-picking’ category are optimistic
about the positive outcomes of global warming for Russia. This tendency
can be regarded as a reflection of the history of science in the Soviet
Union and Russia, as the mental stance of the High Modern frames all
industrial and material progress in an overly positive light (Laruelle
2014b, p. 82). To a very similar extent, the category ‘The climate
changed in the past’ placed in the ‘logical fallacy’ category by Washing-
ton and Cook (2011), can be understood as the intellectual legacy of
the global cooling hypothesis elaborated by Soviet scholars during the
1950s–1970s (Wilson Rowe 2009). According to this hypothesis, the
Earth’s climate is facing a new glaciation period, and that this natural
climatic fluctuation over intervals of several thousand years is a more real
and pressing threat than global warming. Global warming is therefore a
positive development, as it postpones the beginning of a new glaciation.
Arguments belonging to Washington and Cook’s (2011) category,
‘Relying on misrepresentations and logical fallacies’, are central to the
denial discourse throughout our research material. These arguments
mostly emphasize the climate cooling theory. This theory represents a
specifically Russian version of the denial discourse, and its popularity
has to do with the fact that the Soviet cooling theory precedes the current
mainstream global warming thesis, presented even in the most neutral
accounts (including the TV documentary Rossiya Nauka) as an equally
possible scenario to global warming. In its most populist versions, the
theory was taken to its extreme, approaching science fiction with
ungrounded apocalyptic visions for the future (the REN-TV documentary
Terrotoriya zablizhdenii (Territory of Misconceptions) and the NTV
documentary Holod (Cold)). The support for the climate cooling theory is
indicative of the Russian interest in emphasizing Russia’s role as a major
hydrocarbon producer which can, by not taking measures to decrease
GHG emissions but rather by contributing to global warming, save the
world from a global winter. The documentary Holod claims, “the
fluctuating temperature on Earth is a natural and unavoidable phenom-
enon. Naturally, it is reasonable to fight against emissions, as the
atmosphere becomes purer [free from toxins]. … but to control the
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weather is beyond our power. All we can do is to adapt, if possible.” In
the same vein, according to the REN-TV documentary:
Scientists are not hesitating: if, instead of focusing on global warming during
the last 35 years we [humanity] prepared for a long winter on the planet, we
could have resisted the changing temperatures [at this point, the documentary
shows footage of the oil refinery smokestacks]. … [Now] without protection
humanity is facing a new Ice Age that threatens us.
Another line of argumentation representing the above-mentioned cat-
egory suggests that the observed temperature rise is of natural origin. A
Rossiiskaya Gazeta article focused on future droughts in Kyrgyzstan and
Central Asian countries caused by climate change: “According to scien-
tists, humans, alas, cannot do anything to avoid such nightmarish
forecasts from taking place.”11
This claim is repeated in an episode – with 7.1 million views on
YouTube – of a very popular children’s cartoon, Barboskiny.12 The
storyline focuses on the main character, a young boy dog, who hears
about global warming on the radio during a summer heatwave. He misses
the ending of the news as a tennis ball hits the radio, turning it off. As a
result, he assumes that he has caused the ongoing heatwave and global
warming by having sent, one cold winter’s day, his sister’s battery-
operated hairdryer to the upper atmosphere attached to a bunch of
balloons to warm the air. He ties balloons to himself in a quest to find the
voyaging hairdryer and rescue mankind from global warming. His big
brother (dog) intervenes to stop him from flying off into the atmosphere
and, as they struggle, the radio is switched back on to announce,
“Scientists are assured that global warming is caused by continuous
natural cycle, and Earthlings have not and cannot impact on this process.”
There is a happy ending as the hero declares: “It’s the Earth that is
warming itself, not me!” That is, the political message of the cartoon is
that Russians should not be worried about the effects of climate change
and, more importantly, not to push an agenda asking for emission cuts or
changes in energy policies, as Russians or people in general cannot
impact climate processes.
According to the natural-origin argument, no mitigation policies are
needed; on the contrary, such policies are detrimental to the economy of
Russia and the developing world. It is therefore a moral obligation for
11 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 5 April 2012, available at: http://www.rg.ru/2012/04/05/
resurs.html, accessed 18 April 2018.
12 Барбоcкины, No. 107: Глобальное потепление (Global’noe poteplenie), available
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LgkE90RHey4, accessed 18 April 2018.
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governments not to engage in mitigation policies. An example of this
argument is offered by the host of the TV1 talk show Gordon Kihot,13
following the same argument that also appeared in several newspaper
articles: “but, on an economic and political ‘global court’, all possible
steps aimed at changing the [global] economy for the benefit of others
are taken with the help of organizations like Greenpeace, simultaneously
worsening others’ possibilities. [This activity is] based on an academic
dispute, nothing more.”
DENIAL DISCOURSE (RE)CONTEXTUALIZED
Unlike the internationally prominent community of Russian climate
scientists who have adopted mainstream international climate science and
dismissed the idea that the Russian context could affect their views on
climate science, the three categories of climate change denial studied
here – conspiracy theories, ‘cherry-picking’ and ‘misrepresentations/
logical fallacies’ – underline the specifically Russian political and eco-
nomic conditions. The extreme version of the denial discourse promotes
the Messianic idea that Russia has a special role to play in the global
climate system and world history more broadly. In this version, which
falls into both the cherry-picking and logical fallacies categories, Russia
needs to save the world from global cooling by releasing more GHG into
the atmosphere. The milder version makes the case that Russia is actually
behaving responsibly when it opposes the Western-led ‘green industry
conspiracy’ and declines to compromise global economic growth, in
particular, the right of developing nations to modernize, in the name of
climate policy.
As noted, a juxtaposition of Russian and international interests regard-
ing climate change is a constant in our research material. International
climate policy is increasingly seen as a Western-led hegemonic project
aiming to bypass or overrule the sovereignty of Russia. This juxtaposition
is also supported by conspiracy arguments. As our analysis indicates, the
denial discourse generates distrust in international climate science and
emphasizes the contextual nature of scientific knowledge by claiming, in
particular, that the West is trying to monopolize climate science and that
global climate governance is a Western strategy to weaken Russia
13 Gordon Kihot – Global’noe poteplenie, available at: https://en.myshows.me/m/
view/episode/1111359/, accessed 18 April 2018.
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economically and politically. Similar arguments, with nevertheless differ-
ent content, were already being voiced in the Russian media in the early
2000s (Korppoo et al. 2015, pp. 28–9).
Accordingly, the temporal overlap of the shift in the tone of climate
change discourse and Putin’s return indicates that the new discourse
serves the domestic political needs of the regime. A possible impetus for
this qualitative change came after the 2010 drought and fires, that is, the
need to reduce the threat posed by those protesting against the regime,
especially as we have not seen much public criticism on climate change
politics. Yet, the need to reduce environmentally-toned criticism towards
the regime that has not engaged in climate change mitigation and
adaptation is perhaps not fully detached from the fear caused by the
protests against Putin’s third term in major Russian cities in 2011 and
2012.
On top (and as part) of the sovereignty argument and the direct
political interests of Putin’s regime, we argue that the material-spatial
context of Russia in a profound way affects the cultural and political
spheres. That is, the collective feeling aroused by the vast space and its
seemingly endless resources, explains at least some of the arguments
behind climate denial in Russia and, indirectly, the interests of the regime
and its supporters in hydrocarbon exploitation. One motive for Russian
political and energy actors to oppose mainstream international under-
standing of climate change, or at least to cast serious doubts on climate
change as a human-induced process, could be in both the specific
interests of the energy sector in maintaining the status quo in domestic
energy policy and in the general interests of Putin’s regime in reducing
the likelihood of criticism by the Russian people toward the hydrocarbon-
based political and economic system.
Furthermore, referring to the literature on identity construction based
on materialities of energy in Russia (Bassin 2006; Bouzarovski and
Bassin 2011; Grib 2009; Rogers 2012; see also Rutland 2015), we find
that climate denial discourse in Russia could be strategically used to
strengthen a national identity constructed on the notion of Russia as a
‘hydrocarbon giant’ or ‘energy superpower’. As noted by the above-
mentioned scholars, there is the wish of the leadership to strengthen the
role of hydrocarbons as the basis for Russia’s Great Power status.
International understanding of the problem, in particular, its inter-
nationally agreed solutions, including diversification of energy sources
away from fossil fuels, is thus pictured in the media material as an
existential threat to the national identity of Russians.
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CONCLUSION
Russia’s climate change discourse is nationally specific, especially with
regard to climate change denial, drawing on the self-understanding of the
Russian elite concerning their geography and resources, and place in the
world.
There exists a cultural code in Russia enabling the use of the ‘negative
sacral’, that is, societal taboos for the benefit of those in power (Kivinen
2002). In the context of climate denial, three such negative ‘sacreds’ are
of particular interest. First, our analysis indicates that the demonization of
reality is often constructed through the cultivation of conspiracy theories
at the expense of scientific facts. Frequently, increased exploitation of
fossil energy is offered as a cure both for Russia and the developing
world, in direct contradiction to climate change mitigation by reduced
fossil fuel extraction and use. According to Jacques’ (2012) general
theory of denial, its primary cause is that climate change discourse is
serious and threatening to those wishing to maintain power and the
accustomed way of life. Thus, second, the potential and actual chaos
caused by climate change is difficult to acknowledge and discuss in the
public arena. Moreover, the development of production forces, that is,
industrial capacity and the concomitant increase in consumption, is
viewed as a linear process producing well-being and reducing poverty.
This sacral objective is turned into a ‘negative sacred’, the third taboo,
hiding the fact that the extractive nature of the Russian economy
ultimately leads to the consumption of the future wealth of the nation
through resource depletion and climate change.
When compared to Russian climate change discourse during the 2000s
(N. Tynkkynen 2010; Wilson Rowe 2009, 2012), a change in the climate
discourse can be identified: pessimistic accounts of climate change have
gained dominance over the arguments supporting mainstream climate
science. Extreme denialists were influential in Russian climate science
even before the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Laruelle 2014b,
pp. 83–4), but as our analysis shows, they seem to have much wider
possibilities for reaching the public via the media compared to scientists
and journalists adhering to the mainstream international understanding.
The changes experienced recently in Russia’s position as hydrocarbon
producer and exporter and in Russia’s foreign and domestic political
situation provide further motivation for the political leadership not to
oppose climate denial voices in society, if not to support such forces
openly.
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Of course, discussions in the state-controlled media do not reflect the
attitudes of Russian people, and the discourse is only loosely linked to
the choices Russia will make within international climate governance
(Korppoo et al. 2015, pp. 44, 47; Smyth and Oates 2015, p. 302). Yet, the
less the Russian populace is aware of the problems caused by climate
change, and in particular, the less alarmed they are by such problems, the
longer those in power can continue to consolidate their position by
accumulating wealth through extraction and export of fossil energy while
ignoring the threats caused by climate change. Promotion in the state-
controlled media of contrarian and rhetorical notions such as ‘undecided
climate science’, ‘non-rational climate agreements’ or ‘risk-free climate
impacts for Russia’ fits the interests of the energy industry and Putin’s
regime to ensure that there is no strong grassroots opposition to Russia’s
‘free rider’ role in international climate change mitigation commitments.
Even if public discussion after the Paris agreement in December 2015 is
beyond the scope of our research setting here, we can assume that the
tone of the discourse has not remarkably changed after Paris, as Russia’s
commitments concerning emission cuts under the agreement have not
been ambitious.
For the future of Russia’s climate policy, all this comes with major
implications. The need for rapid action in the sphere of climate change
mitigation may arouse more rejection and denial than agency for change.
Because of the ‘negative sacred’, the potential and realized chaos
possibly caused by climate change cannot be discussed. More to the
point, as the international climate effort is in Russia often seen as a
conspiracy to make profit or limit Russia’s sovereignty, the Great Power
dimension of national identity makes it difficult to accept the need to
forefront climate change mitigation policies and emission cuts. Energy
from fossil fuels is seen as Russia’s entrée to Great Power status, and it
seems that this ‘sacred’ cannot be questioned any time soon.
APPENDIX: THE ANALYSED TV DOCUMENTARIES,
TALK SHOWS AND COMEDY SERIES
1. A talk show devoted to climate change aired on national TV1 on 12
December 2009 (Gordon Kihot – “Global’noe poteplenie”).
2. A television documentary utilizing part of the British climate
change denial documentary The Great Global Warming Swindle
(2007), with added Russian sections and interviews (Istoriya
odnogo obmana ili global’noe poteplenie), aired on national TV1 on
12 December 2010.
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3. A television documentary aired on 26 March 2013 on REN-TV
(Territoriya zabluzhdenii s Igorem Prokopenko No. 20).
4. A TV documentary viewed on national Rossiya Nauka (Russia
Science) channel on 14 August 2013 (Nauka 2.0. Global’noe
poteplenie ili lednikovyi period).
5. A documentary film Cold (Holod) aired on NTV in December 2013.
6. A comedy show for adults aired in November 2011 (Odna za Vsekh
– Kris i Endzhi – Global’noe poteplenie).
7. A very popular cartoon (more than 7.1 million views on YouTube)
for kids on national TV1 aired in October 2013 (Barboskiny – 107
seriya. Global’noe poteplenie).
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7. The climate is changing Russia:
from a hydrocarbon to an ecological
culture
In this concluding chapter I will bring together the features of the
Russian hydrocarbon culture and the practices of Putin’s fossil-inspired
geo-governmentality in the context of a changing global climate. Putin’s
Russia continues the centuries-old practices of an empire that is violent
towards its own people and the outside world and is simultaneously
unable to utilize the bountiful resources that Russia possesses, which can
be part of the solution of a healthy planet. Therefore, I want to discuss
not only the gloomy past and the first, but far too inadequate steps that
this regime has taken towards this global goal, but also provide a
blueprint and a vision for a resilient and sustainable Russia. This vision
stems not only from the same geographical realities as the criticized
geo-governmentality of the Putinite hydrocarbon culture, but also from a
knowledge of the Russian national identity and culture. The task of
unleashing the spatial and societal processes that will turn Russia into an
internally strong and internationally respected player is difficult, but
certainly not impossible. This requires a rethinking of the objectives and
rules of the game in both domestic and cross-border contexts: how will
Russians foster the necessary change from within, and how can Russia’s
partners enhance this through their efforts in the spheres of business and
politics?
THE INEVITABILITY OF CHANGE: WILL RUSSIA
SUFFER OR BENEFIT FROM IT?
The scientific evidence and political consensus built up over the past
decades means that climate change is not hitting us out of the blue. It is
not a ‘black swan’ in today’s global perspective; the progress and severity
of climate change does not or should not come as a surprise to leaders.
However, in line with the image constructed by Putin’s regime, the
negative societal impacts of advancing climate change will probably be
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unexpected for many Russians. As I showed in previous chapters, fossil
energy, political power and climate denial are intertwined in Russia to the
extent that an ambitious climate policy with the objective of reducing
emissions, and thus engaging in climate mitigation and transition from a
fossil-based energy system to a carbon neutral one, will be an extremely
difficult task. The political leadership of the country may even see the
effects of climate change as, all things included, beneficial for Russia.
Others, namely the United States, several European countries and China,
will suffer more than Russia (cf. Graybill 2019), so it must be a
beneficial process for the Eurasian territorial giant. The studies illustrat-
ing the potential beneficial economic effects of climate change, such as
the one by Burke and colleagues (2015) regarding the regionalized
economic impacts of climate change, and another focusing on govern-
mental expenditures in Russia (Leppänen et al. 2017), encourage the
Russian leadership to cling to the narrative about the beneficial effects of
climate change for Russia. This story has been told to Russians since at
least the 1990s (for example, N. Tynkkynen 2010): global warming, if it
happens, will for natural reasons benefit Russia. The famous slogan
coined by President Putin in the 2000s on the changing climate – “we
need less fur hats in the future” – is consistent with the possible zero-sum
calculations behind the denialist narrative and political stance. If this
thought is truly driving the words and deeds of the Putin regime’s
geo-governmentality, as I suggest in this book, the idea of Russia as a
surrounded fortress that has permeated political thought is profoundly
biasing the security and risk perceptions of the Russian leadership.
The Fortress Russia mentality is well-suited to the general nationalistic
rhetoric of the conservative-populist movements – which are enchanted
by authoritarianism and its promise to bring order into a world that looks
chaotic – that we see growing today from Eurasia to Latin and North
America. This parochial view of the world is unable or unwilling to see
the cumulative negative effects of climate change as a common problem
facing all humanity and all nations. Instead, it looks at global climate
governance and the effects of climate change as a zero-sum game. The
remedy according to this worldview is not climate mitigation, but thought
control at home in the form of climate denial, and free-riding inter-
nationally in hopes that others who supposedly and in reality suffer more
from global warming will also take care of the mitigation efforts.
Furthermore, as the actors that are actually implementing the mitigation
measures, such as the EU, happen to be the main customers of Russia’s
fossil energy resources, the mitigation itself turns into a security threat
for the fossil-based regime.
Climate is changing Russia: hydrocarbon to ecological culture 115
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter7editedVPT /Pg. Position: 2 / Date:
17/9
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 3 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
When looking at the effects of climate change for Russia, I want to
emphasize that in addition to direct environmental and societal effects
there are others linked to global consequences. These effects, which
include drawbacks in human security leading to conflicts and refugee
crises in Asia, the Middle East and Africa because of climate induced
resource, food and water shortages, are an issue that is nearly fully absent
in the Russian discussion on climate change. As we discussed in the
previous chapter about the Russian mediascape regarding the climate
issue, the line of narrative is that bad things might happen because of
climate change, but they won’t affect Russia. Still, in addition to the
probable impacts of climate change within Russia, the global changes
will have an indirect impact on Russia.
In the territory of Russia, the warming climate will increase the
frequency of extreme and negative weather phenomena (Trenberth and
Fasullo 2012) and infrastructural challenges and economic costs –
including those of the cherished hydrocarbon industries – brought about
by thawing permafrost (Hjort et al. 2018; Schaeffer et al. 2012). The
phenomenon of permafrost thaw is in fact a decisive issue both for
Russia and the whole world. In global terms, a permafrost meltdown may
release such huge volumes of methane into the atmosphere that we might
face a runaway greenhouse effect with catastrophic impacts. In Russia,
permafrost covers approximately 60 per cent of the country’s territory in
western, central and eastern Siberia. Infrastructure, from industry and
transport to housing, is susceptible to the negative effects of permafrost
thaw. The upper layer of soil will become waterlogged and erosion will
be accelerated, thus increasing the costs of building and maintaining
infrastructures. The majority of Russia’s unused hydrocarbon deposits are
in the permafrost areas, meaning that the environmental change experi-
enced there will negatively affect the economy of future projects, as well
as Russia’s ability to export hydrocarbons. This is acknowledged in
official governmental documents (Ministry of Energy 2016): as the
climate changes, the protection of critical infrastructures will become
much more important than today.
In the more northern areas, rising temperatures will be a boon for
agriculture, but the gains on these less fertile lands will be offset by
decreasing grain production in the most fertile southern areas of Russia.
Due to changes in precipitation and evaporation, these areas will become
more arid (Belyaeva and Bokusheva 2017). A warmer climate and higher
CO2 content in the atmosphere will make the forests of the large
coniferous zone of Eurasia grow faster, but forests and forestry in the
taiga zone are expected to suffer from the spread of pathogens and a
higher frequency of forest fires (La Porta et al. 2008). Finally, health
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problems will be exacerbated and life expectancy reduced due to
increasing extreme weather phenomena, such as heatwaves, and by the
spread of tropical and sub-tropical diseases and infection-bearing insects
towards the north (Revich et al. 2012).
The regional and global feedback processes of intensifying climate
change will thus affect Russia in a similar way to the impact they will
have on other Northern industrialized societies. However, the present
hydrocarbon culture mentality is trying to detach Russia from the global
processes and, in fact, from the global community. The parochial Fortress
Russia and the nationalistic-conservative shift carried out by the Putin
regime makes it impossible to picture Russia having any significant role
in the battle against climate change, especially in light of the regime’s
inability to evaluate the trans-boundary security threats of climate
change. As we very well know, climate change is also a security threat
par excellence impacting on all nations, including Russia. Therefore,
unfortunately, the black swan precedes the white: a climate-related
natural disaster in Russia will be the likely trigger for a move towards
sustainability in the present political culture, as climate change is not a
problem for the leadership of a fossil-dependent and monolithically ruled
Fortress Russia. In real terms, not viewed via a socially constructed
hydrocarbon culture identity and practices of a fossil energy-driven
geo-governmentality, climate change is a problem for the Russian people,
businesses and the environment regardless of the mind-set within the
leadership of the country. The severity of the climate-induced catastro-
phe, and how soon it hits Russia, will determine whether Russia is
among the leaders of a new climate-neutral world or a laggard unable to
profit economically or politically from the transition.
In light of Russia’s current strategic outlook, dictated by the hydrocar-
bon culture, the rapid energy transformation is suboptimal. The large-
scale shift from hydrocarbons to renewable energy sources (RES)
provides energy consumers with more choices, meaning that Russia’s
control of energy flows becomes a less effective instrument of geo-
political power (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, since the Russian state
budget is highly dependent on energy export revenues, a major change in
this sector will have a negative impact in many other sectors, including
the military build-up. Lastly, political and technological factors mean that
Russia is unlikely to pioneer the technology development required for the
renewable energy transition. Russia’s involvement in international climate
policy shows that it strives to use diplomacy to influence international
energy and climate policy in a way that discourages change. One key
reason for this inactivity is the power produced via a hydrocarbon
culture.
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The logic of a hydrocarbon culture seems to be at odds with Russia’s
potential to transform to a new level of technological progress. An
innovative economy, which is a prerequisite for transitioning towards a
resilient and sustainable economy built on renewable energies, would
require omitting the mentality and practices – the geo-governmentality –
of a hydrocarbon culture. Instead, Putin’s Russia is now trying to more
effectively utilize different non-military forms of aggression in order to
compensate for the technological lead of Western countries and China.
This point of departure is in fact guiding the agenda of the National
Security Strategy of Putinite Russia. The document states that direct and
indirect political, military, economic and information means are used in
the global struggle for power, and to produce ‘a strategic deterrent’
(Strategiya 2015). A rapid transition to a new technological level, with
energy technologies based on RES leading the way, thus poses a security
threat for Putin’s Russia that needs to be confronted using a wide
repertoire of asymmetric and violent means that have recently been
labelled as ‘hybrid warfare’ (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017;
Galeotti 2017). Furthermore, in the name of Russia’s national interests,
Putin’s hydrocarbon culture is trying to mobilize the entire Russian
society – from individual citizens to major enterprises – behind this
hybrid offensive (Chernenko 2012). In summary, the transition to a
resilient and sustainable Russia that is able to reap the benefits of the
ongoing transition to a new technological level and new RES-based
energies is extremely unlikely under the contemporary violence-prone
hydrocarbon culture. This is the case despite the fact that RES deploy-
ment in Putin’s Russia does exist, as I describe below.
FIRST STEPS: RENEWABLE ENERGY DEPLOYMENT
WITHIN THE HYDROCARBON CULTURE
Russia is an energy giant also in terms of RES: it has both large
resources and the technologically relatively developed society and
economy needed to foster an energy transition towards renewables and a
low-carbon economy. Russia has a large bioenergy potential via its forest
resources, which are the largest in the world, but its vast territory also
provides the potential to develop wind, small-scale hydro, solar and
geothermal power in an economically viable way (LUT 2015). Despite
this promising starting point, the fact that the political elite has grown so
dependent on rents and power derived from hydrocarbons means the
hydrocarbon culture in the making that we are witnessing is at odds with
the energy transition objectives. Historical path dependencies actually
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dictate today’s approach to energy, resources and the environment in
Russia. An important factor is the centrality of resource extractive
industries in the Russian economy throughout its history – from furs,
coal and ore to oil and gas – resulting in economic and environmental
practices that resemble those of other colonial contexts in Africa, Asia
and the Americas. This historical tendency was accelerated during Soviet
era industrialization, which relied on unchecked utilization of natural
resources. The vast size of the industries in the natural resource sector is
the result not only of political history and large resources per se, but also
that of specific resource geographies: the globally important deposits of
oil, gas, coal and uranium are not evenly distributed in the Russian
Eurasian space. Instead, these industries have required significant infra-
structural investments in order to develop resources found mainly in the
periphery. Thus, the specific population and resource geographies of the
country have led to ‘stretched’ infrastructures. This factor then amplifies
the energy–society loop: the more Russia has been compelled to invest in
the energy infrastructures (in gas and oil pipelines, ports and so on) to
maintain production volumes allowing a certain level of rents, the more
its political choices have been narrowed concerning the energy transition
to a carbon-free energy system.
Despite this difficult situation, Russia has officially promoted the use
of renewables and an increase in its energy efficiency. All the energy
strategies that Russia has approved during the 2000s (Ministry of Energy
2003, 2009, 2017) emphasize the necessity to increase energy efficiency
in the Russian economy, from households to the public sector and
industry. This plea for higher efficiency is in line with the economic
rationale to benefit from using less oil and gas in the Russian economy,
and allowing these volumes to be sold on the international markets at a
better premium. Moreover, energy efficiency objectives promote the
deployment of RES, as renewables are also seen as a substitute –
especially for oil and coal – in the domestic energy mix (Smeets 2018a).
Despite being criticized for overblown optimism, particularly concerning
energy efficiency goals and increasing the use of renewables, central
objectives in the strategies (Tynkkynen and Aalto 2012, p. 107; Tynk-
kynen 2014) all mirror the political objectives set for the energy sector by
the political elite. Consequently, the strategies do tell something about
the direction in which official Russia would like to see its energy policies
shift and aim to reassure the rest of the world that Russia is a modern
state with modern goals that only lacks the tools to operationalize these
aspiring objectives. The overly optimistic nature of the strategies is
clearly evident when looking at how the issue of RES deployment has
been discussed, what kind of goals are set, and how these aims have been
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met during the last decade. The 2009 strategy notes that the share of
renewables in the Russian energy mix should cover 14 per cent of the
total energy demand by 2030, and the share of electricity produced via
RES should reach 4.5 per cent (Ministry of Energy 2009). Currently,
Russia’s energy mix contains only 1 per cent so-called new renewables
(IEA 2018b).
Then again, the strategies have had an impact on legislation. The idea
of renewable energies pushing energy efficiencies is made normative
through the government resolution ‘On the Main Areas of Government
Policy to Raise the Energy Efficiency of Electric Power from Renewable
Energy Sources for the Period to 2020’ (Government of Russia 2009).
The legal framework for deploying renewables in Russia, targeting wind
power and bioenergy in particular, was launched in the early 2000s, and
has recently been elaborated by the Russian government via several new
norms concerning both wholesale and retail electricity markets (Gsänger
and Denisov 2017, Appendix 2). Two central governmental strategies set
the scene. The first is the Government decree ‘On the mechanism of
promoting the use of renewable energies in the wholesale electricity
market and power’ (No. 449) passed in May 2013, which introduces
procedures for deploying renewable energy projects within the wholesale
electricity market. This decree has been improved several times since its
onset. The second is the Government decree ‘The scheme of the
territorial planning of the Russian Federation in the field of energy’ (No.
1634-r) issued in 2016, which sets a target to build more than a dozen
wind farms of over 100 MW with the objective of gaining a total wind
power capacity of 4.5 GW by 2030. These efforts have largely been tied
to energy efficiency discourse and norms: the Federal Energy Efficiency
Law of 2009 and Federal Heat Law of 2010 both rely on the idea that
promoting renewables enhances energy efficiency.
In terms of wind power, the issued normative framework is relatively
generous regarding the guaranteed return on investments (Kozlova 2015).
If they meet the capacity supply contract criteria concerning efficiency
and utilized capacity, investments in wind power capacity have a 12 per
cent guarantee of the return on capital. Despite this attractive normative
setting, deployment of wind power has been very slow in Russia: the
ongoing wind installation projects total less than 2000 MW. Even so, the
finalization of these projects will provide a 10-fold increase in Russia’s
wind power capacity. Gsänger and Denisov (2017) list several obstacles
slowing the deployment of wind power in Russia. First, there are very
few investments in the sector because the remuneration scheme is not
transparent. Second, the institutional framework does not favour the wind
power sector, as the players are scattered and lack the scale needed to
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push policies through on the national level. This weakness is further
amplified by the still very small market volume of Russia’s wind power
business. Third, although a legal framework exists, it is considered weak
especially with regard to technical standards and land-use issues. For
example, the standards are hard to observe because of the complicated
regulations concerning the requirements for domestic production and
procurement of technical appliances. Lastly, grid connection is challen-
ging for small-volume wind generator companies, as powerful energy
sector actors in the thermal, nuclear and hydro power areas dominate the
market. Thus, the normative and governance environment for RES
deployment is de jure in place (Boute 2011, 2012), but de facto this
scheme has been very difficult to promote (Pristupa and Mol 2015).
Despite the efforts to construct the normative basis for renewables in
Russia, there are still major problems related to the legal issues: the
system is not transparent and it is full of loopholes that are impossible for
small and medium-sized business players to tackle (Smeets 2018a,
2018b). More to the point, the structure of the energy sector in Russia is
highly biased, in other words, dominated by colossal parastatal com-
panies and state corporations such as Gazprom, Rosneft and Rosatom.
This institutional setting makes it extremely difficult to promote renewa-
bles. In concrete infrastructural terms, the obstacles are also related to the
central role of gas, which comprises half of consumption in Russia’s
energy mix. Historical reliance on gas and the ongoing Gazifikatsiia
Rossii programme (see Chapter 3) have created both political and
infrastructural path dependencies that have become a major barrier to the
decarbonization of Russia. However, within the bioenergy sector – which
is in practice located in the taiga (coniferous) zone of Russia – there is
potential to deploy renewables as they can substitute for the use of costly
oil and coal hauled in from great distances. This is explained by the fact
that the forest industry is a powerful actor in the areas surrounding the
three forestry clusters of Russia – the Northwest region, Southern Siberia
and the Far East – and also has an interest in expanding to bioenergy.
Despite this positive potential push, power plant projects running on
bioenergy have been scarce. This is the case even though national energy
strategies designate the North as a piloting area that would pave the way
for wider bioenergy deployment throughout the country (Government of
Russia 2009). In the forestry-based regions of Russia, the Northern
Delivery system (severnyi zavos), which handles the transportation of
mainly heavy oil and coal from outside the region for use in local power
plants, is surprisingly one of the obstacles to developing bioenergy.
Despite being costly to the communities of the North, the networks of
power, subsidies and the rents involved in the system make it difficult to
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build new energy capacities based on renewables (Salonen 2018). On the
other hand, bioenergy exports, mainly to the EU in the form of wood
pellets and chips, have developed in a much more promising direction
during the past decade (Tynkkynen 2014).
Russia has all the material resources needed to become a ‘Green
Giant’, but currently it is severely lagging behind all other major energy
powers – the EU, China and the United States – in RES deployment. The
proportional increases in RES utilization may encourage the idea that a
major shift is already underway in Russia, but this is only due to the
extremely low starting point. A central question in the context of Putin’s
hydrocarbon culture concerns who is promoting renewable energy in
Russia, and why are specific actors doing so? Discursively speaking, the
promotion of RES is part of a global normative shift to frame social and
economic practices via the loop of environmental sustainability. However,
sustainability has never been a popular term in Russia (Oldfield and
Shaw 2002; V.-P. Tynkkynen 2010). For example, the conservative shift
in Russian policies experienced since the re-election of Putin in 2012 has
basically dropped environmental justifications out of the equation, leav-
ing money as the primary reason to enhance sustainability-related goals
such as energy efficiency (Gustafson 2012; Tynkkynen 2018a). Then
again, the Arctic may well be the context where ‘sustainability’ resonates
for the Putin regime, as being considered ‘green’ is a way to make future
oil and gas projects possible (see Chapter 5). The main problem with
sustainability discourse for Russian critics is related to its social dimen-
sion and, in particular, its emphasis on giving voice to local communities
to define the course of action concerning the use of natural environments
(Tynkkynen 2009b). This liberal ideal is at odds with the authoritarian
power structure prevailing in Russia under Putin. However, sustainability
has entered the corporate world to the extent that major Russian
hydrocarbon companies produce sustainability reports on a yearly basis.
The rationale of Russian actors and institutions when speaking about
sustainability is linked to the concept of democracy. The way democracy
is mimicked in Russia – although it holds elections, has a multi-party
system and independent NGOs exist, all of these are controlled in a
growing fashion by the present regime – suggests that the idea of
democracy has a legitimizing role. In order to gain acceptance, Russian
leaders have thus tried to present themselves as being democratic, as well
as sustainable in their economic policies. Therefore, parastatal companies
employ narratives that mirror the implicit weak sustainability (‘non-
sustained yield’, see Tynkkynen 2007, p. 865) mentality in fossil energy
industries in Russia. Official government policies and programmes, such
as the ‘Year of the Environment 2017’ (see Chapter 5), discuss the
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environment and pollution rather than using the societally loaded term,
sustainability. In order to understand why Russia is home to a growing
number of sustainability projects, it is necessary to examine who is
promoting renewable energy in Russia.
It is no surprise that the actors capable of building renewable energy
capacities today are large domestic and foreign actors rather than regional
or local energy companies that could revolutionize the energy market
from below. For example, the Finnish company Fortum, which produces
up to 8 per cent of Russia’s electricity, is investing in both wind and solar
power in Russia (Fortum 2018). The Russian state corporation Rosatom
(2018) has also entered the renewables scene with investments in wind
power. Although these are real projects, they can be seen as a showcase
initiative enabling the nuclear giant to greenwash its highly problematic
environmental track record. These cases show that so far only big actors
are able to push forward renewables projects on a scale that has any
significance. The combined online capacity (approximately 200 MW)
and ongoing wind power investments (approximately 1800 MW) in
Russia total about 2000 MW (IRENA 2017, p. 12). This might seem like
an acceptable figure, but Russia’s enormous territory – 17 million square
kilometres – sets the potential wind power capacity at thousands of
terawatts and reveals the huge mismatch between the potential and
current deployment. According to the World Energy Council (2018), the
economically viable wind power potential of Russia is a staggering 6000
TWh per year. In comparison, Germany, which has the third largest wind
power capacity after China and the United States, produced 80 TWh
from wind in 2016. The fact that China currently has over 150 times
more and the United States about 80 times more online wind power
capacity is quite telling.
In summary, this kind of a societal setting makes it a very demanding
task to promote renewables and foster the energy transition towards a
low-carbon society. Major energy players have taken the first steps to
establish the renewables sector, and this state-centred approach to RES
deployment will dominate in Russia for years to come. As a result, this is
the only way to promote RES in Russia when the present political
realities are taken into account (Smeets 2018a, 2018b). For the transition
to be successful, Russia will need transparent rules for all actors, small
and large, in addition to breaking the fatal relationship of hydrocarbons
and the social. Thus, while some changes are clearly underway in Russia,
it seems that the (geo)politics of renewables are still the (geo)politics of
hydrocarbons.
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THE NEXT STEP: DEBUNKING PUTIN’S
HYDROCARBON CULTURE AT HOME AND ABROAD
If climate change is not a problem for the leadership of a centrally ruled,
fossil-based Fortress Russia, it will certainly be a severe problem for the
leadership of a globally-oriented, yet locally and regionally strong
federalized Russia. On a regional level, there are already developments
taking place in the renewables sector as well as in the area of climate
change mitigation and adaptation. This is the case in the regions that can
the most benefit from their own RES potential, as well as areas that are
already feeling the effects of climate change (Skryzhevska et al. 2015).
The above-mentioned first steps towards renewables deployment in the
hydrocarbon culture of Russia are a prerequisite for a broader environ-
mental and energy political transformation in the society, but they alone
will not put Russia on the path to resilience and sustainability. The
hydrocarbon culture must be omitted and the social contract based on oil
and gas replaced by regionalized social contracts that are derived from
local socio-economic strengths.
How can the hydrocarbon culture be debunked? The first step is to
discursively unfold and deconstruct the fallacy of the hydrocarbon
culture: to dissect and itemize the presuppositions of the social contract
that stands behind and maintains the hydrocarbon culture. This book aims
to do precisely that and luckily I am not alone, as a growing number of
Russian (Likhacheva et al. 2015; Makarov and Sokolova 2017) and
international (Collier 2011; Rogers 2015) observers are engaged in this
necessary task. This will certainly be very difficult in the authoritarian
and increasingly closed and secretive mediascape of Putin’s Russia, but it
is important for this work to be performed inside the country – first and
foremost by the Russian people – in order to show how the bubble of
hydrocarbon culture is at odds with the global imperative to shift
away from hydrocarbons and why clinging to oil and gas will be perilous
for the Russian people and the state alike. This could be done by
revealing the rationale as well as the business and political actors
behind the specific campaigns and manoeuvres of a hydrocarbon
culture, for example, by scrutinizing and analysing the narrative in the
‘Hydrocarbon-motherland’ (Uglevodorodina) in the special issue of
Novaya Gazeta (2019), which tells the story of Gazprom’s ‘immaculate’
national gas programme while casting a slur on renewables.
Secondly, in tandem and in relation to debunking the hydrocarbon
culture in the domestic context, there is the need to construct an
Ecological Great Power narrative (Klyuev 2002; N. Tynkkynen 2010):
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a resilient and sustainable Russia made possible by unleashing its
potential in renewable energy as well as carbon storage via Russia’s
protected forests, bogs and permafrost. This is a great power position
that comes not by commanding and via coercion, but through the soft
power Russia possesses because other powers look up to it. Russia
is respected and admired because of the ecological services it provides
for the global community along with renewable energies and the
related transport and storage infrastructures, including the electricity
super-grid, power-to-gas production and hydropower capacities, that
provide Russia with a new and – in all meanings of the term –
sustainable economy.
Thirdly, as Russia exports most of its energy commodities, the Russian
thirst for the windfall rents from oil and gas – the root cause of
hydrocarbon culture – can be quenched only by internationally jointly
derived practices aiming at a global transition towards decarbonization.
This primarily consists of new practices, norms and objectives within the
fossil and non-renewable energy industries that force inclusion of the
costs of the social and environmental externalities of hydrocarbon
production, refining and transport in the final price of hydrocarbons and
fossil carbon-based energy in general. Therefore, along with the EU,
China, India and the United States, Russia should jointly agree on strict
monitoring of the social and environmental impacts of hydrocarbon
production as well as mitigation of its negative effects. This must take
many forms: such as carbon pricing and, for example, corporate respons-
ibility certificates that are already well developed in agriculture and
mining. Only in this way can the impact of direct and indirect subsidies
for fossil and non-renewable energy production be reduced, thus paving
the way for renewable energy businesses to compete in the domestic and
international markets.
In the EU–Russia energy diplomacy, this is an issue of both energy
and comprehensive security that can enhance symmetry in energy trade
and promote cooperation and peace. It requires a common voice inside
the EU, via the newly established Energy Union, to exert the full
potential of Europe’s buyer’s power – the natural leverage that the EU
possesses, but has so far failed to use in its relations with Russia (see
Chapter 4). The EU’s Energy Union should enforce strict environmental
and social responsibility norms for all imported and domestically pro-
duced energy sources. This must not be understood as an anti-Russian (or
anti-Norwegian/Libyan/Saudi-Arabian/Nigerian) manoeuvre, as the
entourage of Putin’s hydrocarbon culture would like us to believe. For
example, according to the Russian National Security Strategy (Strategiya
2015) and the report published by the Ministry of Energy (2016) on
Climate is changing Russia: hydrocarbon to ecological culture 125
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Tynkkynen-The_Energy_of_Russia / Division: TynkkynenChapter7editedVPT /Pg. Position: 12 / Date:
14/10
JOBNAME: Tynkkynen PAGE: 13 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed Oct 16 15:26:02 2019
technological prospects in the global energy sector, the United States and
the EU are engaging in a new kind of war against Russia. In this setting,
energy infrastructure is seen as a political tool and source of control. The
Ministry of Energy report argues that “politicization of visions for the
future” is taking place, in other words, increasing demand for norms and
technology that serve environmental objectives set by global climate
governance. They also express the fear that these norms will turn into
geopolitical tensions that hinder investments in Russia. Here they misun-
derstand the intent; the effort needed to debunk the hydrocarbon culture
does not involve hindering or stopping investments in Russia, but
diverting them to sectors and businesses that enable the change to a
low-carbon society. It is an effort to construct symmetric and just trade
relations with Russia that can become sustainable and resilient along with
the reorganization of (trade) relations. This kind of political trajectory
would actually encourage Russia to be at the forefront and behind the
steering wheel in terms of confronting the ongoing energy transition,
rather than being a laggard and a drifter unable to define its own fate.
This problem, which is in fact a grave security issue for Russia and its
neighbours, is recognized in the above-mentioned report by the Ministry
of Energy (2016), and here the “energy revolution” is one option.
Furthermore, the report states that Russian energy companies – and thus
the Russian state – are taking a great risk if they fail to de-invest in
hydrocarbons and reinvest in renewables. The Presidential Decree (2019)
confirming the Energy Security Doctrine of Russia also acknowledges
the need to enable a ‘green economy’ and mitigate climate change. The
risk is that Russia will lose markets and most of the rents as the price of
oil plunges due to the energy transition. Thus, the security risk linked to
the fact that Russia is being left behind in the global race towards
decarbonization is an issue that some factions of the Putin regime
understand. However, they are unable to turn the scales towards action in
the present hydrocarbon culture and when geo-governmentalities dictated
by oil and gas are at play. The above-mentioned Presidential Decree is a
prime example of this: green economies and climate mitigation are
promoted as long as the national economic and security interests of
energy producers are not compromised. Therefore, the above-mentioned
steps need to be taken in order to materialize the vision for a resilient and
sustainable Russia.
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VISION: RENEWABLE ENERGY GEOGRAPHIES WILL
REGIONALIZE AND MODERNIZE RUSSIA
I want to conclude this book with a vision that can act as a blueprint for
a resilient and sustainable Russia. This vision stems from the same
geographical realities as the criticized geo-governmentality of Putin’s
hydrocarbon culture. Furthermore, it corresponds to the mainstream self-
understanding of Russians regarding their national identity and culture.
As I stated above, the task of unleashing those spatial and societal
processes that will turn Russia into an internally strong and inter-
nationally respected player is not easy. However, Russia and the Russian
people can choose differently and prosper. Central to this move is the fact
that the consequences of climate change, and the economies that will
flourish because of it, is the new scene, a game-changer. Although I
argue that materialities and spatialities of (fossil) energy create path
dependencies – the historical inertia of resource-led development and the
authoritarian rule encouraged by it – I emphasize that Russia is not a
prisoner of its geography.
In addition to a highly educated populace, geography and resources are
certainly Russia’s central assets. However, Russia needs to utilize those
riches not for fast economic and political returns, as is the case today
with oil and gas, but to enable a resilient and sustainable Russia. Russia
can play an important role in transforming its own energy system, and
drastically reduce its own emissions, while simultaneously helping China
and Europe, among others, move beyond fossil-based energy systems and
towards renewables. Russia has all the means to make this transition a
reality, and to capitalize on becoming a Green Giant or an Ecological
Great Power. In addition to rich resources – vast space to accommodate
wind and solar power, the ability to link the regions and states of Eurasia
to an electricity (super)grid running on renewables, providing rare earth
metals to benefit renewable energy industries worldwide – this new
position is well suited to the Russian great power identity. Seeing Russia
as a Great Power and an Empire, which is a view shared by many in
Russia, is an asset that can be used for the common good of Russians and
humanity (Klyuev 2002; N. Tynkkynen 2010). The idea of a Great Power
with a special global role has always been a central element in Russian
political thought (Kivinen 2002). This means that Russia can be a key
player in fostering the transition to a climate-neutral world. As climate
change risk becomes reality and also because of its nature Russia can
enable positive change by promoting a new kind of energy policy
leadership. Russia can subsequently become a strong player, resilient and
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sustainable both internally and externally. It can become an Empire
whose power is based on the respect and admiration granted by other
powers because Russia works for the common good of the Earth and
humanity. Today, Russia’s alleged power is based on fear, as illustrated
by the popular Russian proverb: boiatsya, znachit – uvazhaiut or ‘they
fear us, that is – they respect us’. Along with global environmental and
economic changes, Russia has all the potential to be a leader and a
respected actor in a new world where renewable energy plays a decisive
role. One might criticize that this new Green Giant position would be
counterproductive in the framework of Russian modernization aims:
seeing renewables as a new Eldorado for Russia dwarfs the efforts to
diversify Russian economy away from economic dependence on energy.
However, the geographies of renewables are able to foster regionalization
of Russia’s economies to the point that businesses are able to fully utilize
the potential that the specific locality and area possesses. Due to the
profoundly different spatialities and materialities, geographies and infra-
structures of renewable energies (see Chapter 2), they can help to guide
the monolithically ruled country onto the path of decentralization,
regionalization and federalization. In this new context, the whole territory
of Russia becomes an asset as opposed to minuscule points on the
peripheral Siberian and Arctic tundra where oil and gas are extracted
today. This will certainly require new rules, as a true federal system is
able to function only under proper rule of law. However, rule of law
will develop as Russia moves along the path of decentralization and
regionalization, as it is a prerequisite for resilient and flourishing local
businesses, regardless of whether they are small, medium or large, and in
the energy business or not.
As I outlined in Chapter 2, the geopolitical implications of a global
transition to renewables (Scholten 2019) are sure to be a risk for a
monolithically ruled hydrocarbon culture like Russia. However, they
represent a great opportunity for a societally, politically and economically
resilient and sustainable Russia. The inevitable transition has started, but
because the Putin regime is in practical terms unwilling to recognize this,
Russia is severely lagging behind other powers in this transition. The
danger of falling behind is immense: in fact, it is an issue of global peace
and security. A Russia that is unable to transform its economies and shift
the social contract away from hydrocarbon dominance is an extremely
unpredictable and dangerous player in a world that is leaving fossil
energy behind. Therefore, although the prospect of hydrocarbons losing
their markets and profitability appears very distant at this time, now is the
time to make large-scale changes. Once a country falls behind in the race
to deploy renewables on a large scale, it is extremely difficult to catch up.
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As Scholten (2019) argues, renewables are not a strategic factor in the
near future: renewables will probably reduce geopolitical tensions con-
cerning oil and gas, but do not seem to present a challenge to fossil
energy. However, the possibility for petrostates such as Russia to
continue to do business as usual is deceiving.
However, the transition to renewables will depoliticize energy markets
in the medium term, which means around the 2050s. Energy markets and
trade will become more regionalized, but the energy infrastructures
needed to maintain this renewables-based energy system respect (in
principle) no borders. Thus, there will be less need for global flows of
energy, and the accompanying power-vested and geopolitically sensitive
global trade relations, as most of the energy will be produced and
consumed locally. At the same time regionalized energy infrastructures
will make energy relations more complex and reposition the former
producing and consuming countries. Scholten (2019) claims that by this
time energy markets will be regionalized, partly because of the electricity
super-grid. At this stage renewable technologies will probably be pro-
duced massively and in a way that capitalizes on economies of scale. In
this situation, Russia and other petrostates will find that their investments
in oil and gas are turning into stranded assets. If Russia is unable to rid
itself of the hydrocarbon culture and the accompanying social contract by
that time, it will face severe societal problems. This kind of future will
surely not be welcomed by Russians or the global community. However,
as it seems likely that critical metals will be a central part of renewable
technologies, Russia is well positioned with its vast rare earth metal
resources (see Chapter 2). It can capitalize on these resources but still
benefit only partly from the energy transition – remaining a ‘raw material
exporter’ with a volatile and non-resilient economy – if its own energy
system is not changed from centralizing fossil energy to decentralizing
renewables that, in turn, will be a boon for regionalized economies of
Russia.
A Russia that has chosen to become an ecological Great Power in both
words and deeds, forming a new kind of culture and governmentality and
a new strategic outlook that utilizes in this construction all the assets that
the geographies of Russia have to offer, will flourish economically and
be socially resilient in addition to providing solutions for a more
sustainable world via its assets. Renewable energy resources and infra-
structures will play an essential role in this future world. For example,
Russia has a central role to play in forming a Eurasian electricity
supergrid that simultaneously functions as a transit and a storage infra-
structure for electricity trade throughout the Eurasian continent. In terms
of domestic impacts, this transnational infrastructure would allow an
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economically and thus politically regionalized Russia to sustainably
harvest all of its potential – agriculture, high-tech manufacturing and
education – as the colossal structure and the centralizing nature of the
hydrocarbon culture would no longer be blocking business development.
In the international context, along with the trade in renewable electricity,
Russian and European as well as Russian and Chinese relations would
also develop in a more symmetric direction. The renewables-based
electricity super-grid of Eurasia – from Reykjavik and Lisbon to Vladiv-
ostok and Shanghai – will make Russia and its regions important actors
in production, transit and storage of electricity. This can foster trade
relations that are beneficial economically, socially and environmentally
and mitigate common threats: asymmetric dependencies in the domestic
and international contexts as well as global climate change.
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